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INTRODUCTION

The primary regulator of the securities markets is the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), a government agency created under former
President Franklin D. Roosevelt as part of the New Deal. 1 The Great
1.
Andrew Beattie, The SEC: A Brief History of Regulation, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 25, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/secbeginning.asp; The Great
Depression,
DUCKSTERS:
HISTORY,
http://www.ducksters.com/history/us_1900s/great_depression.php (last visited May 1, 2020);
What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (June 10, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/article/whatwedo.html.
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Depression that began in 1929 was in many ways caused by the largely
unregulated stock market.2 The lack of regulation led to great speculation.3
Investors were able to borrow money to buy stocks from brokerage
firms and banks, and when the market began to decline, many of these
investors could not sell their stocks for enough money to pay off their
borrowings.4 Banks and brokerage firms then forced the sale of stock to pay
off margins, and this selling pressure further depressed the market.5 Many
accounts were left with deficit balances because of these forced sales.6 This,
in turn, led to the collapse of many banks and brokerage firms and further
market declines, which triggered sharp declines in buying power and led to
25% unemployment and the closing of many banks, brokerage firms, and
other businesses.7
The 1929 crash was not the first failure of the capital markets; the
Panics of 1884, 1893, 1896, 1901, 1907, and First World War sell-offs were
similarly caused by speculative investors, deceptive stock offerings, and
market manipulation.8 At those times, the Government did not step in.9 An
early part of former President Roosevelt’s New Deal was to enact legislation
aimed at regulating the securities markets, banks, and brokerage firms in
order to prevent future similar debacles.10
The first statute enacted as part of the New Deal’s regulation of
securities was the Securities Act of 1933 (the “‘33 Act”).11 That legislation
dealt primarily with the issuance of securities to be sold and traded on the
stock exchanges of America.12 The ‘33 Act sought to address the problem

2.
Beattie, supra note 1; The Great Depression, supra note 1.
3.
Beattie, supra note 1; The Great Depression, supra note 1.
4.
See Beattie, supra note 1; The Great Depression, supra note 1.
5.
Steve Coll, Lessons of the Great Depression, NEW YORKER (Oct. 11,
2008), http://www.newyorker.com/news/steve-coll/lessons-of-the-great-depression.
6.
See id.
7.
The Great Depression, supra note 1.
8.
Gary Richardson & Tim Sablik, Banking Panics of the Gilded Age, FED.
RES.
HIST.
(Dec.
4,
2015),
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking_panics_of_the_gilded_age;
Bryan
Taylor, Desperate Traders Managed to Keep Trading During the World War I Stock Market
Shutdown, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2014, 11:15 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/worldwar-i-impact-on-markets-2014-8; The Great Depression, supra note 1.
9.
Richardson & Sablik, supra note 8.
10.
See Beattie, supra note 1.
11.
See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 1, 48 Stat. 74, 74 (1933)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa); Beattie, supra note 1.
12.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1).
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caused by bogus offerings of stock to the public.13 Before its enactment,
companies with limited or no financial history and limited or no financial
information (sometimes called shell corporations) were able to raise money
from the public through offerings in companies that were largely fictitious.14
Stock promotors and manipulators were the only ones to benefit from this
activity.15 The ‘33 Act recognized these evils and attempted to require that
the offering of stocks be used to raise capital for legitimate companies that
would promote corporate growth by raising funds for factories, plants, and
equipment and impose integrity on these activities.16 Corporations wishing
to sell stocks to the public faced criminal penalties if they issued false or
misleading financial information, and the ‘33 Act required companies to
disclose all material information about these companies, good and bad, so
investors could understand the businesses and evaluate the risks of investing
in them.17 As we shall see below, this effort has not been fully successful.18
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“‘34 Act”) was directed at
imposing integrity on the stock markets where stocks were publicly traded.19
At that time, in addition to the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), the
nation had other exchanges, including the Boston Stock Exchange, the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, the Chicago
Stock Exchange, the Pacific Stock Exchange, and the American Stock
Exchange.20 Beginning in 1939, many lower-priced securities were offered
13.
Will Kenton, Securities Act of 1933, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 13, 2019),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/securitiesact1933.asp; see also Securities Act of 1933 §
4.
14.
Joshua R. Rosenthal, Note, Burning Down the House or Simply Rolling
the Dice: A Comment on Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Act and Recommendation for Its
Implementation, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L., 1263, 1282–83 (2012); William F. Voelker,
The Securities Act of 1933 and Stockholders of Acquired Corporations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 1, 16
(1965); Kenton, supra note 13; see also Securities Act of 1933 § 6.
15.
See Voelker, supra note 14, at 4, 16.
16.
See id.; Securities Act of 1933 § 6.
17.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2018); see also William O.
Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 181–82
(1933).
18.
What is the 1933 Securities Act?, CORP. FIN. INST.,
http://www.corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/1933securities-act-truth-securities/ (last visited May 1, 2020); see also Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron,
Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1378–79 (2003); discussion infra
Part II.
19.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–291, § 2, 48 Stat. 881,
881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq). The Act has been amended
numerous times since 1934. See Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2018).
20.
Regional
Stock
Exchange,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/regional_stock_exchange (last visited May 1, 2020).
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for sale and sold on markets maintained by the NASD.21 The number of
markets operating in an unregulated environment created many opportunities
for swindlers and stock manipulators to profit from manipulative activities
and take advantage of stock price disparities between the markets.22 For
example, if one could buy a stock on the Boston Exchange for $10 and at the
same time sell it on the Cincinnati Exchange for $10.05, one could turn a
tidy profit based simply on market disparity.23 Reliance on the telegraph and
communication delays also created opportunities for manipulation.24
The ‘34 Act imposed significant criminal penalties on publicly
traded companies that issued materially false or misleading information.25 In
addition, the ‘34 Act institutionalized annual and quarterly reporting of
financial results audited by independent public accountants. 26 Falsifying
revenues, sales, or making wildly optimistic predictions about future results
were all prohibited.27 The ‘34 Act created the SEC, which was charged with
regulating the stock exchanges and security markets and ensuring market
integrity.28 The SEC was granted broad powers to oversee and regulate the
markets. 29 Former President Roosevelt appointed Joseph P. Kennedy, a
well-known stock manipulator, as first Chairman of the SEC, no doubt on the
theory that the fox knew all the tricks played in the henhouse and could best
devise ways to protect the henhouse from the foxes.30 Under Kennedy, who
was the father of former President John F. Kennedy, the SEC in fact took
21.
See Julia Kagan, National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 19, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nasd.asp; Penny Stock
Risk Disclosure Document, FINRA: RULES & GUIDANCE, http://www.finra.org/rulesguidance/notices/92-42 (last visited May 1, 2020).
22.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2.
23.
See a Look at the Buy Low, Sell High Strategy, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25,
2019),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/081415/look-buy-low-sell-highstrategy.asp.
24.
Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1258
(2017).
25.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 5; Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.
(June
10,
2019),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934.
26.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13, 17; Securities Exchange Act of
1934, supra note 25.
27.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18; Securities Exchange Act of
1934, supra note 25; What We Do, supra note 1.
28.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18; What We Do, supra note 1.
29.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18.
30.
See Kenneth Durr & Adriana Kinnane, 431 Days: Joseph P. Kennedy and
the Creation of the SEC (1934–35), SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y (Dec. 1, 2005),
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/kennedy/.
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many steps to impose integrity on the markets.31 It prohibited banks from
lending money to investors for the purchase of stock, thereby protecting the
banks and their depositors from the ravages of margin trading and enforced
the Glass Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibited banks from acting as
broker-dealers.32 It also imposed a minimum margin on stock purchasers.33
No longer could an investor or manipulator borrow all of the funds used to
buy stocks.34 Because the investor had to put up a substantial part of the
purchase price of a stock with his or her own funds, when a stock or stock
market declined, the investor usually had sufficient equity to cover his or her
losses and the risk of the broker liquidating accounts to cover margin loans
and being left with a deficit was reduced.35 Likewise, if a stock bought on
margin declines, the investor is required to add equity to his account.36 This
helped protect the brokerage firms from losing or becoming undercapitalized
due to margin account deficits, protected the public from bank failures
caused by market-related recessions, and sharply reduced bank risk and
broker-dealer insolvency caused by margin lending to customers or the
market decline.37
One of the first rules adopted by the SEC was Rule 10b-5, which
prohibited the making of materially false statements or the omission of
31.
See id.; What We Do, supra note 1.
32.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 7(d) (prohibiting banks from lending
money for the purchase of equity securities); Glass Steagall Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227
(repealed 1999); see also Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 3, 48 Stat. 162, 162
(1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227); 12 C.F.R. § 220.1–220.19 (2019) (providing
further regulations regarding margin lending). Congress also passed the Glass Steagall and
Banking Act of 1933, which prohibited banks from engaging in most broker dealer activities.
Banking Act of 1933 § 3; Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 5, 48 Stat. 74, 77–78
(1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa); Reem Heakal, What Was the GlassSteagall
Act?,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Feb.
13,
2019),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp. This bastion of securities regulation
was largely rescinded by Congress and approved by former President Clinton in 1999 and has
negatively impacted the regulation of securities since that time. Heakal, supra. Recent efforts
to reimpose Glass Steagall restrictions and regulations have failed. 21st Century GlassSteagall Act of 2017, S. 881, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed this
bill in 2017. Id. § 1.
33.
See Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (2018); 12 C.F.R. § 220.4. The
Act authorized the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) to regulate margin trading and impose
minimum margin requirements. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.4.
34.
See 12 U.S.C. § 227; 12 C.F.R. § 220.9; Heakal, supra note 32.
35.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1, 220.4.
36.
See 12 C.F.R. § 220.4.
37.
See 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1, 220.4 (explaining margin requirements and
margin maintenance requirements); Justin Kuepper, Margin Call Definition, INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar. 18, 2020), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/margincall.asp.
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material information from statements made in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities.38 Rule 10b-5 became a key component in the arsenal of
anti-fraud powers of the SEC.39 In subsequent years, the courts permitted
stockholders to sue companies in which they had invested that disseminated
false and misleading information in violation of Rule 10b-5. 40 The legal
profession turned this into a class action cottage industry generating large
legal fees but often little recovery for investors; however, that is beyond the
scope of this Article.41
The SEC has filed many enforcement actions and rule amendments
in an effort to better protect investors. 42 It required companies to report
insider activity in a company stock.43 If the president of a public company
sold (or bought) stock, he (and in the early years, the rare she) had to notify
all shareholders.44 It created new duties on the boards of directors of public
companies, as well as voting rules on the election of directors.45 The later
enacted Williams Act added powers to oversee mergers and acquisitions.46
In recent years, we have seen evidence that much of the regulatory
scheme has failed to create markets that perform with integrity.47 Wall Street
created wealth for its many employees, and great fortunes for its leaders and
corporate entrepreneurs, and great risk for the investing public.48 The crash
of October 1987 should have been a wake-up call, but it was not.49 The
38.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
39.
See id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2018); Lewis
D. Solomon & Dan Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule 10b-5: Legal Standards,
Industry Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
505, 510–13 (1975).
40.
See Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1103–04 (2019); Janus Capital Grp.
v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
249 (1988); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 (1975); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5; Note, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class
Actions, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1086 (2019).
41.
Note, supra note 40, at 1067–68.
42.
What We Do, supra note 1.
43.
See Solomon & Wilke, supra note 39, at 509–10.
44.
See What We Do, supra note 1.
45.
See id.
46.
Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §3, 82 Stat. 454, 455–57
(1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a).
47.
See Solomon & Wilke, supra note 39, at 513; Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. Equity
Market Structure: Making Our Markets Work Better for Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (May 11, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/us-equity-marketstructure.html.
48.
See Aguilar, supra note 47.
49.
See MARK CARLSON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 1987 STOCK MARKET
CRASH WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE RESPONSE 2 (2006).
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crash of 2000, or the tech bubble, revealed that the markets created bubbles
of high-priced tech stocks which had few assets, very low revenues, and no
history of profits.50 Wall Street pushed these stocks on the investing public
and helped create the bubble, which burst.51
Other regulatory flaws were revealed by the collapse of Enron, a
major energy company who, with the aid of its lawyers and accountants,
created cooked books and caused the collapse of Enron, then one of the
largest corporations in the world. 52 Its accountants, the firm of Arthur
Anderson, also had to close its doors. 53 WorldCom also had similar
accounting fraud issues. 54 The response was new, and at least in some
respects, largely ineffectual laws.55 Sarbanes Oxley, enacted in 2002, tried to
address the Enron problem by increasing corporate duties, requiring the
Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of
public companies to certify to the correctness of financial statements, and
increasing the oversight and responsibilities of independent auditors. 56
However, in 2008, another market meltdown led to a significant nationwide
recession, a large rise in unemployment, and a steep market decline.57 This
was largely fueled by improper and highly risky loans to home buyers and
unethical bank practices. 58 Banks generated large short-term profits from

50.
Adam Hayes, Dotcom Bubble, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dotcom-bubble.asp.
51.
Id.
52.
Rapoport, supra note 18, at 1374–75; Scott Horsley, Enron and the Fall of
Arthur
Andersen,
NPR
(May
26,
2006,
4:00
PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=5435092.
53.
Horsley, supra note 52.
54.
Id.; see also In re WorldCom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
55.
See Floyd Norris, A Crime So Large It Changed the Law, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2005, at C1; Horsley, supra note 52.
56.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 802, 116 Stat. 745,
800 (2002); Rosemary Carlson, The Enron Scandal That Prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
BALANCE (Nov. 16, 2019), http://www.thebalancesmb.com/sarbanes-oxley-act-and-the-enronscandal-393497. The Act followed the collapse of Enron and the market crash of 2000, and
requires insiders, corporate officers, and directors to promptly report their purchases and sales
of securities in the companies for which they serve to the SEC and the public. SarbanesOxley Act § 802; Carlson, supra. This followed many years of insider trading cases which
had been decided by federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States. See
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 646–47 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648
(1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
57.
See Veneta Lusk, The Market Crash of 2008 Explained, WEALTHSIMPLE
(June 5, 2019), http://www.wealthsimple.com/en-us/learn/2008-market-crash.
58.
See id.
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these loans, which led to an artificially inflated stock market.59 Banks then
bundled these precarious loans and traded them among each other and to
investors at inflated prices.60 When the underlying mortgage loans went into
default, banks hid this fact from investors and failed to recognize the losses
on their balance sheets.61 Eventually, the loan defaults got way out of hand,
and a number of large publicly traded companies that were heavily invested
in trading sub-prime mortgage paper were forced out of business, including
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, two major brokerage firms, and a
number of banks and mortgage financing companies.62 Congress’s answer
was to enact the Dodd-Frank Act, which imposed greatly expanded oversight
of financial institutions and a whistleblower provision to encourage
employees to report corporate misconduct.63 It also expanded the powers of
the SEC and other government financial regulators and created some new
oversight agencies.64 Congress also imposed new financial rules for banks
and required stress tests on larger banks to make sure they could survive a
financial downturn and were not too big to fail.65
Since 2008, the market has risen steadily to new heights and no
doubt most (but not all) companies are now much more careful, cautious, and
adverse to concealing material information from the investing public than
was previously the case.66 In the modern era, many more Americans have
placed their financial futures in the hands of Wall Street. 67 Retirement
accounts, pension plans, IRAs, and 401(k) plans largely invest in stocks and
mutual funds.68 Thus, the trickle-down effect of prior market crashes and
corrections is now magnified by the direct effect of market movements of

59.
See id.
60.
See id.
61.
See id.
62.
Lusk, supra note 57; Anthony Randazzo & Carson Young, What Caused
the Meltdown:
A Financial Crisis FAQ, REASON FOUND. (Jan. 25, 2010),
http://www.reason.org/faq/what-caused-the-meltdown-a-fin/.
63.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, §§ 1, 748, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376, 1739 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
5301–5330).
64.
Id. § 111.
65.
Id. § 1.
66.
See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29
YALE J. ON REG. 91, 92 (2012).
67.
Eric Whiteside, Where Do Pension Funds Typically Invest?,
INVESTOPEDIA
(July 25, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/credit-loansmortgages/090116/what-do-pension-funds-typically-invest.asp.
68.
See id.
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investors.69 In many ways, these investors are not protected by our laws and
regulations.70 They tend to buy high and sell low.71
It is the thesis of this Article that, in many ways, the markets still
remain at least very underregulated, and the SEC and other oversight
agencies have proven to be unwilling and/or unable to focus on the risks
facing smaller stock market investors. 72 Moreover, Wall Street has
continued to be a casino-like arena, akin to sports betting, rather than a place
where companies can raise capital and create equal and fair opportunities for
all investors to make money.73 Buying stock is—despite a plethora of rules,
regulations and statutes—a place rife with speculation, conflicts of interest,
misconduct, and often has too much resemblance to a casino roulette wheel
or craps table or a bet on a racehorse.74 You pay your money and you take
your chance.75 In too many ways, the fix is in—and certain groups make
money at the expense of the average investor.76 This is not to say that all
investors lose money.77 Those who have bought an S&P index fund and held
on during the 2008 recession have fared well, but many of them panic and
sell low after a large market correction.78 However, there are many groups
that have much better odds than the general public. 79 Regulation was
supposed to prevent that from occurring.80

69.
See Lin, supra note 24, at 1310–11; Kimberly Amadeo, Stock Market
Crash, Its Causes, Effects, and How to Protect Yourself, BALANCE (Mar. 12, 2020),
http://www.thebalance.com/stock-market-crash-examples-causes-impact-3305864.
70.
See Barr, supra note 66, at 110–11.
71.
See Lin, supra note 24, at 1310; discussion infra Section II.A.2.
72.
See Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating Innovation: High Frequency Trading
in Dark Pools, 42 J. CORP. L. 833, 837–38 (2017); discussion infra Section II.A.1.
73.
See Matt Egan, Sports Betting vs. the Stock Market, CNN: BUS. (Aug. 31,
2014,
8:14
AM),
http://www.money.cnn.com/2014/08/31/investing/sports-gamblinginvesting/index.html.
74.
See id.; Jesse M. Fried, Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open
Market Repurchases, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1340–43 (2005).
75.
Lin, supra note 24, at 1253.
76.
Id. at 1287.
77.
See id. at 1313.
78.
See id. at 1311, 1313.
79.
Id. at 1265–66.
80.
See Barr, supra note 66, at 92.
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II.

THE SEC UNDERREGULATES THE STOCK MARKETS AND FAILS TO
TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO PROTECT SMALLER INVESTORS

A.

Underregulation of High-Speed Trading

1.

Failure to Adequately Regulate High Frequency Trading, Alternative
Trading Systems, and Dark Pools

Today, almost all trading takes place on the venerable NYSE or on
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(“NASDAQ”) market. 81 These markets continue to undergo large
fluctuations.82 Each day, television commentators attribute market moves to
fears about the Fed, trade tensions and tariffs, inflation or deflation, domestic
and international politics, and the like.83 On a given day, a stock may rise or
fall 1% or even 2% or more, even though none of the fundamentals of the
company have changed one iota.84 Markets can, and do, rise and fall by 10%
to 20% in very short time periods.85 This is all due to a lack of effort by the
regulators to create a market place that is based on financial performance.86
First, high speed or high-frequency trading (“HFT”)87 and off-market
trading in dark pools 88 has taken control of the markets and made them
81.
Johnson, supra note 72, at 839.
82.
See Lin, supra note 24, at 1274–76.
83.
See id. at 1265.
84.
See id. at 1261.
85.
See Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 1295. In a single week in February 2020,
the markets fell by over 11% in response to the Coronavirus scare, wiping out trillions of
investor funds. Michael Corkery, Wall St. Suffers Its Worst Week Since 2008 as Virus Angst
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2020, at A1.
86.
See Barr, supra note 66, at 97–98.
87.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 836. Large broker-dealer firms run many
of the high-volume dark pools, creating conflict of interest and best execution issues. Id. at
866. The broker has an interest in routing orders to its own dark pool, both because it receives
execution fees and because it may offer its own trading desk or other favored trader’s
opportunities to transact with its customer’s orders. Id. at 868. These interests may conflict
with the customer’s interest in best execution. Id. At least one recent settlement suggests that
these conflicts of interest may have led a dark pool operator to put its own interests ahead of
its customers. See Lin, supra note 24, at 1287.
88.
Barclays Capital Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10010, Exchange Act
Release No. 77001, 113 SEC Docket 1548 (Jan. 31, 2016); Johnson, supra note 72, at 837;
Lin, supra note 24, at 1266. The SEC has filed a few enforcement actions relating to dark
pools. See Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10013, Exchange
Act Release No. 77002, 2016 WL 537942 (Jan. 31, 2016); Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.,
Securities Act Release No. 10272, Exchange Act Release No. 79576, Investment Advisors
Act Release No. 4590, 115 SEC 4340 (Dec. 16, 2016).
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irrational. 89 HFT accounts for almost half of all the volume of trades in
equity securities. 90 The puny regulations directed at hedge funds do not
address the fundamental problem of high-speed trading and some of the
volatility that it causes.91 Hedge funds and other large financial companies,
institutions, institutional investors, Exchange Traded Funds (“ETFs”), and
mutual funds often use technology and high-speed trading to gain advantages
in the markets or manipulate the markets.92 They do not necessarily trade on
the NYSE or NASDAQ; rather, they are permitted to trade off-market and
take advantage of minuscule price differences to make enormous profits.93
This trading often occurs on Alternative Trading Systems (“ATS”) and not
on the NYSE or NASDAQ.94 These trades, if done in dark pools, often do
not have to be reported to the SEC or FINRA at all.95 Other ATS trades are
reported, but only some time after the trade occurs.96 The rise of HFT, ATS
trading, and dark pools is essentially unregulated or underregulated.97 This
trading is extremely complex and presents an ongoing problem that is not
being adequately addressed.98 These types of trades create much volatility
and much risk, and it rarely has anything to do with the financial
performance of a particular company.99
The equity markets tend to move in tandem. 100 On many days,
almost all stocks rise or all stocks fall.101 That is not rational.102 Although
89.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 837–38.
90.
See id.
91.
See Itzhak Ben-David et al., Do ETFs Increase Volatility?, 73 J. FIN.
2471, 2487 (2018); Johnson, supra note 72, at 869.
92.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 835.
93.
Id. at 861, 869.
94.
Id. at 837, 861; Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities
Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 979, 1007 (2015) (discussing the impact of technology
on the trading of securities and the various platforms available for trading). Another factor in
high speed trading is spoofing, an illegal practice engaged in by some traders involving
fictional indications of an interest in buying or selling a security in order to move its price.
Matthew Leising, Spoofing, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2020, 4:44 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/spoofing/2020/01/29/ab90990c-42e0-11ea-99c71dfd4241a2fe_story.html.
95.
Johnson, supra note 72, at 866–67.
96.
Id. at 865.
97.
See id. at 869, 871–72.
98.
Id. at 868, 871–72.
99.
See id. at 837, 858; Lin, supra note 24, at 1313.
100.
See Ira Iosebashvili & Amrith Ramkumar, Risky Assets Move in Tandem,
Stoking Fears More Volatility Lies Ahead, WALL ST. J.: MARKETS (Jan. 23, 2019, 4:18 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/risky-assets-move-in-tandem-stoking-fears-more-volatility-liesahead-11548248400.
101.
See id.
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we live in a world economy where one company’s performance can impact
the performance of other companies on any given day, it makes no sense that
almost the entire market moves in one direction at the same time.103
For instance, the theoretical risk to McDonald’s, Walmart, Hershey’s
Chocolate, or Exxon of a perceived possible decrease in demand for
computer chips is greatly and unreasonably impacted by manipulated
markets. 104 Does a threatened European Union (“EU”) fine of Microsoft
really justify a 5% in McDonald’s, Walmart, Hershey’s Chocolate, or
Exxon? 105 While of course there are some stocks that act counter to the
direction of the overall market, in fact, they are few and far between.106 Am
I really less likely to buy a Big Mac because of the EU fine of Microsoft,
thus reducing the revenues of McDonald’s and its stock price?107 Is Amazon
really worth $50 more or $50 less on a given day?108
High-speed traders, dark pools, and ATS compromise market
efficiency and rationality.109 Often, that trading produces minuscule profits,
but a minuscule profit on five million shares repeated many times over is not
minuscule. 110 In the meantime, the public investor is disadvantaged and
often frightened. 111 Sometimes, the high-speed traders can manipulate a
stock up or down.112 Short sellers pressure stocks and markets to decline.113
The markets themselves are now subject to trading through index funds and
ETFs, so large institutional traders and others can influence the markets by
102.
See id.
103.
See id.; Akane Otani, Stocks Are Moving in Tandem: That Can Be Scary,
WALL ST. J.: MARKETS (Feb. 15, 2018, 5:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/stocks-aremoving-in-tandem-that-can-be-scary-1518720399.
104.
See Otani, supra note 103.
105.
See id.
106.
See id.
107.
See Iosebashvili & Ramkumar, supra note 100.
108.
See id.
109.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 837–38.
110.
Lin, supra note 24, at 1288, 1290.
111.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 858, 860–61; Lin, supra note 24, at 1313.
112.
See Lin, supra note 24, at 1287.
113.
See About Short Selling, FIDELITY, http://www.fidelity.com/learningcenter/trading-investing/trading/about-short-selling (last visited May 1, 2020). A short sale
involves a sale of stock that one does not own. Id. Rather, one borrows shares held by other
investors from a brokerage firm and sells them in the market. Id. At some point, the short
seller must buy back the shares and return them to the broker-dealer. Id. If the short seller
sells a stock for $10 and buys it back later for $9, he makes a profit of $1 per share (less some
cost for borrowing the stock). See id. The short seller is betting that the stock or market will
go down. About Short Selling, supra (discussing the role of how short sellers can force a
decline in the price of a stock or an entire market).
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buying and selling index funds.114 Their purchases and sales require large
additions or deletions in the underlying stocks that compose the index.115
There also appears to be a risk that HFT exercises undue influence
over the United States Government.116 In recent years, every time the Fed
indicates it may normalize interest rates, the market, i.e. the HFT, sells off
and puts pressure on the Fed not to raise rates. 117 It is also likely that
political pressure is brought to bear by HFT on issues like tariffs, pharmacy
prices, and energy policies.118 Thus, the HFT, at times, appears to act like, or
have the effect of, an invisible Political Action Committee, using its funds
and technology to influence policy.119 HFT no doubt is also used by some
ETFs and mutual funds to increase profits.120 The Wall Street commentators
on CNBC and the like rarely speak out against this.121 Rather, they attempt
to show rationality in the process by linking the market moves to trade
uncertainty or concerns that a Fed rate hike will affect profitability.122 In
fact, HFT is often irrational and simply enables the high frequency traders to
make quick profits due to their technological superiority and ability to
influence government policies.123 HFT certainly has elements of a deceptive
or manipulative device which the SEC is supposed to regulate, not
facilitate.124 While the SEC fiddles, Wall Street is fueling a fire that can burn
millions of investors.125

114.
Ben-David et al., supra note 91, at 2472 (discussing the impact index
funds have on market prices). The SEC could also ban short selling. About Short Selling,
supra note 113.
115.
See Ben-David et al., supra note 91, at 2472.
116.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 856.
117.
See id. at 853–54.
118.
See John Schmoll, Political Contributions, High Frequency Trading and
You, C. INVESTOR (Oct. 16, 2019), http://www.thecollegeinvestor.com/7582/politicalcontributions-high-frequency-trading/.
119.
See id.
120.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 856.
121.
See id. at 838.
122.
See Schmoll, supra note 118.
123.
See Gregory Meyer et al., How High-Frequency Trading Hit a Speed
Bump, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), http://www.ft.com/content/d81f96ea-d43c-11e7-a3039060cb1e5f44; Schmoll, supra note 118.
124.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 869; Schmoll, supra note 118.
125.
See Schmoll, supra note 118.
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2.

Steps that the SEC Should Consider in Regulating High Speed
Trading and Dark Pools

HFT is not only in itself a destroyer of the integrity of the market,
but the SEC has left it largely unregulated.126 HFT using dark pools and
ATS does not take place on the NYSE or the NASDAQ.127 It takes place in
a hidden world of cyberspace and is clothed from public scrutiny.128 The
SEC and FINRA carefully monitor and review trades on the NYSE and
NASDAQ.129 While these visible trades are monitored, the shadowy trades
that take place on the cyber street corners, a sort of cyber three-card monte
game, are ignored.130
The SEC should develop regulations to protect the middle-class
investor who relies on market integrity to treat his or her investments fairly
and to protect his or her retirement assets and net worth.131 It is beyond the
purview of this Article to propose what those regulations might look like—
and changes to any system often have unanticipated consequences—
therefore, much thought needs to go into new regulations.132 However, there
are certainly areas that should be considered.* For one, it would appear to
make a lot of sense to require all ATS and dark pool trades to be immediately
reported to the regulators and markets at the time of execution. 133 This
would mean that the market would be aware of these trades and take them
into account in pricing a stock. 134 Alternatively, the SEC might consider
banning HFT, banning off-market trading on ATS and in dark pools, or
requiring all traders, including high frequency traders, to pay a very small
oversight fee—0.001 cents per share—on all trades in excess of, for
example, five thousand shares or $1,000,000 made on a given day in a given
stock by a single beneficial owner.135 This added cost could fund oversight
126.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 860, 869, 872–73.
127.
See id. at 864–65; GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. R43739, DARK POOLS IN EQUITY TRADING: POLICY CONCERNS AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 5 (2014).
128.
SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 127, at 1.
129.
See id. at 9–10, 13.
130.
See id. at 7–10, 12; Johnson, supra note 72, at 867, 870–72.
131.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 870; Lee Barney, SEC Faces Its Own
Debate on Fiduciary Advice Standards, PLANADVISER (July 28, 2015),
http://www.planadviser.com/sec-faces-its-own-debate-on-fiduciary-advice-standards/.
132.
See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 127, at 6–9.
133.
See id. at 9–10.
134.
See id.
135.
See id. at 10; Johnson, supra note 72, at 872–73; Lin, supra note 24, at
1309.
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and make HFT less profitable and provide a disincentive to HFT.136 It might
also consider a small charge based on the market value of the trade.137 For
example, a small fee could be assessed on non-regulated mutual funds
involving a market value in excess of $500,000 or $1,000,000 made within a
five-minute period in a given stock.138 It could also consider requiring a high
frequency trader, and perhaps other investors, to hold a position for twentyfour hours.139 The law of unexpected consequences requires some study of
these issues and solutions, lest the cure be worse than the disease, but the
regulatory void needs to be addressed in a swift and forthright manner.140
B.

Failure to Regulate Irrational Stock Performance
1.

The SEC Has Permitted Markets to Be Overly Volatile,
Creating Additional Risks for Investors

The stock market used to have a rule of thumb.141 Years ago, most
stocks traded at, perhaps, seven times its earnings (if a company earned $10
per share per year, its stock price would normally be around $70).142 Today,
most companies trade at twelve to eighteen times their earnings, but many
trade at much higher multiples with little rational economic justification for
the price.143 Many companies that earn no profit at all trade at high prices.144
Hyped by Wall Street, Beyond Meat, at times, sells for over $200 per share
without any earnings or profit and the risk of strong competition from other
food producers.145 Moreover, stocks routinely trade up or down 1% or more

136.
See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 127, at 9–10; Johnson, supra note 72,
at 870–73, 884; Lin, supra note 24, at 1309.
137.
See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 127, at 9–10; Johnson, supra note 72,
at 870–73, 884; Lin, supra note 24, at 1309.
138.
See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 127, at 9–10; Johnson, supra note 72,
at 870–73, 884; Lin, supra note 24, at 1309.
139.
See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 127, at 9–10; Johnson, supra note 72,
at 870–73, 884; Lin, supra note 24, at 1309.
140.
See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 127, at 9–10; Johnson, supra note 72,
at 872–73, 884, 886; Lin, supra note 24, at 1309.
141.
See Aguilar, supra note 47.
142.
See id.; Dana Anspach, P/E Ratio & How to Use It to Make Smart
Investments: How to Interpret the Price to Earnings Ratio, BALANCE: INVESTING (Nov. 15,
2019), http://www.thebalance.com/normal-pe-ratio-stocks-2388545.
143.
See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 127, at 3–4; Aguilar, supra note 47.
144.
See Aguilar, supra note 47.
145.
David Moadel, Beyond Meat Stock Is Finally Worth A Look After Wild
Ride
in
2019,
INVESTORPLACE
(Jan.
6,
2020,
11:37
AM),
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on a given day, and up or down 5% or 10% in a given week.146 The failure
of stocks to trade rationally appears to be related to HFT, ATS, and dark
pools—stocks no longer trade based on fundamentals.147
2.

How Might the SEC Make Stocks More Rational and Less
Volatile

Stock prices should be rational.148 A stock should be priced in such
a way that reflects current income, realistic future income, and the rate of
return from dividends.149 If a stock has a dividend that appears to be solid,
its dividend yield should not soar to two or three times the yield of a ten-year
treasury note when the market sells off. 150 For the stock market not to
continue to be a casino, stock prices should be less volatile and more
rationally related to the underlying fundamentals of the stock.151 Some of the
matters discussed above explain the lack of correlation at any given time of
the actual economic performance of a stock with its stock price.152
All public companies are required to report projected earnings and
actual earnings.153 Quarterly financial statements are required to be reported
on Form 10-Q and annual financial statements are required to be reported on
Form 10-K. 154 Under the current system, companies often give earnings
estimates and Wall Street then estimates performance; when earnings and/or
revenue exceed or miss expectations, the stock of the company fluctuates up
or down significantly.155 This quarterly reporting leads to surprises and rapid

http://www.investorplace.com/2020/01/beyond-meat-stock-is-finally-worth-a-look-after-itswild-ride-in-2019/.
146.
See Corkery, supra note 85; Earnings Call: A Closer Look at Financial
Reports, HENSSLER FIN. (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.henssler.com/earnings-call-a-closerlook-at-financial-reports/.
147.
See Johnson, supra note 72, at 836–37, 866, 870.
148.
See id. at 835–37, 870.
149.
Id. at 840; Claire Boyte-White, How Dividends Affect Stock Prices,
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 17, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/091015/howdividends-affect-stock-prices.asp.
150.
See Boyte-White, supra note 149.
151.
See Ben-David et al., supra note 91, at 2474.
152.
See id.; Johnson, supra note 72, at 835–37, 866, 870; Boyte-White, supra
note 149; Earnings Call: A Closer Look at Financial Reports, supra note 146.
153.
See Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (June 26, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-form10khtm.html.
154.
See id.
155.
See James Chen, Street Expectation, INVESTOPEDIA (May 1, 2018),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/streetexpectation.asp.
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stock movements.156 Companies certainly know their weekly revenue and
costs and should report that within a week or two following the weekly
cycle. 157 This way, the market will not be full of unanticipated financial
results and surprises and can avoid the fluctuations that result. 158 If the
company believes that a weekly result is an aberration, it can state why—for
example, a company could state that a train strike delayed deliveries, but that
it expects to be able to make up for this shortly after the strike ends.159 The
SEC should consider weekly financial reporting to decrease volatility.160 It
may also reduce class action lawsuits filed against companies by eliminating
surprise financial reports.161
C.

Corporate Buybacks Are Largely Unregulated
1.

Issues Created by Corporate Buybacks

Corporate buybacks are another major contributor to irrational stock
performance.162 Many of the Fortune 500 companies use their free cash and
profits to buy back their own stock in the market place, thereby reducing the
number of publicly traded shares and presumably increasing the earnings per
outstanding shares. 163 These buybacks can be a windfall for institutional
investors and corporate insiders.164 If the CEO has acquired 0.05% of his or
her company’s stock through grants of stock or options, a buyback of
company stock increases his or her percentage of company ownership and
has a significant benefit for him or her.165 For the ordinary shareholder with
100 shares, or with a two share position through a mutual fund, the increase

156.
Earnings Estimates and Their Impact on Stock Prices, AM. ASS’N
INDIVIDUAL INV., http://www.aaii.com/investing-basics/article/earnings-estimates-and-theirimpact-on-stock-prices (last visited May 1, 2020).
157.
See id.
158.
See Earnings Call: A Closer Look at Financial Reports, supra note 146;
Earnings Estimates and their Impact on Stock Prices, supra note 156.
159.
Chen, supra note 155; Earnings Call: A Closer Look at Financial
Reports, supra note 146.
160.
See Earnings Call: A Closer Look at Financial Reports, supra note 146.
161.
James Brumley, Class-Action Suits Shouldn’t Stress, or Surprise, Nio
Stock
Owners,
INVESTORPLACE
(Mar.
21,
2019,
10:37
AM),
http://www.investorplace.com/2019/03/class-action-suits-shouldnt-stress-or-surprise-theowners-of-nio-stock/.
162.
Fried, supra note 74, at 1356.
163.
See id. at 1362 (discussing corporate buybacks).
164.
See id. at 1358.
165.
See id.
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is minuscule and provides no meaningful financial gain.166 Wall Street loves
buybacks because they favor the wealthiest.167 A buyback, unlike a stock
dividend, is not double taxed (i.e., the corporation pays a tax on its profit and
the shareholder is also taxed on receipt of that profit in the form of a
dividend). 168 Buybacks thus increase the national debt and decrease tax
revenues from corporate profits.169
2.

How Could the SEC Better Regulate Stock Buybacks

Funds used for the buyback could be paid as dividends to investors,
invested in property, plant, equipment, or research and development to
expand the company and provide jobs, or used to reduce corporate debt.170
Most of our large public corporations carry significant amounts of long-term
debt.171 Yet they do not pay it down when they have accumulated significant
cash, but rather use their excess cash to buy back stock.172 This appears to
create a risk of fiscal imprudence and is negative on long-term performance,
as the corporation remains liable for interest and principal repayments on its
debt.173 Some of the corporate cash used for buybacks could possibly be
paid as a return of capital to all stockholders, which could be treated as taxfree. 174 The SEC should also consider barring stock buybacks. 175 The
directors and CEOs who authorize them often have a conflict of interest with
smaller shareholders.176 The SEC also permits many companies to limit the
voting rights of their common shareholders, further reducing their influence
on buybacks and other reforms that might benefit investors. 177 These
166.
See id.
167.
See Fried, supra note 74, at 1357–58.
168.
See id. at 1336–37; Neil H. Buchanan, Are Taxes on Dividends Really
Double Taxation, as President Bush Claims? Why the Answer Is No — and Why That Is the
Wrong
Question
to
Ask,
Anyway,
FINDLAW
(Feb.
20,
2003),
http://www.supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/are-taxes-on-dividends-really-doubletaxation-as-president-bush-claims.html. The taxation of the corporation on its profit and of its
investor’s dividends paid by the corporation has euphemistically been described as double
taxation. Buchanan, supra.
169.
See Fried, supra note 74, at 1336; Buchanan, supra note 168.
170.
See Fried, supra note 74, at 1338, 1385.
171.
Id.
172.
See id. at 1329, 1385.
173.
See id. at 1329, 1347, 1385.
174.
Id. at 1336–37, 1343.
175.
See Fried, supra note 74, at 1342.
176.
See id. at 1342–44, 1347.
177.
See J.B. Maverick, Class A Shares Vs. Class B Shares: What’s the
Difference?,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Apr.
21,
2019),
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directors and officers derive most of the benefit while the corporation and
small investors are, in many ways, often disadvantaged by the practice.178
The buyback often leads to an increase in stock price that is unrelated to the
actual objective value of the stock and gives institutional investors the
opportunity to show positive results that are overstated. 179 It also creates
opportunities for high frequency traders to make quick short-term profits.180
D.
Corporate Compensation Is Excessive, Largely Unregulated, and
Negatively Impacts Financial Results for Investors
1.

How Does Corporate Compensation Harm Investors

Wall Street over-rewards corporate founders and stock underwriters.181 A Bill Gates, a Jeff Bezos, or a Steve Jobs certainly should be
very generously compensated for their creativity and business acumen.182
But should Jeff Bezos have so much wealth that he can get a divorce,
give his ex-wife half his Amazon stock, and still be the richest man in the
world?183 Most CEOs have a rather short shelf life, but they often rake in
$10, $15, or $20 million a year or more, while the corporations they run
often pay workers $7.50 an hour and pay shareholders zero in dividends.184
Capitalism has many worthy attributes, but the significant under-controlled
and underregulated overcompensation of top corporate officials has gotten
out of hand.185 It has grossly overrewarded a few, greatly overvalued many
others, and deprived shareholders and workers of their fair share.186 It also
negatively impacts corporate profits, at least to some extent.187 Moreover,
corporations are required to disclose the compensation of only their very top

http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/062215/what-difference-between-class-shares-andother-common-shares-companys-stock.asp (discussing different classes of common stock with
different voting rights).
178.
Fried, supra note 74, at 1346, 1355–56.
179.
Id. at 1349, 1351, 1354–55.
180.
See id. at 1356.
181.
See Jill Fisch et al., Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm
Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (2018); Natasha Frost, Jeff Bezos Just Lost
$38 Billion. He’s Still the Richest Person in the World, QUARTZ (July 6, 2019),
http://www.qz.com/1659819/jeff-bezos-remain-worlds-richest-man-after-finalizing-divorce/.
182.
Fisch et al., supra note 181, at 102.
183.
See Frost, supra note 181.
184.
Fisch et al., supra note 181, at 102; Fried, supra note 74, at 1367.
185.
See Fisch et al., supra note 181, at 102 (discussing CEO compensation).
186.
See id. at 108.
187.
See id. at 102.
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executives.188 The SEC now gives shareholders some limited opportunity to
state whether they feel CEO compensation is fair, but this is non-binding.189
It also requires some reporting of the ratio of CEO compensation to median
compensation of all employees. 190 Many lower level executives are also
overrewarded with large six and seven figure earnings which are not
disclosed to shareholders.191 This again reduces corporate profits and creates
great wealth inequality.192
Despite the anemic SEC efforts to require disclosure of some
corporate compensation for high ranking and/or highly paid executives, and
its lack of any restrictions on such compensation, the fact is that many
corporations richly reward CEOs and other executives year after year,
whether profits are up or down.193 CEO pay has grown exponentially over
the last fifty years, while income tax rates have generally declined.194 Why
should a corporation pay its leaders 100, or 200, or 300, or 1000 times more
than what it pays to its average worker?195 Why should a CEO be paid $15
million or $30 million a year, or more, when the average employee makes
$50,000 per year?196 A successful CEO should be able to drive a Mercedes
188.
See id. at 105; SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, U.S. SEC &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html (last visited
May 1, 2020).
189.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2019). The SEC gives shareholders an
advisory opportunity to indicate approval or disapproval of CEO compensation. Id.
However, because it is advisory only, it appears to have little value. Fisch et al., supra note
181, at 106.
190.
See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50104, 16 (Aug. 18, 2015) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 229, 240, and 249). The SEC also has required disclosure of how
CEO compensation compares with the median compensation of all employees, which was
adopted to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641); Securities Regulation — Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1144, 1144 (2016). The SEC did not develop
any findings on how this information would assist investors. Securities Regulation — DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra.
191.
SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, supra note 188.
192.
See Fisch et al., supra note 181, at 108.
193.
See id. at 106.
194.
See Diana Hembree, CEO Pay Skyrockets to 361 Times That of the
Average
Worker,
FORBES
(May
22,
2018,
4:28
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dianahembree/2018/05/22/ceo-pay-skyrockets-to-361-times-thatof-the-average-worker/.
195.
See id.
196.
See id. Interestingly, CEO longevity appears to be relatively short. See
CEO Turnover at Record High, FINANCIAL, http://www.finchannel.com/opinion/analysis3/77322-ceo-turnover-at-record-high (last visited May 1, 2020). This suggests that many
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and own a lovely vacation home if he or she wants to and have meals that
cost $500 per person. 197 But are his children, grandchildren, great
grandchildren, and their offspring also entitled to live that well, at the
expense of the small shareholder?* No wonder the top 1% control so much
of the nation’s wealth.198
2.

How Can the SEC Regulate Corporate Compensation to Better
Protect Shareholders

Obviously, an effort by the Government to regulate employee
compensation will create much controversy and opposition. 199 But the
Government does regulate corporate compensation to the extent it imposes a
minimum wage. 200 Why is it such a great leap to impose a maximum
wage?201
Of course, even if someone accepts the premise of a cap on
compensation, the question becomes, “how much is the cap and how can it
be done?”202 Several approaches could be considered.203 A corporation that
is paying out compensation that exceeds a certain percentage of revenue
could be required to submit the matter to shareholders.* A corporation that
desires to pay top officers more than one hundred times the median
compensation paid to its workforce could be required to submit this to a
shareholder vote.* A corporation that wanted to give its senior officers a
raise in any year in which the corporate profit declines from one year to the
next could be required to submit that to shareholders.* A study of this and
other possible approaches should be undertaken.* The current regulations

CEOs are not performing at a high level that justifies their extraordinary compensation levels.
Id.
197.
See Adam Hartung, Why CEOs Make So Much Money, FORBES:
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(June
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2015,
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Alexandre Tanzi & Michael Sasso, Richest 1% of Americans Close to
Surpassing Wealth of Middle Class, BLOOMBERG: ECONOMICS (Nov. 9, 2019, 5:00 AM),
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199.
Hartung, supra note 197.
200.
See Damon Linker, Why We Need a Maximum Wage, WEEK: OPINION
(Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.theweek.com/articles/447652/why-need-maximum-wage.
201.
See id.
202.
See id.
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See id.
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simply do not regulate corporate compensation.204 These types of corporate
regulations might well cause boards of directors to simply stay within the
guidelines so as to avoid having to seek shareholder approval of arguably
over generous packages.205
Senior officer compensation is approved by the board of directors.206
They, in turn, often rely on compensation consultants who compare the
compensation of top officers of comparable companies. 207 Successful
compensation consultants find ways to justify whatever the CEO can
persuade the board is fair compensation.208 This razzle dazzle also does not
regulate corporate compensation. 209 Another truism is that corporate
performance is often based on factors that have nothing to do with CEO
performance, such as rises or falls in commodity prices, changes in supply
and demand in particular products, and the like.210 As one author has noted,
[f]actors that have little or nothing to do with the CEO’s
performance, but that lead to a rise in profits and share prices, can
lead to higher CEO pay. For example, a study found that jumps in
world oil prices led to large increases in the pay of CEOs at oil
companies (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). Presumably, the
CEOs had nothing to do with the rise in world oil prices, so
effectively they got large pay raises as a result of factors that were
outside of their control.211
204.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2019); see also Fisch et al., supra note 181, at
105; Securities Regulation — Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
supra note 190, at 1144.
205.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21; see also Fisch et al., supra note 181, at 105;
Securities Regulation — Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra
note 190, at 1144.
206.
Michael J. Segal, 2017 Compensation Committee Guide, HARV. L. SCH. F.
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/29/2017compensation-committee-guide/.
207.
Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and Independent
Compensation Consultants, 49 J. ACCT. & ECON. 247, 247 (2010); see also Securities
Regulation — Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 190,
at 1144; Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Compensation Consultants and the Level,
Composition and Complexity of CEO Pay 1–41, 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Accounting & Mgmt.
Unit, Working Paper No. 18-027, 2019) (discussing the role of compensation consultants).
208.
See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Untold Story of Underwriting
Compensation Regulation, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 642 (2010).
209.
See id. at 649.
210.
See BAKER ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., REINING IN CEO COMPENSATION
AND CURBING THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 8 (2019).
211.
Id. Presumably, with oil prices and oil company profits deeply distressed,
the CEOs of these companies are still generously compensated. Id.
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E.
Public Offerings Often Benefit the Underwriters and Institutional
Investors to the Disadvantage of the Issuer and at Times Do Not Benefit the
Corporation Issuing the Stock at All
1.

What Is Wrong with the New Issue Market

The original premise of a stock offering was to raise capital for the
corporation so it could increase its investment in property, plant and
equipment, and research and development.212 This in turn led to growth in
earnings, expansion of markets and innovative products, and profits for
investors.213 However, often ignored is the fact that once a stock is sold to
the public, the capital is raised, and the use of proceeds, wise or unwise, is
completed.214 Thereafter, the stock is traded, but the corporation gets little or
no direct benefit if the stock goes up and little or no direct detriment if the
stock goes down. 215 Rather, the offering price set by the issuer and its
underwriters is the price received by the company. 216 If the stock
immediately increases dramatically—as in the recent issue of shares by
Chewy and Beyond Meat—the company gets no benefit. 217 The initial
offering is the price which institutional investors and favored clients of
broker-dealers pay.218 If the stock jumps, they immediately benefit.219 The
average investor has no access to the stock at the initial offering and thus
pays a higher price.220 Of course, the corporate insiders, the underwriters
who are often paid in stock, institutional investors, corporate founders, and
key officers and directors now have a place to sell their stock at far above
what the corporation received for the stock.221 The average investor jumps in
212.
See Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 208, at 628, 646.
213.
Id. at 646–47.
214.
Id. at 628–29.
215.
See id. at 632.
216.
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Chewy IPO, RETAILDIVE (July 16, 2019), http://www.retaildive.com/news/petsmart-upgradedthanks-in-part-to-chewy-ipo/557990/; Paul R. La Monica, Beyond Meat Shares Are on a Wild
Roller
Coaster
Ride,
CNN:
BUS.
(June
18,
2019,
11:51
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2019/06/18/investing/beyond-meat-stock/index.html.
218.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 585–86; Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 208, at
630. For a discussion of how the initial public offering (“IPO”) price is determined and how
insiders and underwriters advantaged. See Griffith, supra note 216, at 585–86.
219.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 601.
220.
Id.
221.
See id. at 594; Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 208, at 631.
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often paying well above the offering price, and often several multiples above
the price paid by these insiders.222 If the insiders choose to hold their stock,
they maintain, for all practical purposes, control of the corporate purse
strings with access to liquidity.223 This unique system permits the average
public investor to be disadvantaged and perhaps duped.224 There are many
reasons why the system works this way, but by in large the system works this
way to benefit the insiders.225 The SEC looks away while Wall Street, in
effect, often rips off the corporation issuing stock and the small investor.*
For example, the investment banker reduces its potential liability to
purchasers of stock under section 11 of the ‘33 Act, in the event of a
misstatement in the prospectus in that it has no liability so long as the stock
does not fall below the initial offering price.226 Whatever justifications are
made for the system, it is a bad system that requires a new look and more
regulation.*
Not only do stock markets not raise capital after the IPO, but some
companies go public without raising any capital for the corporation. 227
Chewy recently went public and jumped in price immediately, but the funds
raised in the IPO went primarily to pay off debt of a major shareholder,
PetSmart, and not into the coffers of Chewy.228 The money was not used to
build new distribution centers or better automate deliveries.229 It was not
spent on computers or software.230 It was not even spent to pay the direct
debt obligations of the company.231 Investment bankers and traders create a
mindset divorced from reality.232 In effect, this kind of IPO is a scam.233 In
the Chewy case, the scam was fully disclosed, and therefore passed muster
under the ‘33 Act.234 There, of course, is the problem.* How could the SEC
approve a scam?* Investors who buy shares in the new public company after
222.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 585–86.
223.
See Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 208, at 633.
224.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 630.
225.
Id. at 601; Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 208, at 633.
226.
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018); Sjostrom, Jr., supra
note 208 at 633.
227.
See Jansen, supra note 217.
228.
See id.
229.
See id.
230.
See id.
231.
See id.
232.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 643–44.
233.
See id. at 642–43.
234.
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2018); Lauren Hirsch &
Leslie Picker, Chewy.com, PetSmart’s Online Business, Prices IPO at $22 a Share, Above
Expected
Range,
CNBC
(June
14,
2019,
9:17
AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/13/petsmarts-online-business-chewycom-prices-ipo.html.
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the public offering are not raising capital. 235 They are participating in a
perpetual poker game where sometimes they win, sometimes they lose, or
sometimes they stop playing. 236 An IPO benefits the founders of the
company and insiders, who often realize immediate generational wealth
(once the lock-up period ends).237 Those who buy the stock in the market
after a company goes public become participants in a perpetual poker
game.238
Moreover, the sale of shares to the public in an IPO is buried in
mystery, despite the one hundred page and longer, single-spaced offering
documents that are required to be given to investors.239 The average investor
does not understand how unfair the system is to him or her.240
Capitalism is based on the idea that companies can raise money from
the public in order to compete in the marketplace.241 But if the company
raises money that does not go to the company, what was the point of the
offering?242 Of course, some money can theoretically be raised after a public
offering.243 A company can sell additional shares and dilute its stock price,
but other than that, the price moves on the market do not provide capital.244
The company can sell debt, but that has to be repaid with interest.245 But
otherwise, the market, with its wild fluctuations, ceases raising working
capital for property, plants, equipment, and research and development.246 It
is in many ways, as noted above, a place to make a bet.247 The SEC has not
addressed this aspect of publicly traded stocks.248

235.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 630–32.
236.
See Egan, supra note 73.
237.
Alon Brav & Paul A. Gompers, The Role of Lockups in Initial Public
Offerings, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 1 (2003). The lock-up period is intended to prevent insiders
from selling their shares at the same time as the IPO and requires them to hold their shares
before selling in the public markets for a period of six months. Id. at 3. One theory for having
a lock-up period is to prevent insiders from dumping their shares into the public markets and
perhaps profiting from an overpriced IPO. Id. at 4–5. In fact, the lock-up period may benefit
insiders if the IPO price is set too low and the stock price rises following the IPO. Id.
238.
See Egan, supra note 73.
239.
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b).
240.
See Brav & Gompers, supra note 237, at 5.
241.
See id. at 23.
242.
See id. at 26–27.
243.
See id. at 19.
244.
See id.; Fried, supra note 74, at 1385.
245.
See About Short Selling, supra note 113.
246.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 635.
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Brav & Gompers, supra note 237, at 18.
248.
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The SEC should look at attempts to issue stocks to raise capital and
make sure the public investors will have their funds used to benefit the
company, and not some other entity, or a private investment firm.249 The
SEC should also take steps to ensure that public companies selling stock
obtain the most significant amounts obtainable. 250 The system, however,
primarily protects the underwriters and insiders who profit in various ways
from having companies issuing stock at too low of a price.251 Underwriters
are often compensated in whole or in part with stock of the issuer; if the
underwriter is paid in stock based on the initial offering price and the stock
immediately rises when the offering begins, the underwriter’s profit is
dramatically increased; for example, if the offering is priced at $100 and the
underwriter receives ten shares (i.e. $1000) based on this price, if the stock
immediately trades at $200, the underwriter can sell its stock and get $2000
rather than the contemplated $1000.252 Insiders receive shares valued at the
offering price, but they are not allowed to sell their shares immediately
because the SEC wants to disincentive insiders who price an IPO at too high
a price, then sell it in the IPO and see the price drop thereafter, thereby
profiting from the overpriced IPO.253 However, in practice, it is not clear
that this is a current risk.254 Conversely, when an IPO is underpriced, the
insider is likely to benefit from a higher price after the lockup period ends.255
The interests of the actual issuing corporation or the average investor is not a
predominant interest.256
Additionally, public offerings are subject to what appear to be
irrational and perhaps manipulated prices.257 A company like Beyond Meat
might sell its stock at $25 a share, but a few minutes later, the stock price
may be $50 a share or more.258 It may rise to $100 or even $200 in a few
days or a few weeks.259 The company gets its $25.260 Who gets the rest?261
249.
See id. at 23.
250.
See id.
251.
Griffith, supra note 216, at 592–93.
252.
See id. at 593–95.
253.
See id. at 585–86.
254.
See id. at 587.
255.
See id. at 589–90.
256.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 634–35 n.177; Therese H. Maynard,
Spinning in a Hot IPO — Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2023, 2080–81 (2002).
257.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 592–93.
258.
La Monica, supra note 217.
259.
Id.
260.
See id.; Griffith, supra note 216, at 599–600.
261.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 599–600; La Monica, supra note 217.
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Speculative traders, high frequency traders, ATS, dark pool traders, and the
insiders and underwriters all have a field day.262 Institutions that get in at the
$25 price make a killing.263 Usually, relatively few shares are offered to the
investing public, and usually these shares go to special customers designated
by successful stock brokers. 264 Those who were not able to buy Beyond
Meat at its offering price, but did want to own it, paid a tremendous
premium.265 The SEC never seems to look at this.*
How are IPO shares marketed?266 A sophisticated road show goes
out and provides institutions, and other broker-dealers, with glowing reports
on the prospects of the company.267 Brokerage firms, especially those who
are part of the underwriting group, recommend the security to their investors,
big and small.268 They create the hype that leads to the company getting $25
a share, while the stock trades at twice that—and costs average investors
twice as much—in a few minutes.269
2.

How Can the SEC Better Regulate IPOs

The problem suggests the cure. 270 First, SEC regulations should
better protect the issuer. 271 The newly public shares should be sold to
investors by the issuer, not by underwriters. 272 This way, the issuer gets
more of the money and potentially a much better price.273 The issuer could
be empowered to directly fill orders on purchases of the stock during the first
week, two weeks, or month of the offering.274 Alternatively, for a period of
time after the start of the IPO, half the shares bought after the IPO begins
could be required to be filled by the issuer, and the other half from the
market.275 If the market price goes up, then the issuer will benefit.276 The
262.
Johnson, supra note 72, at 836–38; see also Griffith, supra note 216, at
599–600; La Monica, supra note 217.
263.
See La Monica, supra note 217.
264.
Griffith, supra note 216, at 630–31.
265.
See La Monica, supra note 217.
266.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 585.
267.
Id. at 613 n.105; see also Solomon & Wilke, supra note 39, at 516 n.42.
268.
Griffith, supra note 216, at 619–20; see also Solomon & Wilke, supra
note 39, at 513.
269.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 619–20; La Monica, supra note 217.
270.
See Aguilar, supra note 47.
271.
Id.
272.
See id.; Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 208, at 641–43.
273.
See Sjostrom, Jr., supra note 208, at 641–43; Aguilar, supra note 47.
274.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 622; Aguilar, supra note 47.
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See Griffith, supra note 216, at 609–10; Aguilar, supra note 47.
276.
See Griffith, supra note 216, at 609–10.
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shares purchased by investors can then be traded by them on the market.277
If the market price rises, the issuer will have an opportunity to sell shares at
the higher price, rather than let the insiders benefit from having the inside
track if the stock rises precipitously. 278 This type of regulation would
certainly disadvantage Wall Street investment firms and cost them a lot in
profits, but it would prevent some of the current problems and create a fairer
market for all market participants.279 The SEC should also consider placing
limits on what a company that issues stock to the public can do with the
money. 280 How much should underwriters receive? 281 How much of the
money raised should be available for uses other than corporate expansion?282
How much IPO money should be available to pay off the debts of the
company rather than invest in property, plant, equipment, research and
development, and other purposes that could lead to growth?283 The use of
proceeds proposed by the issuer could also be made subject to shareholder
approval shortly after the IPO is complete.284
Regulations should be enacted that require all IPO funds to go only
into the coffers of the company issuing stock.285 Chewy should get all the
proceeds, not some other entity.286 The SEC should never approve Chewytype sales and should create regulations preventing this from reoccurring.287
The SEC or Congress might consider evaluating a rule that a
percentage of short-term IPO profits go back to the issuer.288 So, if an IPO
purchaser sold its shares for a 100% gain within five days of the IPO,
perhaps 25% of that gain could be remitted back to the issuer.289 The SEC
could and should better regulate and monitor road shows.290 Underwriters
should be better regulated so that they do not establish new issue prices that
are unrealistically low and unfair to the issuer.291
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Online Day Trading Causes Additional Problems to Market Integrity
1.

How Can Online Trading Negatively Impact Investors

Another area that is underregulated, or not regulated, is certain forms
of online trading.292 Online day trading by poorly capitalized and poorly
trained individuals is akin to going to the racetrack with a racing form
book. 293 Because of the factors creating market volatility, amateur day
traders are at great risk, but the SEC has little or no interest in this group.294
The public is often bombarded by e-trade companies and e-trade training
course advertisements that suggest that the average investor can become a
successful day trader.295 In one recent television ad, a disgruntled employee
who does not get a raise is told not to get mad, but get even, by turning to her
online trading account at her office computer to make more money and
improve her financial situation.296 Another commercial highlights that some
online firms charge lower interest on margin loans than some larger brokerdealers.297 This encouragement of online trading is absurd.298 Many, if not
most, inexperienced and amateur day traders are singularly unsuccessful.299
The SEC has done little to regulate online trading, despite its many
pitfalls.300 The SEC and FINRA suitability rules state that a broker can only
292.
See Rob Daly, FIMSAC Recommends E-Trading Regulatory Reform,
MARKETS MEDIA (July 17, 2018), http://www.marketsmedia.com/fimsac-recommends-etrading-regulatory-reform. Online trading involves trading by an investor who opens an
account on his or her computer and enters orders without the assistance of a broker. See Lisa
Smith, Basics of the Mechanics Behind Electronic Trading, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 14, 2019),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/110713/basics-mechanics-behind-electronictrading.asp. Many companies, including E-Trade, Vanguard, Fidelity, Schwab, and many
full-service broker-dealers offer this product. See id. Typically, commissions are a small
fraction of the cost of trading with a full-service broker-dealer such as Merrill Lynch or JP
Morgan.
See
Online
Trading,
INVESTOPEDIA
ACAD.,
http://academy.investopedia.com/collections/online-trading (last visited May 1, 2020).
293.
See Neale Godfrey, Day Trading: Smart or Stupid?, FORBES (July 16,
2017 8:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nealegodfrey/2017/07/16/day-trading-smart-orstupid.
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See id.
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See Eillie Anzilotti, E-Trade’s New Ad Campaign Is Everything That’s
Wrong
with
Capitalism,
FAST
COMPANY
(June
20,
2017),
http://www.fastcompany.com/40433517/e-trades-new-ad-campaign-is-everything-thatswrong-with-capitalism.
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Id.
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See id.
298.
See id.
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See Godfrey, supra note 293.
300.
See Daly, supra note 292.
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make a recommendation that is suitable or appropriate to an investor given
his or her financial situation, risk tolerance, age, income, and assets. 301
However, these rules do not apply to online trading because the brokerage
firm does not recommend an investment to an online trading account. 302
Thus, day trading is an unregulated poker game full of great risk.303
2.

The SEC Should Better Regulate Online Trading

The SEC could promulgate rules and regulations to protect some of
the public from the risks and evils of online day trading.304 It could require
online non-professional customers to certify to a particular net worth that is
not exposed to market risk. 305 This way, smaller, less knowledgeable
investors could avoid risking their rainy day funds in online trading.306 It
could require disclosures that online trading involves special risks and
greater risk of loss than do non-online brokerage accounts. 307 It could
require online orders to have a legend reminding investors that online trades
have significant risks and that online investors should not invest more than a
small portion of their assets in online trading.308 It could require all online
trades to be placed as limit orders so online traders can minimize the risks of
being victims to a pump-and-dump or other manipulation or market maker
misconduct.309 Online traders should not be allowed to enter market orders

301.
2111.
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http://www.finra.org/rulesguidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2111 (last visited May 1, 2020).
302.
See Daly, supra note 292.
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305.
See Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
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12,
2016),
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See Amy Fontinelle, Safe and Liquid Options to Invest Your Emergency
Fund on, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 14, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/13/safeliquid-investment-for-emergencies.asp.
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id.;
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FAQ,
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http://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/advanced-investing/online-trading-faq
(last
visited May 1, 2020).
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See Fontinelle, supra note 306; Online Trading FAQ, supra note 307; Tips
for Online Investing: What You Need to Know About Trading in Fast-Moving Markets, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/investorpubsonlinetipshtm.html.
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See Tips for Online Investing: What You Need to Know About Trading in
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when markets are closed. 310 When the market is closed and an order is
placed, the stock can open many times higher than an investor might
anticipate, especially if a market maker sees the order before the opening.311
The SEC can also ban margin trading in online accounts or require online
investors to have a certain amount of assets in their accounts before they can
invest on margin or increase margin requirements for online traders.312
G.
1.

Failure to Oversee Corporate Dividend Practices
The SEC Does Not Protect Investors from Companies that Do Not
Pay Dividends

Another area that is underregulated lies in the dividend payments
made by large corporations.313 Corporations, no matter how profitable, are
not required to issue any dividends.314 Many of the largest most profitable
companies do not do so; although, historically, investors who reinvest
dividends in a stock often have ended up with a high-performing asset.315
Other companies pump up their stock price by paying dividends that may not
be sustainable because most of their earnings are depleted by dividend
payments.316 If a company earns $1 per share and pays out a dividend of
$0.60 or $0.75 per share, it is likely to have to lower its dividends when its
earnings decline.317 In the meantime, if the $1 per share dividend is paid on
a stock selling for $20 per share, the dividend yield is 5% of market value

310.
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Time?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 1, 2020), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/after-hourstrading-am-i-able-to-trade-at-this-time/.
311.
See id.
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See Online Trading, supra note 307; Tips for Online Investing: What You
Need to Know About Trading in Fast-Moving Markets, supra note 308.
313.
See Tom Streissguth, Do Corporate Stockholders Have a Right to
Dividends?, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/corporate-stockholders-right-dividends61653.html (last visited May 1, 2020).
314.
Id. Directors generally have very broad discretion regarding whether or
not the corporation will pay a dividend. See id.; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.23 (2016). For
example, Amazon and Google do not currently pay dividends, although they earn around $50
per share.
See AMZN: Amazon.com, Inc. Common Stock, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/market-activity/stocks/amzn (last visited May 1, 2020).
315.
Amy Fontinelle, Companies That Pay Dividends — and Those That
Don’t, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 3, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/12/why-dosome-companies-pay-a-dividend.asp.
316.
Boyte-White, supra note 149.
317.
See id.
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and many investors, deluded by this high rate of return, believe the stock is
safe, when in fact, it may be far from safe.318
2.

How Can the SEC Facilitate the Payment of Dividends for
Investors

The SEC should undertake to study dividends and devise rules to
make them more economically efficient and to make the markets more
efficient.319 The purpose of the SEC is to protect shareholders.320 Assuring
them dividends is one way to do that.321 Financially-realistic dividends help
support stock prices and reward investors. 322 Perhaps all companies with
earnings should pay dividends to their owners. 323 Perhaps no company
should be permitted to pay a dividend that uses up to 50% or 33% or more of
its profits to pay them.324 Perhaps stock buybacks, discussed above, should
not be permitted unless the company is also paying a dividend.325 One way
to accomplish these steps would be to require shareholder approval if the
corporation wishes to deviate from the guidelines.326 If the shareholders vote
to receive no dividends, that would be their decision.327 Again, boards of
directors would also be more likely to work within a dividend framework to
avoid shareholder votes.328
H.
The SEC Fails to Protect Investors from Broker-Dealers Who Fail to
Pay Settlements and Arbitration Awards
Investors are inadequately protected from recovering amounts
awarded to them in arbitration or in settlements with SEC and FINRA

318.
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registered brokerage firms.329 Most customer claims against brokerage firms
must be filed as arbitrations before FINRA. 330 For example, FINRA has
tracked tens of millions of dollars of awards to customers who are never able
to collect.331 While there have been discussions about how to address this
issue, nothing effective has been done.332 For example, FINRA and the SEC
continue to permit brokerage firms to be licensed with a minimal net capital
that subjects investors to the risk of unpaid arbitration awards.333 The rules
require a minimum net capital of only $250,000 and do not permit debts to
exceed net capital by 1500%.334 FINRA and the SEC could easily impose a
significant minimum net capital requirement for all firms, an increased net
capital requirement, and decrease the permitted ratio of debt to net capital.335
Much investor abuse is caused by small undercapitalized firms who operate
bucket shops that engage in significant fraudulent activities.336 Absurdly, the
SEC permits firms that cease to be active to maintain no net capital, which
also permits firms to avoid paying customer settlements and arbitration
awards; thus, FINRA defines an inactive member as a “member . . . not
subject to a net capital requirement so long as he [or she] is not conducting or
engaged in the securities business.”337
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I.

Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies
1.

Bitcoin Is a Totally Unregulated Security

Bitcoin and the like appear to be a widespread and widely accepted
Ponzi scheme.338 These currencies are neither backed by the full faith and
credit of any country, nor are they backed by gold, silver, or any other
precious metal.339 They are not backed by any currency.340 They simply
circulate as a substitute for currency and on some irrational basis that
fluctuates greatly in value.341 They are also securities in every sense of the
word.342
These cryptocurrencies have been widely criticized by many and
have led to some increasing demands for regulatory action, but they continue
to be popular and unregulated.343 They are also suspected to be a popular
way for money launderers, drug cartels, criminal organizations, tax cheats,
and the like to go about their business undetected.344 While the United States
has required a huge expenditure by brokerage firms and banks on AntiMoney Laundering (“AML”) regulations and often investigates—and
devotes many enforcement efforts to some of the minute regulation
violations—AML compliance, cryptocurrency is allowed to circumvent and
eviscerate all of the AML compliance efforts.345 Why they are not regulated
is inexplicable.346 They are Kryptonite type investments.347 One must also
338.
Michael Mendelson, From Initial Coin Offerings to Security Tokens: A
U.S. Federal Securities Law Analysis, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 54 (2019).
339.
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341.
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Assessing Digital Assets — SEC, Framework for Investment Contract Analysis of Digital
Assets, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2418, 2418 (2019) (discussing what the SEC has done regarding
cryptocurrency and its limited effort to apply Howey to cryptocurrency).
343.
See Mendelson, supra note 338, at 54, 59.
344.
See JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45664,
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LEGAL BACKGROUND, ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 1, 6–7, 9–10 (2019) (discussing the use of
cryptocurrencies by criminal enterprises).
345.
See id. at 2, 11. AML regulations are codified in FINRA Rule 3310 and
the Bank Secrecy Act. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2018); 3310. Anti-Money Laundering Compliance
Program, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/3110 (last visited
May 1, 2020).
346.
SYKES & VANATKO, supra note 344, at 11–12.
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wonder if cryptocurrencies will at some point be accepted as payment for
securities trades by some broker-dealers.348 If this happens, the capital of
brokerage firms and the firms’ survival will be at great risk.349
2.

How Can Cryptocurrency Be Regulated

Because sales of cryptocurrency are sales of security, they should be
subject to registration under the ‘33 Act. 350 It is submitted that
cryptocurrencies sold to date were sold illegally. 351 In addition, a
cryptocurrency sold to the public should be required to be backed by actual
assets.352 Moreover, at some point, if not already, cryptocurrency could be
used to make stock market purchases.353 This will put broker-dealers and
contra parties at an enormous risk of failure. 354 A firm that is paid
$1,000,000 in cryptocurrency for the delivery of shares of stock to another
party rapidly depletes its capital if the cryptocurrency drops 20% in the first
minute after the receipt of it.355 This should not be permitted.356

340.

347.

Bitcoin: Is It Only Your Cryptocurrency or Tax Kryptonite?, supra note

348.
See Mendelson, supra note 338, at 67–68.
349.
Id. at 52–53.
350.
Id. at 67; see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2018).
351.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c); Mendelson, supra note 338, at 67.
352.
See Asset Backed Cryptocurrency: Let’s Talk Real Estate, Oil, Diamonds
& More, CRYPTOSIS (Mar. 14, 2019), http://www.cryptosis.io/asset-backed-cryptocurrency/;
Zvi Gabbay, Asset-Backed Digital Currencies: Advantages and Challenges, BARNEA: BLOG
(July 1, 2018), http://www.barlaw.co.il/blog/technology/asset-backed-digital-currenciesadvantages-and-challenges/; What Are Asset-Backed Cryptocurrencies?, WORLD CRYPTO
INDEX, http://www.worldcryptoindex.com/asset-backed-cryptocurrencies/ (last visited May 1,
2020).
353.
See Mendelson, supra note 338, at 67–68; Asset Backed Cryptocurrency:
Let’s Talk Real Estate, Oil, Diamonds & More, supra note 352.
354.
See Gabbay, supra note 352.
355.
See Bitcoin: Is It Only Your Cryptocurrency or Tax Kryptonite?, supra
note 340; Paul Vigna & Eun-Young Jeong, Cryptocurrency Scams Took in More than $4
Billion in 2019, WALL STEET J.: MARKETS (Feb. 8, 2020, 1:00 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/cryptocurrency-scams-took-in-more-than-4-billion-in-201911581184800.
356.
See Bitcoin: Is It Only Your Cryptocurrency or Tax Kryptonite?, supra
note 340; Vigna & Jeong, supra note 355.
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III.

WHY ARE THE REGULATORS FAILING TO PROVIDE NEEDED
OVERSIGHT?

A.
The SEC Revolving Door, Staff Conflicts of Interest, and the Power
of Money in Politics
The fact that the regulators do not address many of the most salient
problems of the stock market is due to a number of factors.357 In large part,
the regulators, including the SEC, are not focused on the real problems.358
They ignore what is happening and what will happen and focus on putting
their fingers in the dikes that have sprung a leak.* They do not see the rising
river behind the dikes that will soon destroy the markets.*
Why?* One must speculate somewhat on this.* But it seems clear
that the regulators focus on the irrelevant because they are encouraged to do
so by Wall Street.359 The SEC has become the gateway to high-paying jobs
for its staff.360 SEC staff members and supervisors almost inevitably leave
the SEC to join Wall Street firms or law firms that service Wall Street.361
The revolving door creates a serious risk of potential conflicts of interest.362
The SEC recognizes the problem and has adopted rules regarding practice
before the SEC by former SEC employees, but these rules have little
practical effect.363 FINRA has a revolving door rule, but it is far weaker than
the SEC rule.364
357.
See Norman S. Poser, Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against
Regulation, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 289, 309–10 (2009).
358.
See id. at 290.
359.
See Jason M. Breslow, Is SEC Fearful of Wall Street? Agency Insider
Says Yes, PBS: FRONTLINE (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/is-secfearful-of-wall-street-agency-insider-says-yes/; Jeff Stein, As Bank Profits Soar, Wall Street’s
Political Spending Hits New High, WASH. POST: BUS. (Apr. 30, 2019, 8:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/04/30/bank-profits-soar-wall-streets-politicalspending-hits-new-high/.
360.
See Breslow, supra note 359.
361.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-654, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: EXISTING POST-EMPLOYMENT CONTROLS COULD BE FURTHER
STRENGTHENED 1 (2011).
362.
See id. The phrase, revolving door is one used by the SEC. Id. at 2
(quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 968, 124 Stat. 1376, 1914 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641)).
363.
See id. at 1. The SEC revolving door or conflict rule is embodied in 17
C.F.R. § 200.735-8. See 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-8 (2019). It permits applications for waivers of
the rule. Id.; see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND RULES ON FAIR
FUNDS AND DISGORGEMENT PLANS 9–10 (2018). The Dodd Frank Act mandated further
review of the SEC revolving door policies. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5346 (2018); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra
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The SEC often hires bright young lawyers out of law school who
often do not know a stock from a bond, and it sends them out on witch hunts,
which are pursued in lieu of dealing with the real hardcore issues facing the
market.365 After a few years, the SEC staff member or supervisor trades in
his or her badge and switches sides.366 The new staff knows how their career
path is laid out so they continue with witch hunts and ignore the bigger
issues.367 They play nice with former regulators who are now prospective
employers.368 This can be conscious or subconscious, but it is hard to avoid,
and may be difficult to detect or quantify.369 If things work out, the departed
staffer, having later given employment to many more staffers, may return to
the SEC or FINRA in a more senior role, maybe even a Deputy
Commissioner or Commissioner, or head of a department at FINRA. 370
FINRA is a regulatory body overseen by the SEC and handles many
enforcement actions in the first instance.371 Notably, in many cases the SEC
and FINRA fail to coordinate their activities and bring their own cases
against individuals and broker-dealers for the very same misconduct.372 This
wastes resources and diverts attention from other serious issues.*
note 361, at 1, 24–25. FINRA rules were strengthened somewhat in late 2018 but are still
weaker than the SEC rules. See 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201 (2019). Federal conflict laws do not
appear to prohibit behind-the-scenes participation in matters before one’s former government
employer. See id.
364.
See 9910. Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions; Nonpublic
Information, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/9910 (last
visited May 1, 2020). FINRA rules were strengthened somewhat in late 2018 but are still
weaker than the SEC rules. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2018). Notably, federal conflict laws
permit behind the scenes participation in matters before one’s former government employer.
See 5 C.F.R. 2641.201.
365.
See Ed deHaan et al., The Revolving Door and the SEC’s Enforcement
Outcomes: Initial Evidence from Civil Litigation, J. ACCT. & ECON., Nov.–Dec. 2015, at 65,
66; Lanning Taliaferro, Former Informer Accuses SEC of Fraud, Witch Hunt, PATCH (July 10,
2017, 12:57 PM), http://www.patch.com/new-york/southeast/putnam-man-still-fighting-secover-stock-manipulation-case.
366.
See 18 U.S.C. § 207.
367.
See Taliaferro, supra note 365.
368.
CHING-HUNG CHANG ET AL., REVOLVING-DOOR DIRECTORS AND
FINANCIAL OPACITY 2–3 (2018).
369.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 361, at 14.
370.
See Chairman Jay Clayton, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/biography/jay-clayton (last visited May 1, 2020); FINRA Executives,
FINRA: ABOUT FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about/governance/finra-executives#finance (last
visited May 1, 2020).
371.
What We Do, supra note 1.
372.
See SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470–71 (D.N.J. 2008);
FINRA, DECISION, COMPLAINT NO. CLG050021 (Mar. 3, 2010).
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After a few years at the SEC and perhaps at FINRA—which pays
much better than the SEC—these positions become a new bigger meal ticket
with a larger office and higher compensation at a large brokerage firm, law
firm, or public company, where representation before the SEC or FINRA is
the basis for success and very lucrative incomes.373 The reason why the SEC
and FINRA are, or at least often appear to be, lax on major financial
institutions probably has these conflicts as its root cause, or at least one of its
root causes.374 Senior executives very rarely face criminal prosecutions for
shady and often disastrous policies.375 The staffer who wants to go up the
ladder of corporate wrongdoing and go after top executive malfeasance will
become a lifetime staffer.*
In the Madoff case, Bernie Madoff, a former NASD chairman,
falsely reported to his clients billions in profits that were fictitious.376 The
SEC and FINRA both failed to discover his gross malfeasance, despite
several red flags and warnings. 377 Madoff was part of the club, and the
examiners sent to check his books and records knew that and were
completely lax. 378 A conflict of interest decision involving SEC General
Counsel David N. Becker and negligence on the part of several SEC staffers
also contributed to the survival of the scheme, but no SEC officials were
terminated.379
373.
See SEC Compensation Program, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
ABOUT, http://www.sec.gov/ohr/sec-compensation (last visited May 1, 2020).
374.
See David S. Hilzenrath, Eight SEC Employees Disciplined Over Failures
in Madoff Fraud Case; None Are Fired, WASH. POST: BUS. (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/seven-sec-employees-disciplined-onfailure-to-stop-madoff-fraud/2011/11/10/gIQA3kYYCN_story.html.
375.
See id.
376.
United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see
also BRIAN ROSS, THE MADOFF CHRONICLES: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF BERNIE AND
RUTH 103–04 (2016) (discussing the Madoff case and the failures of the SEC and FINRA to
detect the massive Ponzi scheme); Ex-Nasdaq Chair Arrested for Securities Fraud, CNN:
MONEY
(Dec.
12,
2008,
6:22
AM),
http://www.money.cnn.com/2008/12/11/markets/madoff_fraud/ (discussing that Madoff was
chairman of the NASD). The NASD is now known as FINRA. Kagan, supra note 21. As
some of the above articles point out, Madoff’s CPA firm consisted of a sole practitioner
working out of his garage in New Jersey, a red flag to anyone (except, apparently, the SEC
and FINRA). Madoff Accountant Charged with Fraud, GUARDIAN: NEWS (Mar. 18, 2009,
7:10 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/mar/18/madoff-accountant-charged.
377.
See ROSS, supra note 376, at 103–08.
378.
See id.
379.
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTIGATION OF CONFLICT ARISING
FROM FORMER GENERAL COUNSEL’S PARTICIPATION IN MADOFF-RELATED MATTERS 5 (2011)
(discussing SEC General Counsel David N. Becker’s conflicts regarding Madoff); Hilzenrath,
supra note 374.
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If our policemen were able to leave the force and become bank
robbers, and then go back on the force as captains, only to leave to become
even bigger bank robbers, most people would cry foul and advocate for
change.* While this analogy is likely a gross exaggeration, an SEC
commissioner or market regulation supervisor is a prime candidate for
General Counsel or Director of Compliance at large financial institutions and
for a partnership at a large law firm that pays its partners millions of dollars a
year. 380 The staff knows that these ex-SEC officials will be their future
employers.381 It is not a good idea for a career-minded, ambitious SEC staff
member to get on the wrong side of his or her future employer.382 The SEC
appears to attempt to protect this career path by—consciously or
unconsciously—not taking on issues that are of the most concern to Wall
Street, at least not unless a crisis of major consequence requires some
window dressing-like action.383 Criminal actions against corporate leaders
who are wrongdoers are very, very rare.384 So are large fines.385 While there
have been record fines in recent years against a few firms, such as those
involved in the subprime mortgage crisis that led to the 2008 recession, these
fines are rare and, although they involved some large dollars, are financially
manageable by the firms involved.386 They are hard slaps on the wrist, but
that is all they are.387 Wall Street lawyers are paid up to $1500 an hour or
more for their time and earn their money by protecting these corporate
leaders.388
Historically, the top leaders of the Wall Street club often get a pass
from the regulators.389 No major Wall Street leader was prosecuted for the
acts leading up to the 2008 recession and collapse of Lehman and Bear
Stearns.390 Some years earlier, the Keating Five, which involved a number
of United States Senators, including John McCain, Alan Cranston, and John
380.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 361, at 1.
381.
See id. at 2.
382.
See id.
383.
See id. at 1; Hilzenrath, supra note 374.
384.
See William D. Cohan, How the Bankers Stayed Out of Jail, ATLANTIC,
Sept. 2015, at 20.
385.
See id.
386.
Id.
387.
See id.
388.
Sara Randazzo & Jacqueline Palank, Legal Fees Cross New Mark:
$1,500 an Hour, WALL STREET J., Feb. 9, 2016, at A1.
389.
See Joe Pinsker, Why Aren’t Any Bankers in Prison for Causing the
Financial
Crisis?,
ATLANTIC:
BUS.
(Aug.
17,
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/why-arent-any-bankers-in-prison-forcausing-the-financial-crisis/496232/.
390.
See id.; Randazzo & Young, supra note 62.
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Glenn, helped Keating avoid regulation and detection of his fraudulent bank
practices and permitted Keating to perpetuate the Savings and Loan
scandal. 391 Keating sold millions of dollars of non-Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) certificates of deposit with high-interest
coupons to unsuspecting small account holders at his bank. 392 When he
could no longer pay the interest, the bank failed and the investors had no
FDIC insurance.393
Of course, Wall Street is a powerful political lobby and source of
campaign funds for many politicians.394 This also contributes to the ability
of Wall Street to avoid regulations that will be detrimental to its financial
interests and that negatively impact or weaken it.395
B.
The SEC Should Greatly Enhance Its Conflicts Rules with Respect to
Its and FINRA’s Revolving Door
Someone who works for the SEC should not be able to change teams
at will.
It can be argued that the minimal conflict rules of the SEC and
FINRA do little or nothing. 397 They allow former staffers to involve
themselves in many SEC matters, even if they may be barred for a short
period from appearing before the SEC. 398 The SEC should close the
revolving door and look harder at regulation. 399 Staffers wanting to leave
can seek legal jobs outside of the industry, work on civil securities litigation
396

391.

MICHAEL BINSTEIN & CHARLES BOWDEN, TRUST ME: CHARLES KEATING
MISSING BILLIONS 47, 389 (1993); Keating Five, WIKIPEDIA,
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/keating_five (last visited May 1, 2020). The Keating Five
included former Senators John McCain and Alan Cranston. Keating Five, supra. The Five
often intervened with government regulators to protect Charles Keating. Id.
392.
Id.; BINSTEIN & BOWDEN, supra note 391, at 47, 389.
393.
BINSTEIN & BOWDEN, supra note 391, at 47, 389; Keating Five, supra note
391.
394.
Stein, supra note 359.
395.
See id. (discussing Wall Street’s lobbying expenditures).
396.
9910. Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions; Nonpublic
Information, supra note 364.
397.
See Bill Singer, Securities Industry Commentator, BROKERANDBROKER:
WALL STREET LEGAL & REG. FEED (Oct. 25, 2018), http://www.rrbdlaw.com/4252/securitiesindustry-commentator-by-bill-singer-esq/ (discussing the anti-conflict FINRA rule’s filing
with the SEC).
398.
18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (2018); 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(d)(2) (2019); 9910.
Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions; Nonpublic Information, supra note 364.
399.
See Michael Smallberg, SEC to Close Revolving Door Loophole, POGO
(Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.pogo.org/analysis/2013/08/sec-to-close-revolving-doorloophole/.
AND
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matters, go to other regulators, or teach.400 They should not be able to take
on senior roles in regulated entities or representation of securities firms
before regulators for a significant amount of time after they leave—perhaps
for seven to ten years.401
The current conflict rules prohibit a former SEC staff member or
supervisor from practicing before the SEC for two years after he or she
leaves the SEC.402 He or she is also not supposed to assist the new employer
in SEC matters or share in revenue from cases before the SEC.403 The rule
has glaring loopholes.404 First, two years is many years too short.* Second,
the rule does not prohibit hypotheticals; so if a former SEC official is asked
by his or her law partner about how some SEC officials think, or what their
view might be of X or Y practices, the former official can offer material
assistance in these matters.405 Moreover, the SEC and its staff know full well
that good old Jack is at firm X, will be practicing before the SEC shortly, and
will be in a position to offer them employment.406 FINRA Rule 9910 does
not purport to prohibit a former FINRA officer from conferring with his or
her law partner about matters pending before FINRA.407 Conflicts of interest
can be very difficult to detect, but they do exist.408 This Author has never
won a case before a judge where his opponent was a former law clerk to that
judge.* This is of course a very human and understandable type of
occurrence, but it does likely explain some of the SEC’s failings.409

400.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 361, at 1.
401.
See id. at 1, 24.
402.
18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2); 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(d)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 200.7358(b)(1) (2019); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 361, at 2; 9910. PostEmployment Conflict of Interest Restrictions; Nonpublic Information, supra note 364.
403.
5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(a); see also 9910. Post-Employment Conflict of
Interest Restrictions; Nonpublic Information, supra note 364.
404.
See 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-8; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note
361, at 1; Barney, supra note 131.
405.
See 5 C.F.R. § 2641.201(d)(3); 17 C.F.R. § 200.735-8(b)(1); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 356, at 1; Barney, supra note 131.
406.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 361, at 10; Breslow,
supra note 359.
407.
See 9910. Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions; Nonpublic
Information, supra note 364.
408.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 361, at 4, 12.
409.
Id. at 1–2, 10.
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C.
The SEC Often Decides, or Is Persuaded by Wall Street, to Focus on
Less Important Issues, While Ignoring the Big Issues of Today
The SEC often focuses on non-essential issues.410 This, of course,
pleases broker-dealers, public companies, and their attorneys, and distracts
regulators from the systematic problems that plague the securities industry.411
No doubt, the conflicts of interest discussed above also contribute to the
failure to provide regulations in many crucial areas.412
While ignoring or underregulating many areas, the SEC has devoted
huge resources to somewhat opaque issues. 413 For example, the now onagain/off-again fiduciary duty rule, or best interests rule, which seeks to
declare stock brokers and their firms as fiduciaries to their retirement account
customers, has taken up a lot of time, resources, and expenses, and has
created a lot of work for the law firms that hire from the federal regulators,
even though the Shingle Theory and many court cases have imposed a duty
of fair dealing on broker-dealers and investment advisors.414 Accordingly,
the actual need for a best interests rule is somewhat questionable, in that
existing law appears likely to be adequate to permit the SEC and FINRA to
410.
See Breslow, supra note 359.
411.
Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 701–02 (2010).
412.
See id. at 722; 9910. Post-Employment Conflict of Interest Restrictions;
Nonpublic Information, supra note 364; Smallberg, supra note 399; supra Section III.B.
413.
Laby, supra note 411, at 722.
414.
Id. at 716, 722; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(2019); Barney, supra note
131. Arguments can be made that the broker-dealer does have a duty in most cases to give his
customer’s interest priority and to disclose all material facts to a client. Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018); Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1271, 1290 (1995); Laby, supra note 411, at 703–04. The Shingle Theory is well
recognized by the SEC and the courts and imposes a duty of fairness by a broker-dealer holding itself out to the public to handle financial transactions. See Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969,
976–77 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (finding that a broker has a duty of fairness and duty of full disclosure); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 3776, 21 S.E.C. Docket 865 (Jan.
24, 1946). The Shingle Theory and court decisions which rely upon it, in effect, place a fiduciary duty requirement on brokers. See Karmel, supra, at 1276. If fairness is required, that
would appear to require disclosures of self-dealing and of securities purchases that result in
greater compensation to the broker. See Laby, supra note 411, at 711. The Shingle Theory
may not translate into a fiduciary duty for all customer transactions, but it appears to apply to
situations where the broker is recommending a security. Karmel, supra, at 1276. Investment
advisor’s fiduciary duties have been more readily applied by the courts. Id.; see also Laby,
supra note 411, at 711. Registered investment advisors are subject to SEC registration and
oversight and have fiduciary obligations to their clients. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2018); see also
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963); Laby, supra note 411,
at 716.
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take action when broker-dealers favor their own economic interests over
those of their clients.415 Industry opposition to the rule and success in trying
to narrow its fiduciary duty is certainly not in the public interest.416
The fiduciary duty rule was proposed by the United States
Department of Labor (“DOL”), with no apparent coordination with the SEC,
again, reflecting political spats and outright inefficiency. 417 Part of the
proposed DOL rule would have heavily regulated the sale of brokerage
firms’ and investment advisors’ own products to retirement accounts.418 The
SEC will likely attempt to do the same.419 After extensive work was done by
most broker-dealers preparing for the new regulations, the regulations were
found to exceed the scope of authority of the DOL.420 Although brokerage
firms have, for years, been required to avoid the conflicts involved in selling
their own products, such as paying brokers additional commissions for
selling in-house mutual funds, violations repeatedly reoccur.421 If the SEC
simply enforced its existing rules regarding brokerage firm sales of
proprietary products, and if someone would tell it and the DOL to play nicely
in the sandbox, the efforts devoted to the fiduciary duty rule could have been
avoided and resources devoted to more important matters.422
415.
Greg Iacurci, SEC Sued by Seven States to Kill Reg BI Investment-Advice
Rule, INVESTMENTNEWS (Sept. 10, 2019, 10:27 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/secsued-by-seven-states-to-kill-reg-bi-investment-advice-rule-81261.
416.
Id. Indeed, the industry has already filed a court action seeking to have
the best interests rule nullified. Id. “The lawsuit — State of New York et al. v. SEC . . . seeks
to vacate the final rule, which was issued in June after a 3-1 vote by commissioners, and
permanently prevent its implementation, which is scheduled for the end of June 2020.” Id.;
New York v. SEC, No. 19 Civ. 8365, 2019 WL 5203751, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019).
Just as many automakers now embrace car safety, the securities industry might consider
embracing, rather than combatting efforts to protect public investors. See Opinion,
Aggravating Alerts: Drivers Should Embrace Car Safety Technology, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Sept. 26, 2019, at A8; Iacurci, supra note 415.
417.
See Brian Menickella, The Return of the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule, FORBES
(May 29, 2019, 10:40 AM), http://forbes.com/sites/brianmenickella/2019/05/29/the-return-ofthe-dols-fiduciary-rule/.
418.
Id.
419.
See id.
420.
See Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 387–88,
397 (5th Cir. 2018).
421.
See Menickella, supra note 417. Dean Witter, now part of Morgan
Stanley, has repeatedly been investigated for pushing in-house mutual funds and paying
incentives to brokers who sell such funds. See Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., Securities Act
Release No. 8339, Exchange Act Release No. 48789, 81 SEC Docket 1993 (Nov. 17, 2003).
422.
See Jamie Hopkins, SEC Brings Increased Confusion for Investors with
New
Best
Interest
Rule,
FORBES
(June
5,
2019,
3:55
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiehopkins/2019/06/05/sec-brings-increased-confusion-forinvestors-with-new-best-interest-rule/; Menickella, supra note 417.
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The SEC insists on bringing legal actions against low-level wrongdoers and expending millions of dollars on these cases which are largely
non-productive and a diversion from the important issues facing investors.423
The SEC may have missed Madoff and Enron and the subprime crisis
discussed earlier in this Article, but it is happy to go after small firms with
issues that should be resolved in a conference room meeting. 424 In SEC
Release No. 80360, Matter of the Application of Kimberly SpringsteenAbbott, the SEC reviewed an appeal from a decision by a FINRA hearing
panel, as affirmed by the FINRA National Adjudication Committee
(“NAC”), which found that Kimberly Springsteen-Abbott, the CEO of a
small broker-dealer, Commonwealth Capital, misallocated personal expenses
to certain equipment leasing funds.425 The NAC had affirmed a permanent
bar of Springsteen-Abbott. 426 FINRA alleged that some 1840 items of
personal expenses, such as personal meals, amounting to possibly $200,000,
had been misallocated to the funds she managed over a period of years.427
Springsteen-Abbott conceded that some charges were made improperly and
had reversed many of them, and provided detailed explanations about how
the errors had occurred.428 She had a previously unblemished record and
vigorously opposed the effort to impose a permanent bar. 429 The SEC,
FINRA, and Springsteen-Abbott’s attorneys spent tens of thousands of hours
prosecuting and defending the charges involving a very small brokerage firm
for allegedly spending relatively few dollars of the funds of investment
partnerships it controlled on the CEO’s personal expenses. 430 The SEC
found that the NAC and FINRA had failed to develop proof regarding most
of the 1840 allegedly misallocated charges and remanded for further
proceedings.431 The NAC reaffirmed its decision, and Springsteen-Abbott
again appealed to the SEC.432 Springsteen-Abbot argued, inter alia, that, no
423.
See Finance Firm Says SEC Is Slander Happy, So It’s Suing, RM
WARNER LAW (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.kellywarnerlaw.com/finance-firm-sec-slander/.
424.
See id.
425.
See FINRA, NOTICE, SD-2132 (May 24, 2018); Springsteen-Abbott,
Exchange Act Release No. 80360, 2017 WL 1206062, at *1–2 (Mar. 31, 2017).
426.
Springsteen-Abbott, Exchange Act Release No. 80360, 2017 WL
1206062, at *2 (Mar. 31, 2017).
427.
Id.
428.
Id.
429.
See id.
430.
See id. at *2–4.
431.
Springsteen-Abbott, Exchange Act Release No. 80360, 2017 WL
1206062, at *4–5 (Mar. 31, 2017). The Author of this Article represented the Respondent
during some of her appeal process. Id.
432.
Id. at *5; Springsteen-Abbott, Exchange Act Release No. 87913 (Jan. 8,
2020).
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doubt, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch/Bank of America, and JP Morgan
engage in widespread use of their shareholders’ money for arguably nonbusiness purposes. 433 The SEC recently vacated a $50,000 fine against
Springsteen-Abbott, affirmed a finding that she had misallocated some
$36,000 in expenses (rather than the $200,000 found by FINRA to have been
misallocated), and affirmed her permanent bar from the industry. 434 The
years of litigation and expense over a $36,000 dispute that should have been
capable of early resolution reflects a waste of resources and SEC bias against
smaller firms.435 The SEC apparently has not chosen to question the millions
of dollars spent by publicly-owned broker-dealers on efforts to lobby the
SEC for anti-investor regulations.436 The SEC and FINRA do not appear to
have actions pending against these large firms relating to how they spend
shareholder funds.437 Does the SEC care how many limousines are parked
outside these firms’ headquarters ready to transport senior executives to their
homes, or to church, or to family gatherings?* How much is spent on
executive dining rooms that often are simply high-priced eating clubs paid
for by shareholders?* Do officers ever invite a friend or spouse to dine
there?* How often does a spouse accompany an executive, junior, or senior
on a business trip or to a conference and have some or all of their expenses
covered by the company?*
Limos, lavish private rooms, sending
representatives (and their spouses) to high-end resorts for compliance
conferences which involve lavish dinners, golf tournaments and the like, and
which are also attended by numerous SEC and FINRA officials, not to
mention expense account charges on Scores, a well-known Wall Street Strip
Club.* The SEC and FINRA send numerous representatives to securities
conferences conducted at high priced resorts.438 They pay their own way, but
433.
Springsteen-Abbott, Exchange Act Release No. 80360, 2017 WL
1206062, at *2 (Mar. 31, 2017); see also Stein, supra note 359.
434.
Springsteen-Abbott, Exchange Act Release No. 87913 (Jan. 8, 2020); see
also Springsteen-Abbott, Exchange Act Release No. 88156 (Feb. 7, 2020).
435.
Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals questioned whether the sanctions imposed showed bias
against a new firm. Id.
436.
See Stein, supra note 359.
437.
Id.
438.
See Events, SIFMA, http://www.sifma.org/events/ (last visited May 1,
2020). The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), the Public
Investors Advocate Bar Association (“PIABA”), Compliance Professionals, and others hold
these annual conferences at swanky resorts in Palm Desert, California, Phoenix, Arizona, and
Orlando, Boca Raton, and Marco Island, Florida, among other places. 36th Annual RMA
Securities Finance & Collateral Management Conference, RISK MGMT. ASS’N,
http://landing.rmahq.org/global/filelib/asl/asl2019_brochure-updated_sponsors2.pdf; Tracy L.
Gerber,
2019
SIFMA
C&L
Annual
Seminar,
GREENBERG
TRAURIG,
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the broker-dealers send hundreds of representatives to these conferences,
where the afternoons are left open for golf, tennis, and sightseeing (often
charged to the firms and their shareholders).439 Do the regulators care that
the many public shareholders of these companies pay for the broker-dealer
employees’ airfares, swank resort hotel rooms, fine dining, conference fees,
and recreational activities for the over one thousand broker-dealer employees
who frequently attend?* The regulators are often heavy-handed with the
little guys and gals, and not so heavy-handed with the large firms, which led
to “[t]he SEC censur[ing] the NASD and requir[ing] it to consent to a
number of reforms, including reforms designed to reduce the influence of
members over regulatory and disciplinary matters.”440 In the SpringsteenAbbott case, a matter that likely could have been quickly and inexpensively
resolved, became a drain on regulatory resources that did little or nothing to
protect investors or markets.441
When FINRA went after a former junior staff attorney at a firm for
failing to ensure timely filing of certain forms, rather than simply mandating
the firm to correct its practices and requiring all those in the chain of
overseeing the filing of the form to be more diligent, what was the point?442
The charges were later dropped.443
When the SEC and FINRA both filed identical charges against
Knight Securities and some of its senior officials and traders for allegedly
overcharging institutional customers for their securities purchases, and spent
millions on the case, what was the point? 444 Not only did the SEC and
http://www.gtlaw.com/en/events/2019/03/2019-sifma-cl-annual-seminar (last visited May 1,
2020); PIABA, http://www.piaba.org (last visited May 1, 2020); Shadow Financial Showcases
ShadowSuite at This Week’s SIFMA Operations Conference and Exhibit, GLOBENEWSWIRE
(May
3,
2010,
1:34
PM),
http://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2010/05/03/1225847/0/en/shadow-financial-showcases-shadowsuite-at-this-wee-sSIFMA-operations-conference-and-exhibit.html; SIFMA C&L Annual Seminar, SIFMA,
http://www.sifma.org/event/clannual/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
439.
See 36th Annual RMA Securities Finance & Collateral Management
Conference, supra note 438; Events, supra note 438; PIABA, supra note 438.
440.
See Barbara Black, Punishing Bad Brokers: Self-Regulation and FINRA
Sanctions, 8 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN., & COM. L. 23, 36 (2013); PIABA, supra note 438.
441.
See Springsteen-Abbott, Exchange Act Release No. 80360, 2017 WL
1206062, at *1 (Mar. 31, 2017); FINRA, FINRA 2019 ANNUAL BUDGET SUMMARY 6 (2019).
442.
USA
v.
Turner
et
al.,
PACERMONITOR,
http://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/28147106/USA_v_Turner_et_al (last visited May
1, 2020).
443.
Id. The Author handled this matter for the former broker-dealer staff attorney. Id.
444.
See SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470–71 (D.N.J. 2008);
FINRA, DECISION, COMPLAINT NO. CLG050021 (Mar. 3, 2010).
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FINRA lose both cases and waste substantial resources on it, but the alleged
victims were among the most sophisticated traders in the world and always
had the ability to and, in fact, did analyze their trade executions.445 In 2007,
in Department of Market Regulation v. John P. Leighton and Kenneth
Pasternak, 446 a FINRA hearing panel concluded that violations had
occurred.447 A year later, the SEC tried the same case in federal court.448 In
SEC v. Pasternak and John P. Leighton,449 a three-week federal trial resulted
in a fifty-page opinion which concluded that:
Throughout the trial, although given ample opportunity, the SEC
failed to solidify its theory of the case, or present sufficient
evidence to establish any element required by the various statutes it
invokes in its Amended Complaint. The Court, therefore, finds in
favor of Defendants and against the SEC. Because the Court
adjudicates the entirety of the case on its merits, it dismisses as
moot Defendants’ motions for judgment on partial findings.450

Thereafter, the FINRA National Adjudicatory Counsel reversed the
FINRA hearing panel decision and found that the evidence did not support a
finding of any violations.451 Here, again, enormous resources were wasted
for no purpose. 452 The ineptness of FINRA and the SEC is obvious, the
diversion of resources from significant issues apparent, and the political
discord between the SEC and FINRA manifest.*
The cases discussed above, and the emphasis given to largely
minuscule order reporting violations involving trades and relatively benign
violations of AML rules reflect the SEC’s lack of focus, waste of resources,
and inability to coordinate with FINRA.453 They create the illusion of robust
regulation, but they are really a diversion from robust regulation.454
445.
Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 470–71, 517; FINRA, DECISION,
COMPLAINT NO. CLG050021 (Mar. 3, 2010).
446.
FINRA, DECISION, COMPLAINT NO. CLG050021 (Mar. 3, 2010).
447.
Id.
448.
Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
449.
561 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D.N.J. 2008).
450.
Id. at 517. The Author represented Mr. Leighton in both the FINRA and
federal court matters. Id. at 465.
451.
Id. at 509.
452.
See id. at 517.
453.
See Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 509, 517; FINRA, DECISION,
COMPLAINT NO. CLG050021 (Mar. 3, 2010); Letter from Vaishali Shetty, Senior Counsel,
FINRA Dep’t of Enf’t (Apr. 22, 2019) (on file with FINRA). In a letter from Vaishali Shetty,
a firm apparently failed to have a review of its AML procedures conducted by a truly
independent entity. Letter from Vaishali Shetty, supra. Although the firm fixed the problem
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In SEC v. Strochak,455 the SEC filed a complaint in August 2019,
against a former broker who had already been criminally convicted of
swindling investors. 456 Was this proceeding at all necessary?* In In re
Joseph J. Fox,457 the SEC filed charges in July 2019 against an individual
seeking a permanent bar, even though the individual had been permanently
barred by FINRA three years earlier. 458 These types of actions divert
attention from the issues discussed herein and reflect a waste of resources,
poor decision-making, and political infighting, but they do little or nothing to
protect the average investor or preserve the integrity of the securities
markets.*
IV.

CONCLUSION

Many are deluded into believing the stock market is a level playing
field where a rational economic system prevails and regulation protects the
integrity of the market.459 As we have seen, this is not quite the case and is
likely far from the case.460 Although regulation has eliminated or tried to
eliminate some of the more obvious forms of dishonest and manipulative
conduct, such as insider trading, pump and dumps, and blatant falsification
of financial reporting, there is still much to do.461 In fact, even those types of
after FINRA brought the issue to its attention, FINRA still felt it an appropriate use of
resources to negotiate a fine of $5,000. Id.
454.
See Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 509; FINRA, DECISION, COMPLAINT
NO. CLG050021 (Mar. 3, 2010).
455.
No. 9:19-cv-81164-xxxx, 2019 WL 3856007, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11,
2019).
456.
See id.; Bruce Kelly, Ex-Broker in South Florida Pleads Guilty in Castleberry
Financial
Fraud
Case,
INVESTMENTNEWS
(Aug.
19,
2019),
http://www.investmentnews.com/ex-broker-in-south-florida-pleads-guilty-in-castleberryfinancial-fraud-case-80922.
457.
Fox, Exchange Act Release No. 1382 (ALJ July 30, 2019) (initial
decision).
458.
Id. at 3 n.2.
459.
See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last visited
May 1, 2020); SEC Obtains Asset Freeze in Microcap Pump and Dump Scheme Targeting
Elderly Retail Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 18, 2019),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-136.
460.
See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, supra note 459;
SEC Obtains Asset Freeze in Microcap Pump and Dump Scheme Targeting Elderly Retail
Investors, supra note 459.
461.
See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, supra note 459;
SEC Obtains Asset Freeze in Microcap Pump and Dump Scheme Targeting Elderly Retail
Investors, supra note 459.
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illegal activities continue.462 Few think of the stock market as a precursor to
sports betting.463 But it is not far enough removed from sports betting.464
Sports betting is basically rigged; the house wins, no matter what.465 Wall
Street is too close to that model.466 It is of course a very complex subject,
but the SEC does not appear to really focus on many of the significant issues
facing stock markets and market integrity and the interests of the middle
class or smaller investor.467 It appears too beholden to the industry to do its
regulatory job properly.*
This Article has a broad sweep.468 Concededly, it may be too broad
in some respects.* It is not intended to condemn all members of the Wall
Street community.* It is not intended to impugn the integrity of all
regulators.* Many staffers are career staffers, and many are very aware of
potential conflicts and appearances of conflict, and conduct themselves
accordingly.469 But there is much that needs to be done to better regulate
Wall Street that is not being done.470 Many of the problems require careful
study and understanding of the complexities involved when one begins
tinkering with aspects of the markets.471 However, regardless of how one
perceives the root causes of some of these regulatory failings, there is a
serious failure to look at these problems or come up with possible
improvements or solutions.472 Of course we could just concede that Wall
Street is a casino-like business, that the house always wins, and that human
greed overcomes integrity.473 At least then, people could put their money in
the bank and sleep well at night—assuming stress tests work and Keatings
462.
See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, supra note 459;
SEC Obtains Asset Freeze in Microcap Pump and Dump Scheme Targeting Elderly Retail
Investors, supra note 459.
463.
See Egan, supra note 73.
464.
See id.; Chris Chase, 11 Biggest Scandals in Sports Gambling History,
FOR WIN (May 16, 2018, 7:31 AM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2018/05/11-biggest-scandals-insports-gambling-history.
465.
J.B. Maverick, Why Does the House Always Win? A Look at Casino Profitability, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 28, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/personalfinance/110415/why-does-house-always-win-look-casino-profitability.asp.
466.
See Egan, supra note 73.
467.
See Breslow, supra note 359.
468.
See supra Part I.
469.
See Hilzenrath, supra note 374.
470.
See id.; Barr, supra note 66, at 119.
471.
See Barr, supra note 66, at 103.
472.
See id.; Brummer, supra note 94; Hilzenrath, supra note 374; Stein, supra
note 359.
473.
See Egan, supra note 73; Keating Five, supra note 391; Maverick, supra
note 465.
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are kept out of the banking business.* If they want to play the game, at least
they would be informed about the playing field.474 However, more focused
and robust regulation appears to be more in the public interest than
permitting Wall Street to become, or continue to be, another form of sports
betting.475

474.
See Maverick, supra note 465; Stein, supra note 359.
475.
See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 613, 615, 617–20, 696, 710–712
(1995); Egan, supra note 73; Stein, supra note 359.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States leads the world in incarceration rates.1 About two
million people were incarcerated or under supervision in the year of 1980.2
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This number has dramatically increased in recent years to over seven million
people.3 Of these citizens, those convicted of a felony will face restrictions
on their right to vote.4 As a result of mass incarceration, disenfranchisement
rates have also dramatically increased throughout the years.5 In 1976, 1.17
million individuals were disenfranchised; this number increased to over 5.85
million in 2010.6 This increase in disenfranchisement is disturbing because
these individuals are unable to participate and be part of our democracy,
undermining our political process.7
The majority of these individuals have completed their sentences.8
As of 2016, 6.1 million people were estimated to be affected by felony
disenfranchisement laws.9 Only twenty-three percent of these people were
incarcerated.10
This means that over seventy-seven percent of the
disenfranchised population have served their time, completed their sentences,
and are reintegrated in their communities.11 This amounts to almost three
million ex-felons that have completed their sentences, but continue to be
disenfranchised.12
Since its inception, disenfranchisement laws have existed in the
United States.13 By the time the Constitution was ratified, twenty-nine states
had enacted disenfranchisement laws.14 These laws were based on the theory
that a social contract exists between the government and its citizens, meaning
that “those convicted of a crime had violated social norms, and, therefore,
had proven themselves unfit to participate in the political process.”15

1.
ACLU ET AL., DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED: A REVIEW OF THE PREVALENCE
AND IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013).

2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 1 (2014).
5.
See id.; ACLU ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
6.
ACLU ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
7.
Id.
8.
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST
VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016 6 (2016).
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12.
ACLU ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
13.
Id. at 2.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
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After the Civil War and Reconstruction, Southern states began to
expand their disenfranchisement laws.16 The purpose behind this was to
include crimes known to be “disproportionately committed by African
Americans,” such as burglary, theft, and arson.17 Lawmakers intended to
“circumvent the requirements of the Fifteenth Amendment,” which extended
the vote to African American males.18 There are a few justifications behind
felony disenfranchisement laws.19 The most relied on are: Maintaining “the
purity of the ballot box” and preventing the perversion of the political
process.20 Felony disenfranchisement laws have been routinely upheld by
courts across the nation under the reasoning that these laws are not focused
on punishing the individual as a result of their offense, but, instead, they
focus on regulating the franchise and the election process.21
A trend to allow ex-felons to regain the right to vote has risen in the
past few decades.22 However, these laws vary greatly and change
constantly.23 Specifically, laws vary from “uninterrupted right to vote to
lifetime disenfranchisement, despite completion of one’s full sentence.”24
Many new voter restoration laws are conditional upon repayment of carceral
debt, requiring ex-felons to satisfy all of their carceral debt before regaining
the right to vote.25 This debt can amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars
for some and includes many fees not related to the offense itself.26 Instead,
much of this debt is composed of the state’s operating costs.27
Repayment laws have routinely been upheld across the nation
because they are analyzed under a rational basis standard of review.28 More
specifically, courts conclude that repayment bills are rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.29 However, these laws disproportionally affect the
poor since only those who have the means to satisfy their carceral debt can

16.
Id.; Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, Legal Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon Suffrage:
Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 197, 217–18
(2011).
17.
ACLU ET AL., supra note 1, at 2; Ziegler, supra note 16, at 217.
18.
ACLU ET AL., supra note 1, at 2; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
19.
See ACLU ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 2–3.
22.
Id. at 3–4.
23.
Id. at 4.
24.
ACLU ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
25.
Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 387 (2012).
26.
Id. at 381 n.178, 387.
27.
Id. at 349.
28.
Id. at 389–90.
29.
Id. at 389.
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regain the right to vote, rendering those who are unable to pay off their debt
permanently disenfranchised.30
Additionally, disenfranchisement laws have a disproportionate effect
on the African American population.31 As a result, voting rights advocates
and political scientists have begun to question the true purpose behind
disenfranchisement laws.32 In fact, many argue that disenfranchisement laws
are but the last set of laws restricting the African American vote not
prohibited by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the “Act”).33
Recently, Florida joined the voter restoration movement with the
passage of Amendment IV in the 2018 election.34 The Amendment would
restore voting rights for felons in the State who had completed all terms of
their sentences, with the exception of those convicted of murder or sexual
offenses.35 As a result, over 1.4 million Floridians were estimated to regain
the right to vote.36 However, Florida legislators passed a repayment bill in
order to continue to regulate the voting franchise.37 The bill requires Florida
residents convicted of a felony to satisfy the debt incurred during their
sentence before regaining the right to vote.38 The new law will permanently
disenfranchise poor people, a vast majority of which are African
Americans.39
First, this Comment will analyze the history of felony
disenfranchisement and the early origins of disenfranchisement, followed by

30.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 389, 398.
31.
UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
32.
Tara A. Jackson, Dilution of the Black Vote: Revisiting the Oppressive
Methods of Voting Rights Restoration for Ex-Felons, 7 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV.
297, 302–03 (2017).
33.
Id. at 303–04; Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, § 2, 79
Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
34.
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, amended by FLA. CONST. amend. IV; German
Lopez, Florida Votes to Restore Ex-Felon Voting Rights with Amendment 4, VOX: POL. &
POL’Y
(Nov.
7,
2018,
1:15
PM),
http://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/11/6/18052374/florida-amendment-4-felon-voting-rights-results.
35.
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, amended by FLA. CONST. amend. IV; Lopez,
supra note 34.
36.
P.R. Lockhart, A Controversial Florida Law Stops Some Former Felons
from Voting. A Judge Just Blocked Part of It, VOX: POL. & POL’Y (Oct. 19, 2019, 2:53 PM),
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/7/2/20677955/amendment-4-florida-felonvoting-rights-injunction-lawsuits-fines-fees.
37.
Id.; see also Fla. CS for SB 7066, at 1 (2019).
38.
Fla. CS. for SB 7066, at 28; Lockhart, supra note 36.
39.
Lockhart, supra note 36.
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the evolvement of disenfranchisement in the United States.40 Then, the
Comment will address disenfranchisement today.41 Specifically, it will
address how many people face disenfranchisement in the United States as a
result of overly restrictive laws.42 Next, it will discuss the rising trend of
voter restoration and the variety of laws across the states.43 After analyzing
the different voter restoration laws, this Comment will discuss repayment
bills, focusing on the racial and economic disparities of these laws.44
However, this Comment will mainly focus on Florida’s Amendment IV, the
newly passed repayment bill, and the consequences of the bill for
Floridians.45 Finally, this Comment will address possible solutions and
recommendations to solve the problem of disenfranchisement and repayment
bills, for instance, analyzing these laws under a higher level of scrutiny and
automatic restoration.46
II.
A.

THE HISTORY OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT

Early Origins

Disenfranchisement is not a modern concept, as most of our voting
laws derive from European history.47 In Ancient Greece, depending on the
crime, individuals would be stripped of their civil rights, including the right
to vote.48 In Ancient Rome, a person found infamous could lose their ability
to run for office or to vote.49 During the Renaissance period, individuals
who were categorized as outlaws would lose all of their civil rights.50 Lastly,

40.
See Alec C. Ewald, Civil Death: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059–1066 (2002);
discussion infra Part II.
41.
See Martha Guarnieri, Civil Rebirth: Making the Case for Automatic ExFelon Voter Restoration, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 454 (2017); discussion infra Part II.
42.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 454.
43.
See MORGAN MCLEOD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE:
TWO DECADES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM 3 (2018); discussion infra Part III.
44.
See Cammett, supra note 25, at 387; Jackson, supra note 32, at 298;
discussion infra Part IV.
45.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, amended by FLA. CONST. amend. IV; Fla.
CS. for SB 7066, at 1 (2019); Lopez, supra note 34; discussion infra Part V.
46.
See Cammett, supra note 25, at 401; Lockhart, supra note 36; discussion
infra Part VI.
47.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1059.
48.
Id. at 1059–60.
49.
Id. at 1060.
50.
Id.
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in England, citizens convicted of a felony or treason were faced with civil
death.51 The concept of civil death refers to losing all civil rights and land.52
These early forms of disenfranchisement were justified under the
social contract theory.53 The social contract theory is the theory that a
contract exists between the government and its citizens.54 Essentially,
according to this theory, the government offers protection and the citizens, in
turn, follow the government’s rules.55 Thus, if a citizen violates the rules, he
or she surrenders the right to participate in the rule-making process.56
B.

Early American History

With colonization, the British brought with them many of these laws,
which varied depending on the form of crime committed.57 Originally,
crimes subject to disenfranchisement were crimes related to voting or
conduct considered an “egregious violation[] of the moral code.”58 This
differs from disenfranchisement laws today.59 Today, disenfranchisement is
based on the status of being a felon, rather than on the type of crime
committed.60
After the ratification of the United States Constitution, voting rights
became an issue left to the states.61 As a result, many states adopted laws
similar to what was already in place.62 During this time, only “white, male
property owners, over the age of [twenty-one]” had the right to vote.63 Thus,
only few could actually vote.64 Disenfranchisement laws applied only to
them because those outside of this category had no right to vote to begin
with.65 In addition, early constitutions required a showing of good character
in order to be able to vote.66 As a result, those citizens who had a criminal
record could not vote, since they could not show good character because of

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1060.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 457.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 358.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1062, 1078.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 457.
Id.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 359.
Id.
Id.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1063.
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their records.67 Between 1776 and 1821, eleven states prohibited criminals
from voting.68
C.

Civil War and Reconstruction

Before the Civil War, “women, men without extended residency,
blacks, soldiers, students, the institutionalized mentally ill, and criminals”
did not have the right to vote.69 Today, the institutionalized mentally ill and
criminals continue to face restrictions on their right to vote.70 This reflects
how American views have evolved and expanded throughout history.71
African Americans had the right to vote in only six states in 1860.72
They were barred from voting in almost every state where criminals were
denied the right to vote.73 African Americans could not vote because of their
race.74
Thus, discrimination was not the original intent of felony
disenfranchisement.75 However, following the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments, nearly every Southern state amended their disenfranchisement
laws.76 The laws were expanded to include less serious crimes such as
burglary, theft, and arson.77 The intent behind this was to prevent African
Americans from voting.78 Thus, felony disenfranchisement began to be used
as a tool post-Reconstruction to suppress the votes of the African American
population.79
During the Jim Crow Era, disenfranchisement laws restricted those
who were convicted of crimes.80 These crimes were those believed to be

67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 1064.
70.
Id.
71.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1064.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 1064–65.
74.
Id. at 1065.
75.
Id.
76.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1065; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIII § 1; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 1; U.S. CONST. amend XV § 1.
77.
Ziegler, supra note 16, at 217.
78.
Id.; see also ACLU ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
79.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 361.
80.
Lauren Latterell Powell, Concealed Motives: Rethinking Fourteenth
Amendment and Voting Rights Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement, 22 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 383, 388 (2017).
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committed by African Americans.81 They included “thievery, adultery,
arson, wife-beating, housebreaking, and attempted rape.”82
The Fourteenth Amendment was the first way in which felons were
able to challenge felony disenfranchisement laws.83 They would argue that
these laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.84 Specifically, under the Equal Protection Clause, “no [s]tate
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”85 Equal Protection cases are based on the issue of “whether the
‘government’s classification is justified by a sufficient government
purpose.’”86
Even though the original purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was
to free and protect the African American population, the Fourteenth
Amendment had the opposite effect and has strengthened modern
disenfranchisement laws.87 In 1974, the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld a state disenfranchisement law in Richardson v. Ramirez.88
In Richardson, three California men convicted of felonies completed
their sentences.89 However, when they attempted to vote in three different
counties, they were denied because of their criminal records.90 At the time,
the California Constitution denied ex-felons the right to vote.91 The
California men argued that this law violated the Equal Protection Clause.92
They argued that, under strict scrutiny, which the Supreme Court of the
United States had subjected voting violations in the past, only a compelling
government interest can justify a denial of voting rights.93 The California
Supreme Court agreed and declared the disenfranchisement law

81.
Id.
82.
Id.
(quoting
Andrew
L.
Shapiro,
Challenging
Criminal
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Act: A New Strategy,103 YALE L.J. 537, 541 (1993)).
83.
William Walton Liles, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws:
Past, Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 618 (2007); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
84.
Liles, supra note 83, at 618; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
86.
Liles, supra note 83, at 618 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.1.2, at 669 (3d ed. 2006)).
87.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1065–66; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
88.
418 U.S. 24 (1974); Ewald, supra note 40, at 1066.
89.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 26.
90.
Id. at 31–32.
91.
Id. at 27.
92.
Id. at 33.
93.
Id.
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unconstitutional.94 However, the Supreme Court of the United States
overturned the California decision.95
The Supreme Court of the United States found that the California
Supreme Court had failed to consider section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.96 Under section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “any state
which disenfranchises adult males . . . will face proportionate reduction in its
congressional representation.”97 The Court held that the language in section
2 “obviated any need to justify disenfranchisement laws with a compelling
state interest.”98
Previously, the Supreme Court of the United States had established
that the right to vote was a fundamental right.99 Thus, any restrictions were
subject to strict scrutiny.100 However, in Richardson, the Supreme Court of
the United States established a dangerous precedent.101 When the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld California’s disenfranchisement law, it
essentially held that felons lost their fundamental right to vote when they
committed their offenses.102 The Supreme Court of the United States
reasoned that the language in section 2 distinguished felony
disenfranchisement laws from other restrictions on the right to vote, which
had previously been subject to strict scrutiny.103 Following the precedent set
forth in Richardson, very few felony disenfranchisement laws have been
deemed unconstitutional.104
D.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965

In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act.105 The purpose of
the Act was to correct the ineffectiveness of the post-Reconstruction
Amendments in enfranchising the African American population.106 The Act

94.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 27; Ewald, supra note 40, at 1067–68.
95.
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56.
96.
See id. at 54, 56.
97.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1068; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
98.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1068; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
99.
Ewald, supra note 40, at 1067–68.
100.
See id.
101.
See id. at 1071–72; Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53–54, 56.
102.
See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53–54, 56.
103.
Id. at 54.
104.
Liles, supra note 83, at 624; see also Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56.
105.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437
(1965) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301); George Brooks, Felon
Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 859
(2005).
106.
Brooks, supra note 105, at 859; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2.
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prohibited discriminatory voting practices such as literacy tests.107 Under
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, any “voting qualifications or prerequisite
to voting or standard, practice, or procedure . . . imposed or applied . . . to
den[y] or abridge[] . . . the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color” were prohibited.108
The Act had great success in outlawing discriminatory laws and
extending the right to vote to many African-Americans.109 Further, the Act
created a second avenue for felons to challenge felony disenfranchisement
laws.110 These types of cases have yet to make it to the Supreme Court of the
United States.111 However, the lower courts have analyzed the issue and
reached contradicting decisions in the ability to challenge
disenfranchisement laws under section 2 of the Act.112
Wesley v. Collins113 was one of the first cases to use the Act as an
avenue to challenge felony disenfranchisement laws.114 In Wesley, the
plaintiff sued Tennessee on the grounds that the state’s disenfranchisement
law was unconstitutional.115 The plaintiff argued that the law violated
section 2 of the Act by denying him the right to vote on the basis of race.116
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
Tennessee’s disenfranchisement law was constitutional.117 However, it
recognized valid the ability to sue under section 2 in felony
disenfranchisement cases.118 Accordingly, Wesley set the precedent for
challenges to disenfranchisement laws under the Act.119
In turn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the Act did not apply to felony disenfranchisement laws.120
Specifically, the court found that Congress had not explicitly stated that the

107.
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2; see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018)
(originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437).
108.
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018) (originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437); Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2.
109.
See Brooks, supra note 105, at 860.
110.
Liles, supra note 83, at 624.
111.
Id.
112.
Id. at 625–27.
113.
791 F.2d 1255, 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
114.
Id.; Liles, supra note 83, at 625.
115.
Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1257; see also Liles, supra note 83, at 625.
116.
Liles, supra note 83, at 625.
117.
Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262.
118.
Liles, supra note 83, at 625.
119.
Id.; see also Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262.
120.
Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Liles, supra
note 83, at 625–26.
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Act applied to disenfranchisement laws.121 Without such explicit intention,
the court reasoned the Act did not apply unless specifically dictated by
Congress.122
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that felony disenfranchisement laws can be challenged under section
two of the Voting Rights Act if evidence is presented showing that African
Americans were disproportionally denied the right to vote as a result of the
state’s felony disenfranchisement laws.123 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that discrimination on the basis of
race is a relevant factor courts may consider in determining the
constitutionality of a disenfranchisement law.124
E.

Felony Disenfranchisement Today

More than 6.8 million felons are under correctional control in the
United States.125 This includes: “[P]robationers, parolees, prisoners, and
prison inmates.”126 In 2016, around 5.85 million citizens were barred from
voting as a result of having a felony conviction.127 Seventy-five percent of
these citizens were not incarcerated, but are on probation, parole, or have
completed their sentences.128 In 2014, four states barred the vote at all stages
of a felony conviction, even after completing the sentence.129
In recent years, many states have changed their felon
disenfranchisement policies.130
However, felony disenfranchisement
continues to have a significant impact on African Americans.131 While
felony disenfranchisement laws may not be facially discriminatory, these
felony disenfranchisement laws disproportionally affect African
Americans.132 The War on Drugs and other policies have resulted in mass
incarceration.133 As a result, there has been an increase of 1.17 million in

121.
Baker, 85 F.3d at 922; Liles, supra note 83, at 626.
122.
Baker, 85 F.3d at 922; Liles, supra note 83, at 626.
123.
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2003); Liles,
supra note 83, at 626.
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Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1015; Liles, supra note 83, at 626.
125.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 454.
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Id.
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Id.
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See id.
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THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 4, at 1.
130.
See id.
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Id.
132.
Id.
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Powell, supra note 80, at 388.

206

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

1976 to 6.1 million in 2016 in the number of disenfranchised individuals.134
This has led to a disproportionate number of African Americans
incarcerated.135 One out of every five black adults is disenfranchised in the
states of Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia as a result of a felony conviction.136
III.

THE RISING TREND OF VOTER RESTORATION

Disenfranchisement policies are part of the process outside of the
criminal sentence.137 As a result, they operate hidden from the public as a
form of invisible punishment.138 Disenfranchisement laws are one of the
harshest punishments imposed by our American society.139
The
disenfranchised have no political power.140 They have no say in the
policymaking that will govern them later on and which laws they have to
abide by.141 As a result of the effects of disenfranchisement laws, more
states have enacted laws to restore voting rights.142
The process of restoring voting rights is known as reenfranchisement.143 Re-enfranchisement laws vary greatly from state to
state.144 This has created confusion regarding the different processes
surrounding re-enfranchisement laws.145 Currently, restoration of voting
rights for felons is regulated in every state except for Maine and Vermont.146
These two states allow felons to vote even while serving their sentences in
prison.147
In recent years, many states have expanded their felony
disenfranchisement laws to allow more ex-felons to regain their right to
vote.148 Since 1997, twenty-three states have repealed or amended their
lifetime disenfranchisement laws.149
Additionally, seven states have

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 454.
Id. at 455.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 370.
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McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 971 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
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Id. at 375–76.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 375.
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expanded voting rights from previous lifetime disenfranchisement laws.150
Six states have eased the restoration process for felons, allowing those under
community supervision to regain the right to vote.151 Finally, seventeen
states have eased their restoration processes to allow voting restoration after
sentence completion.152
Restrictions of voting rights vary among the states, from the type of
crime committed, the criminal history, to how long it has been since
completing the sentence.153 For instance, Alabama disenfranchises those
convicted of crimes of moral turpitude.154 Another example is Mississippi,
where twenty-one offenses can result in disenfranchisement.155 Finally, in
Tennessee, crimes of “murder, treason, rape, voter fraud, [or] sexual
offenses” result in disenfranchisement.156
Many states have recently passed legislation to amend or reform
their disenfranchisement laws.157 For instance, Delaware passed an
amendment repealing their disenfranchisement law, which required a fiveyear waiting period after sentence completion.158 Another example is
California; the state stopped litigation over policies that barred low-level
felony offenders from having a right to vote.159 Another instance was
Wyoming, which allowed first-time offenders convicted of a non-violent
offense to regain their right to vote.160
While some states have loosened their disenfranchisement laws,
other states have taken the opposite approach to felony
disenfranchisement.161
In eight states, felons face lifetime
disenfranchisement unless they go through “individual application, review,

150.
Id.
151.
Id.
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Id.
153.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 468; see also MCLEOD, supra note 43, at 3.
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Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 468.
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Id.; Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Tennessee, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST.: OUR WORK (Feb. 9, 2018), http://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-tennessee.
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Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 468.
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Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Delaware, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.:
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Offenders,
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(Aug.
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2015),
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Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 469.
161.
Id. at 468.
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and approval” of their cases.162 This process can be lengthy, confusing, and
include a clemency board.163 Other states require payment of fines accrued
during the completion of a criminal sentence before restoring a felon’s right
to vote.164
These procedures are constantly changing, creating confusion and
instability.165 As a result, many individuals do not know their status or
whether they can vote.166 Further, individuals who have completed their
sentences may not be given documentation to show that they have completed
their parole requirement.167 This makes it difficult when they have to show
proof of completion in order to have their voting rights restored—even
though they may be eligible to vote.168
These financial payment
requirements serve as another barrier keeping many ex-felons from being
able to regain their voting rights.169
IV.
A.

CONSEQUENCES OF REPAYMENT BILLS IN RESTITUTION LAWS
Repayment of Fees for Restitution

Debt associated with or incurred during incarceration is known as
carceral debt.170 Carceral debt includes not only restitution, court costs, and
other fees directly related to the criminal conviction, but also debt incurred
during or as a result of the incarceration itself.171 Fines are court-ordered
penalties and form part of the individual’s sentence.172 Generally, fines are a
monetary penalty and are set as a form of punishment depending on the
severity of the crime committed.173 Restitution is a form of payment, ordered
by the court, which the individual sentenced must pay to the victim for
financial losses incurred as a result of the offense.174
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Id. at 470.
Id.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 378.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 379.

2020]

FLORIDA JOINS THE VOTER RESTORATION TREND

209

Another type of court ordered payments are public cost recovery
fees.175 These fees reflect the effort of the state governments to charge
prisoners the costs of the states’ deficit.176 These fees differ from other court
ordered legal financial obligations (“LFOs”).177 Fines and restitution are
intended to punish the defendant and aid the victim, respectively.178
However, public cost recovery fees are solely intended to serve as profit for
the state’s economy.179
Recently, the Brennan Center for Justice performed a study showing
that “[c]ash-strapped states have increasingly turned to user fees to fund their
criminal justice systems, as well as to provide general budgetary support.”180
Offenders are charged for everything, including probation supervision, jail
stays, and a required public defender.181 Generally, defendants are part of a
class that is unable to pay this massive debt as a result of being
underemployed and poor.182
After their release, their chances for
employment decrease even more, rendering them helpless when attempting
to pay back these debts, which are constantly increasing as a result of interest
rates, payment plan fees, and collection agency fees.183 Many states make
carceral debt a condition of the individual’s parole, probation, or any other
correctional supervision they may be on.184
Recently, many states have been making their re-enfranchisement
laws conditional on the payment of their carceral debt.185 Appellate courts,
in both the federal and state court systems, have upheld laws conditioning
payment of carceral debt on felony re-enfranchisement.186
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
upheld Virginia’s re-enfranchisement law.187 The law required convicted
felons to pay a ten-dollar fee to begin the process of having their voting

175.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 379.
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Id.
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rights restored.188 The decision set the precedent that laws that make repayment a condition for restitution of voting rights are constitutional.189
In 2007, the Washington Supreme Court upheld a statute that made
re-enfranchisement dependent on payment of all LFOs.190 The court found
that LFOs are a continuing part of a felon’s completion of their criminal
sentence.191 As a result, once their criminal sentences are restored by
repayment, then the offender should have their voting rights restored.192
Ignoring the argument that the repayment of LFOs served as an
unconstitutional poll tax, the court went on to reason that convicted felons do
not have a fundamental right to vote, and only a rational basis analysis is
required in laws restricting a felon’s right to vote.193 The court found that
“the [s]tate clearly has an interest in ensuring that felons complete all of the
terms of their sentence, and there is no requirement that the [s]tate restore
voting rights to felons until they do so.”194
Additionally, the Washington Supreme Court also analyzed the issue
of discrimination against poor felons unable to satisfy their LFOs.195
Regarding this issue, the court reasoned that, while low income felons may
be disproportionally affected by these laws, this factor alone does not
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.196
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld an Arizona law automatically restoring voting rights to first time
felony offenders that fully complete their sentences and pay their carceral
debt in full.197 The court applied the rational basis test and concluded that
payment of carceral debt was part of completing a sentence.198
Overall, the courts that have considered the constitutionality of
repayment laws have concluded that these laws are constitutional and subject
only to a rational basis review.199 These courts have reasoned that an
individual’s inability to pay cannot be the sole basis to deem these laws
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unconstitutional.200 As a result, a lot of ex-felons who have completed their
sentences and served their time continue to be disenfranchised.201
B.

Racial Disparity

Disenfranchisement laws have a clear and disparate impact on
minorities, specifically African Americans.202 Today, African Americans
make up thirteen percent of the population.203 However, African Americans
make up “[forty] percent of the prison population.”204 Additionally, one in
every thirteen African Americans across the nation is disenfranchised—this
is a 7.7% rate.205 This is four times higher than the non-African American
community, which is disenfranchised at a rate of 1.8%.206 In Florida,
Kentucky, and Virginia, the rate is even higher.207 At least one in every five
African Americans is disenfranchised in these states, at a rate of over twenty
percent.208 More than forty percent of these individuals have served their
time and completed their sentences.209
The right to vote is regarded as a fundamental right.210 The African
American population has fought, bled, and died to have this right and finally
have a say in the political process.211 Throughout history, the black vote has
been suppressed through laws designed to disproportionally affect the
African American population.212
Since the beginning, the right to vote was a privilege reserved for
few—generally, white men over the age of twenty-one who owned
property.213 Finally, in 1869, the African American male population gained
the right to vote, as a result of the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteeing the
right to vote to all male citizens regardless of “race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”214 However, in the years to follow, the states began
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to pass legislation with the sole purpose of suppressing the African American
right to vote.215 These laws are commonly known today as poll taxes,
grandfather clauses, and literacy tests.216
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was the result of a peaceful march
for voting rights met with violence.217 The Act prohibited any law that
denied the right to vote based on race.218 The Act has evolved with the
passage of each amendment with the purpose to end each and every one of
these unjust laws which disproportionally impact the black vote.219 As a
result, more modern laws suppressing the black vote, such as
disenfranchisement laws, are much more facially neutral than they once
were.220 However, felony disenfranchisement is a clear example that the
black vote continues to be massively suppressed.221
Many of the laws prohibited by the Act have similarities to the
current disenfranchisement laws.222 For instance, literacy tests were initially
interpreted as race neutral laws, much like disenfranchisement laws are
interpreted today.223 However, literacy tests were abolished because, in
practice, the laws had a disparate impact on the African American vote.224
Today, felony disenfranchisement laws have two major similarities with
literacy tests.225 First, both depend on racial discrimination to have a
disproportionate effect on the African American vote.226 Second, this racial
discrimination serves to exclude African Americans from voting.227
Another example are similarities between poll taxes and
disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement laws that make repayment of
carceral debt a requirement for voting restoration.228 The purpose of poll
taxes was to suppress black voters.229 Initially, like literacy tests and
disenfranchisement laws, it was viewed as racially neutral.230 However, in
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practice, black voters were disproportionally affected by this law because
they could not afford to pay the taxes in order to vote.231 As a result, most
African Americans were barred from the ballot box because of their inability
to pay the taxes.232 Felony disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement laws
that require repayment are similar because they affect a large number of the
African American population who are unable to pay these growing carceral
debts.233
In 2012, more African Americans were “in the grip of the criminaljustice system—in prison, on probation, or on parole—than were in
slavery.”234 In 2014, black males were more likely to be in prison than nonAfrican Americans.235 Black males were in prison at a rate of 3.8 to 10.5
times higher than the white male population, and 1.4 to 3.1 times higher than
the Hispanic male population.236
Hispanics, although not facing as high incarceration rates as the
African American population, also face more likelihood of being
disenfranchised than the non-Hispanic population.237 The likelihood of
incarceration for Hispanic men is 2.4 times greater than for non-Hispanic
men and 1.5 times greater for Hispanic women than non-Hispanic women.238
If this trend continues, seventeen percent of Hispanic men will be
incarcerated in their lifetime in comparison to six percent of non-Hispanic
white men.239
These numbers clearly show that disenfranchisement laws, even
though facially neutral, have a disproportionate effect on minorities—
specifically African Americans.240 The African American population has
fought for their voting rights for centuries and continues to fight for them.241
However, they still meet restrictions specifically designed to suppress the
African American community.242
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Economic Disparity

African Americans, along with other minorities, are overrepresented
among the poor.243 More than eighty percent of prisoners qualify for
indigent services.244 As a result, the poor are disproportionally represented
among people in the criminal justice system.245 Generally, people in the
criminal justice system tend to be poor, underemployed, uneducated, and
from disadvantage communities, where crime and incarceration have higher
rates.246 The chances of improving after imprisonment are even slimmer,
since class mobility is even harder after a felony conviction.247
As a result, in the case of re-enfranchisement laws—which require
the repayment of carceral debt to regain the right to vote after a felony
conviction—a court may conclude that the state’s interest in these laws are
not legitimate nor rational.248 While the courts allow great deference to
states under the rational basis test, it is not so that every legislation subject to
the rational basis test must be deemed constitutional.249
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted that “[p]erhaps withholding
voting rights from those who are truly unable to pay their criminal fines due
to indigency would not pass this rational basis test.”250 Justice O’Connor
questioned whether laws that prevent low income felons from voting were
truly legitimate.251 Generally, felons are not only politically powerless but
also indigent.252 Consequentially, regaining their voting rights ultimately
becomes impossible if they are required to pay their carceral debt before
being able to vote.253
While the states may have legitimate reasons why repayment laws
should survive a rational basis analysis, there are several reasons that make
these laws irrational for low income ex-felons.254 First, these laws provide
no incentives for ex-felons.255 If ex-felons are unable to pay their carceral

243.
See Disturbing Racial Wealth Gap, ECON. POL’Y
http://www.epi.org/news/disturbing-racial-wealth-gap/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
244.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 369.
245.
Id.
246.
Id. at 370.
247.
Id.
248.
See id. at 398.
249.
See Cammett, supra note 25, at 389.
250.
Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010).
251.
Cammett, supra note 25, at 398.
252.
Id.
253.
See id. at 399–400.
254.
Id. at 398–99.
255.
Id.

INST.,

2020]

FLORIDA JOINS THE VOTER RESTORATION TREND

215

debt, there is no incentive to make these payments a condition for the
restoration of voting rights.256 The right for felons to vote should not be
conditional on the repayment of carceral debt because ex-felons will
continue to carry this debt after serving their time and completing their
sentences.257
Further, the state can achieve the legitimate end of collecting these
debts through other methods.258 The Supreme Court of the United States has
concluded that a person’s ability to pay should be considered in determining
whether re-arrest as a result of non-payment is appropriate.259 Thus, if an exfelon has the ability to pay his or hers carceral debt, and is willingly failing
to pay it, this person will likely be re-arrested.260 Consequently, not only are
re-enfranchisement laws that require repayment of carceral debt irrational
because an indigent ex-felon simply cannot pay their carceral debt, they also
do not accomplish the legitimate state purpose they are set out to
accomplish.261
Another reason that these laws are irrational for low income felons is
that carceral debt in the aggregate can be massive.262 As a result, ex-felons
become permanently disenfranchised because they will never be able to
completely pay off this debt.263 Accordingly, re-enfranchisement laws that
require repayment are dangerous because they essentially end the rising trend
of voter restoration, since a majority of ex-felons are permanently
disenfranchised as a result of the repayment requirement.264
Repayment laws undermine another equally important state purpose
to the collection of debt: The reintegration and rehabilitation process for exfelons.265 For ex-felons to successfully reintegrate back into society after
completing their sentences, they need to be part of the society.266 This
becomes even more difficult with restrictions on voting rights such as
repayment laws.267 Furthermore, there is a strong relationship between crime
and voting, which shows that “[t]hose who vote are less likely to be arrested
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and incarcerated, and less likely to report committing a range of property and
violent offenses.” 268
V.
A.

FLORIDA’S VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION LAWS

History of Felony Disenfranchisement in Florida

Under the Florida Constitution, a person convicted of a felony could
not “vote, serve on a jury, or hold public office until [his or her] civil rights
[were] restored.”269 In 2007, Florida amended its voting rights restoration
laws to approve automatic reinstatement for offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes.270 However, this changed when Governor Rick Scott, along
with three other government officials, as members of the Executive
Clemency Board, rescinded the amended restoration proceedings.271
The Clemency Board consisted of the Governor and his cabinet and
convened four times a year.272 The Clemency Board heard issues in relation
to clemency, pardon, and restoration of civil rights.273 Under Governor Rick
Scott’s reforms, Rules Nine and Ten went into effect creating two categories
of ex-felons.274 Ex-felons affected by Rule Nine, were offenders of less
serious crimes and had a five-year waiting period after completion of their
sentences to be eligible for a hearing in front of the Clemency Board.275
Offenders of more serious crimes had a seven-year waiting period after
completion of their sentences.276 At the hearing, ex-felons had five minutes
to present their case and answer questions from the Board and to pay their
outstanding restitution fees.277
The hearings proved to be extremely unsuccessful.278 Governor
Bush approved one fifth of over 300,000 applications for restoration of
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voting rights during his time in office.279 The Governor has the ultimate
decision to determine whether an application should be approved.280
“If the governor recommends clemency, and if a majority of the
cabinet members agree, and they almost always do, the ex-offender’s civil
rights are restored. If the governor feels otherwise, the petitioner returns
home without the full privileges of citizenship.”281
The voting restoration procedures in Florida had a disparate impact
on the African American population.282 In 2008, more than one hundred
thousand ex-felons would have been able to vote in the 2008 election.283 A
majority of these ex-felons were African Americans.284
Florida has disenfranchised more potential voters than any other
state in the nation.285 As of 2010, Florida had disenfranchised 1,541,602
citizens as a result of a felony conviction; more than 10% of Florida’s
population and more than 20% of the African American population.286
Today, nearly half of the disenfranchised ex-felons in the United States live
in Florida.287 These numbers particularly affect the African American
population since they form part of over half of the state’s prison population,
but only 15% of the overall state’s population.288
B.

Amendment IV and The New Repayment Bill

Amendment IV was passed as part of the 2018 Florida elections.289
The Amendment would restore voting rights for anyone in the State
convicted of a felony who had completed all terms of their felony sentences,
except for those convicted of murder or sexual offenses.290 About 1.5
million Floridians were estimated to regain their right to vote as a result of
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the passage of Amendment IV.291 The Amendment went into effect in
January 2019.292
Following the passage of Amendment IV, Florida’s legislators
argued that the Amendment was vague and needed clarification.293 The
legislature followed by introducing measures to limit how many ex-felons
would automatically have their voting rights restored.294 They passed Senate
Bill 7066 and Governor Ron DeSantis signed it.295 This bill includes a
requirement in which Florida residents convicted of a felony have to pay all
LFOs before regaining the right to vote.296 Legislators, in support of the bill,
argued that all LFOs imposed by a judge are part of their sentences and
therefore need to be paid before restitution of the right to vote.297
Generally, judges convert LFOs into a lien, turning the criminal debt
into a civil debt.298 The new bill states that LFOs must be paid, even if
converted into civil debt, before restitution of voting rights.299 Exceptions to
full payment of LFOs before restoration include: A judge waiving the lien or
converting it into community service, or if the victim dismisses restitution
payments.300
Requiring payment of LFOs before restoration of voting rights
means that Florida residents now have to pay hundreds of millions of dollars
in LFOs before being able to vote.301 For instance, in Miami-Dade County,
from the year 2000 to today, there are over $278 million dollars in
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outstanding LFOs related to ex-felons.302 In Palm Beach County, there are
over $195.8 million dollars in outstanding LFOs related to ex-felons.303
Additionally, over one billion dollars in LFOs were issued between 2013 and
2018.304 In those five years, only nineteen percent of this outstanding debt
was paid per year.305 Moreover, the outstanding carceral debt can be sent to
collection agencies, which are allowed to increase the amount an ex-felon
may owe by forty percent.306 Furthermore, eighty-three percent of LFOs in
this five year period were labeled minimal collections expectations.307 This
means that the courts know that this debt is unlikely to ever be satisfied
because most of these ex-felons are unable to make the payments.308
Since the 1990s, Florida legislators have passed laws creating more
than twenty categories of LFOs for different criminal offenses.309 These
fines serve as penalties for the crimes committed, separated from court costs
and restitution fees.310
Concurrently, legislators have passed laws
eliminating exceptions for felons unable to satisfy their LFOs.311
Mandatory fines are attached to every offense, “from money
laundering to driving under the influence, writing graffiti, and soliciting
prostitution.”312 For example, a conviction of drug trafficking is attached to
a “mandatory fine of $25,000 to $500,000 per count.”313 This leads to most
ex-felons facing an insurmountable amount of debt upon completion of their
sentences, and yet another barrier before regaining their right to vote.314
C.

Consequences of the New Bill

Florida’s new law will permanently disenfranchise poor people, a
vast majority of which are African Americans.315 These individuals will be
denied the rights that were overwhelmingly voted for by the people in
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Amendment IV.316 “[M]ore than half a million people” have been affected
by the passage of this bill.317 It will take years for these people to pay off
their outstanding LFOs in order to regain the right to vote.318
Generally, these individuals make $15,000 less than the average
voting population.319 This creates a substantial barrier in voting rights
restoration because the majority of these individuals will be unable to pay
their outstanding LFOs.320 Those who never pay their outstanding LFOs in
full will be permanently disenfranchised.321 Legislators claim that the bill
was necessary for clarification.322 However, the bill does not address many
issues, which will create more confusion than automatic restoration would
have.323
Florida already has a very complex system for dealing with
repayment of LFOs.324 As a result, the restoration of voting rights continues
to be complicated and discriminatory.325 There is no single entity in place to
track LFOs, and it will be very expensive to create such a system.326 Further,
the process of petitioning a judge to convert outstanding LFOs into
community service was not laid out in the bill.327 As a result, many things
are unclear; for instance, whether a lawyer will be needed to petition the
judge in order to get the LFOs turned into community service.328 Most
courts in Florida do not have programs where LFOs are converted into
community service; therefore, it is unclear whether these programs will be
put in place.329 Further, it is unclear how individuals will know the total
amount of LFOs they need to pay before regaining their right to vote, or how
election officials will know who is able to register.330
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The current system creates a cycle of debt for ex-felons attempting to
reintegrate into society.331 The incarcerated population is often unable to pay
these fees.332 In enacting this bill, the legislators and the governor have
failed to consider the effects of this insurmountable debt on those convicted
of crimes who are attempting to re-enter society.333 Currently, the exemption
for carceral debt continues to lessen, and the fees and fines continue to
increase in the State.334 Florida has clearly failed to consider inability to pay
in imposing LFOs as a condition of regaining the right to vote.335
Further, the Florida legislation ignored the outstanding support of
Amendment IV across party lines by passing this bill.336 This undermines
the democratic process, which should ultimately rest on the will of the
people.337 Many voting rights advocates are equating this bill to a poll tax
because the majority of individuals with a felony conviction are
disproportionately members of the African American population and more
likely to be poor.338 As a result, the bill has a discriminatory effect on
African Americans, similar to the poll taxes.339
Several voting rights groups have filed lawsuits questioning the
constitutionality of the new bill: First, the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU of Florida”) and other civil rights groups have joined together in a
lawsuit; second, Kelvin Jones, a black ex-felon who owes more than $50,000
in LFOs and is unable to pay them; third, the Campaign Legal Center; and
fourth, the Southern Poverty Law Center.340 The first three suits have been
consolidated together and will be in front of United States District Court
Judge Mark Walker as one case.341 The four lawsuits make the same basic
claim, questioning the constitutionality of the bill and its effects of
disenfranchising poor people and people of color convicted of a felony, and,
as a result, denying the rights granted to these people under the passage of
Amendment IV.342

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id.
Id.
Lockhart, supra note 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lockhart, supra note 36.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

222

NOVA LAW REVIEW

VI.

[Vol. 44

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is clear that there is a relationship between race, class, and
disenfranchisement.343 Conditioning voter restoration on full payment of
carceral debt could lead to a crisis where millions of people, the majority of
which are likely African Americans, will be permanently disenfranchised
because they are unable to pay their carceral debt.344 The African American
population is more likely to live in poverty and is more likely to be in the
criminal system throughout their lifetime.345
The relationship between race, class, and disenfranchisement could
lead to a higher level of scrutiny because disenfranchisement
disproportionately affecting African Americans does not satisfy a legitimate
state interest.346 As Erwin Chemerinsky and Mario L. Barnes explained,
“[o]ne should need no other basis to call for closer scrutiny than the obvious
truth that poverty takes on the character of a stigmatizing identity category.
This stigma alone is powerful but also interacts in myriad and complex ways
with race—a classification that receives strict scrutiny.”347
The disproportionate effect that disenfranchisement laws,
specifically the rising trend of repayment laws, have on African Americans
creates an additional burden on a community that has faced and is currently
facing so many other social hurdles and disproportionalities.348 Analyzing
these laws under a heightened level of scrutiny will show that these laws do
not achieve a government interest, in addition to the irrationality of
requiring someone who does not have the ability to pay, to pay for their
carceral debt before regaining their right to vote.349
In addition to using a higher level of scrutiny to interpret voter
restoration laws and felony disenfranchisement laws, automatic restoration
could also be a possible solution to the felony disenfranchisement
problem.350 Automatic restoration eliminates the confusion and burdens that
are set with overly restrictive restoration bills.351 These laws are constantly
changing, vary from state to state, and create a lack of knowledge not only
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among ex-felons but among election officials as well.352 For instance, as
discussed above, the new repayment bill in Florida will create confusion
because there is no one system in place in charge of managing carceral
debt.353 Thus, it will be hard to regulate who is eligible to vote, or who has
satisfied their payments.354 Further, there is no system in place in Florida for
judges to deal with the influx of people who will petition to have their
carceral debt turned into community service.355 Automatic restoration would
eliminate all the hurdles and confusion that arise from the passing of this
repayment bill.356
Automatic restoration would also save time and resources spent in
creating the systems necessary to appropriately implement these laws.357
Confusing and difficult to implement restoration procedures create
unnecessary expenses in “coordinat[ing] complicated data matches,
administer[ing] convoluted eligibility requirements . . . [and] sort[ing]
through thousands of restoration applications.”358 In addition to resources
spent on informing and educating public officials of the new regulations in
place, automatic restoration would eliminate all these hurdles and save states
thousands of dollars spent on all these resources.359 This was exactly the
purpose the Fourth Amendment was set out to accomplish in Florida before
the repayment bill was passed.360
Additionally, automatic restoration “aligns with the spirit of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”361
Repayment bills and overly restrictive
restoration laws disproportionally bar the poor and as a result impact
minorities from regaining the right to vote.362 This should not be permissible
today.363 Restrictive restoration laws threaten the American principles
behind the democratic process because they exclude a massive population

352.
See id.
353.
See Lockhart, supra note 36.
354.
See id.
355.
Id.
356.
See id.
357.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 483.
358.
ERIKA WOOD & RACHEL BLOOM, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DE FACTO DISENFRANCHISEMENT 9 (2008).
359.
See Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 483.
360.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, amended by FLA. CONST. amend. IV; Lopez,
supra note 34.
361.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 484; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
362.
Guarnieri, supra note 41, at 483–84.
363.
Id. at 484.

224

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

from the political process.364 Automatic restoration of voting rights is
efficient, unbiased, and “the most constitutionally sound option.”365
VII.

CONCLUSION

The right to vote is a fundamental right.366 It allows citizens to play
a role in the political process.367 “It gives each person a voice, a choice, and
a sense of belonging.”368 For the African American population, it is a right
they have fought and died for.369 As Dr. Martin Luther King explained,
“[w]ith it, the Negro can eventually vote out of office public officials who
bar the doorway to decent housing, public safety, jobs, and decent integrated
education . . . to do this the vote is essential.”370
Felony disenfranchisement laws after an individual has completed
their sentences serves only as over-punishment that disproportionally affects
the African American population.371 Repayment bills specifically affect the
poor population, a majority of which are African Americans.372 Not
allowing ex-felons to vote and restricting them from regaining their right to
vote after serving their time exacerbates inequality, and shows them that they
are not welcomed back to reintegrate into their community.373 As a result,
disenfranchisement laws move our society away from the reintegration and
rehabilitation purposes of a criminal system and sentence.374 “Any threat to
achieving true equality is really a threat to the entire democracy . . . .”375
Thus, automatic restoration of voting rights is necessary to ensure that we
continue to protect the democratic process.376 It is not a true democracy
when millions of citizens cannot vote, but yet have to abide by the same laws
as those who do have a say in the political process.377
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a young aspiring rapper who has written a hip-hop
song describing your frustrations with local law enforcement.1 Now,
imagine that song you wrote down is being used against you in a criminal
proceeding as proof of a violation of a federal law.2 Jamal Knox found
himself in a similar situation in 2012 when he produced and posted a hip-hop
music video and was subsequently charged with sending terroristic threats
and witness intimidation under Pennsylvania state law.3 The case became an

*
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1.
See Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
2.
See id. at 1150.
3.
Id. at 1148–49.
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to his arrest.15 Knox was then charged with witness intimidation and sending
terroristic threats.16
At trial, the government’s basis for these charges stemmed from
Knox’s song which, unbeknownst to him, was posted online by a different
person.17 The court rejected Knox’s First Amendment argument, finding it
was not protected speech because the lyrics indicated Knox specifically
intended to intimidate the officers and “obstruct the administration of
criminal justice.”18 On appeal, the conviction was upheld, but the
intermediate court failed to properly address the First Amendment issue and
a subsequent appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed.19
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld Knox’s conviction,
reasoning that naming specific police officers who were meant to testify
against him indicated the song was more than just a fantastical form of
artistic self-expression.20 The threatening and realistic nature of the lyrics
took a song that normally would be considered free speech and turned it into
an unprotected threat against two police officers.21 The court stated they did
not wish to insulate true threats that take the forms of song lyrics from
prosecution simply because they appear in a song.22
Hip-hop comes from very humble beginnings.23 Music that started
out as party music transformed into a powerful platform for people to voice
their opinions and spread their messages on a national scale.24 As hip-hop
has continued to grow in popularity, the platform rappers use has also grown
in size to a now global level.25 Since the late 1980s, hip-hop and politics
have not been far removed from each other.26 From F*ck tha Police to the

15.
Knox, 190 A.3d at 1149.
16.
Id. at 1150.
17.
Id. at 1151.
18.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19.
Knox, 190 A.3d at 1152; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20.
Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160–61.
21.
See id.
22.
Id.
23.
Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 7, Knox v. Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. (2019) (No. 18–949); see also
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 16.
24.
Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 8.
25.
Id.; Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 16.
26.
See Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 8.
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Black Lives Matter movement, hip-hop has been full of protest anthems that
shock and appall many who do not agree with the music’s message.27
Jamal Knox’s case is another example of hip-hop lyrics being used
as evidence in a criminal proceeding against its author.28 One of the issues
surrounding the use of hip-hop lyrics as evidence in a court is that the
criminal justice system does not treat lyrics as an art form, but instead as
statements of truth and guilt.29 Hip-hop and poetry share some common
ground because they both take advantage of literary devices such as similes,
metaphors, hyperboles, and tales of fantasy.30 However, hip-hop is not given
the benefit of the doubt like poetry when it comes to depictions of crime and
guilt.31 Courts are not willing to inform juries about what makes hip-hop the
complex art form that is on par with poetry because it is simply viewed as
inferior.32 Hip-hop is surrounded by stigma and bias, conjuring negative
connotations by those who are not familiar with the genre.33 Tests show that
those unfamiliar audiences assume that hip-hop is more violent than any
other genre and therefore people who consume or produce hip-hop are
violent individuals.34 These negative biases can unfairly prejudice a trial
against a hip-hop artist defendant.35 The criminal justice system’s treatment
of hip-hop needs an overhaul to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial
separate from biased courts of public opinion.36 This Comment will first
cover the history of the true threats doctrine and the seminal cases that
created the foundation for the modern interpretation of the true threats
doctrine.37 It will also analyze the problems the Supreme Court of the United
States has created for the lower courts by not creating a clear test or
27.
See id.; Andrea L. Dennis, Black Contemporary Social Movements,
Resource Mobilization, and Black Musical Activism, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2016, at 29, 47,
50–51.
28.
Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1150–51 (Pa. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019).
29.
Andrea Dennis, Poetic (In)Justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and
Criminal Evidence, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 12–13 (2007).
30.
See id. at 20–23.
31.
See id. at 12–13.
32.
See id. at 13–14.
33.
Adam Dunbar et al., The Threatening Nature of Rap Music, 22 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL’Y, & L. 280, 280 (2016).
34.
Id. at 282.
35.
See id. at 288.
36.
See Dennis, supra note 29, at 40.
37.
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2008 (2015); Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 351 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per
curiam); Matt Kass, Elonis v. United States: At the Crossroads of First Amendment and
Criminal Jurisprudence in the Digital Age, 43 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 110, 115
(2017); discussion infra Part II.
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precedent courts should use when analyzing the statutes that involve
prosecuting true threats.38 Then, this Comment will discuss the history of
hip-hop songs and its use as evidence in criminal proceedings against the
defendant.39 This section will present the argument for why hip-hop needs to
be treated as an art form in the criminal justice system and why an overhaul
for how it is presented to factfinders is needed.40 The main focus of this
Comment is to present a test for the true threats doctrine that will provide a
balance between protecting the First Amendment rights of the speaker and
protecting the victim from future harm.41 The goal is to create a test that will
cover every statute that involves a true threat while also ensuring hip-hop is
treated as an art form and not just a laundry list of confessions.42 At the end
of the day, people should be able to speak, create, or rhyme what they want
without the fear of being prosecuted for it.43
II.

THE TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE: A HISTORY OF CONFUSION AND
AMBIGUITY

The First Amendment exception of true threats originated in the
Supreme Court of the United States’ case Watts v. United States.44 The true
threat exception applies to statements that convey harm to the recipient or
statements that strike fear into the recipient.45 When a true threat has been
conveyed, the speaker of the threat can then be prosecuted under a relevant
state or federal law.46 The problem with the current state of the true threat
analysis is that the Supreme Court of the United States has failed to
accurately create a way to measure and scrutinize true threats.47 Cases
38.
Megan Chester, Lost in Translation: The Case for the Addition of a
Directness Test in Online True Threat Analysis, 23 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS: J. COMM. L. &
POL’Y 395, 425 (2015); Kass, supra note 37, at 130; see also discussion infra Part II.
39.
Dennis, supra note 29, at 5–6; Donald F. Tibbs & Shelly Chauncey, From
Slavery to Hip-Hop: Punishing Black Speech and What’s Unconstitutional About Prosecuting
Young Black Men Through Art, 52 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 46–49 (2016); see also
discussion infra Part III.
40.
See Dennis, supra note 29, at 20–23.
41.
Alison J. Best, Elonis v. United States: The Need to Uphold Individual
Rights to Free Speech While Protecting Victims of Online True Threats, 75 MD. L. REV. 1127,
1157–58 (2016); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; discussion infra Part IV.
42.
See Best, supra note 41, at 1151–56, 1158.
43.
See Dennis, supra note 29, at 40.
44.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
45.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
46.
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015); Watts, 394 U.S. at
705; Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1150 (Pa. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547
(2019).
47.
Kass, supra note 37, at 130; see also Chester, supra note 38, at 395, 401.
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surrounding true threats have been vague or narrowly tailored to the relevant
statute, instead of broad statements qualifying exceptions to the First
Amendment.48 This has led to confusion among the lower circuit courts as to
whether they should treat true threats as general or specific intent crimes.49
As communication between people has become easier with growth of the
internet and social media use, threats have become easier to spread and
harder to distinguish from mere expression.50 A bright-line test is needed to
ensure First Amendment rights are protected across the jurisdictions and
court decisions are uniform under the true threat exception.51 Unfortunately,
after fifty years of precedent surrounding the true threat doctrine, not much
has actually been clarified.52
The First Amendment establishes that Congress shall make no law
that abridges the freedom of speech of United States citizens.53 The Supreme
Court of the United States has long held that the First Amendment protects
speech that takes the form of symbols, expressions, and words.54 Since the
Bill of Rights and the First Amendment’s adoption, there have been
limitations placed on what is considered to be free speech.55 The Supreme
Court of the United States has proscribed limitations on free speech as far
back as 1919.56 In Schenck v. United States,57 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”58
Justice Holmes’ famous quote demonstrates that the First Amendment does
not contain absolute protections to all speech and that certain forms of
speech could fall outside the scope of the protections guaranteed by the First
Amendment depending on where the expression takes place and how it is
communicated.59 Schenck would establish what was known as the clear and
48.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004; Black, 538 U.S. at
348; Watts, 394 U.S. at 707; Chester, supra note 38, at 411.
49.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 9–10; see Mary Margaret Roark, Elonis v.
United States: The Doctrine of True Threats: Protecting Our Ever-Shrinking First
Amendment Rights in the New Era of Communication, 15 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 197, 206
(2015).
50.
Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1902.
51.
Roark, supra note 49, at 210; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52.
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013.
53.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
55.
See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X; Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707
(1969) (per curiam); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
56.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
57.
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
58.
Id. at 52.
59.
See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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present danger test.60 This test would become the standard for analyzing
certain forms of dangerous speech that fell outside of the scope of the First
Amendment until 1969 when the Supreme Court of the United States would
coin the term true threat for certain kinds of unprotected speech.61 By
creating the true threat exception, the Court sought to identify certain forms
of speech as true threats and distinguish them from constitutionally protected
expression.62
A.
The True Threat Doctrine and the Supreme Court’s Lack of
Guidance
The true threat doctrine arose in response to a climate of political
and social unrest in 1960s America.63 Americans were loudly voicing their
dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War, racial segregation and civil rights, and
with the state of American politics.64 On August 27, 1966, a young man by
the name of Robert Watts announced his dissatisfaction with President
Lyndon B. Johnson and the Vietnam War at a protest rally.65 There, Watts
proclaimed: “If they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in
my sights is L.B.J.”66 Even though Watts’ comment was met with laughter,
he was charged with and subsequently found guilty of violating a federal law
that prohibited a person from “knowingly and willfully threatening the
President” of the United States.67 Watts appealed and eventually came
before the Supreme Court of the United States.68 The Court reversed the
lower courts’ decisions ruling that political hyperbole, even if violent, does
not automatically indicate a serious intent to commit violent acts.69 In its
decision, the Court identified a new exception to free speech known as true
threats.70 Unfortunately, the Watts Court did not offer any insight into true
threats besides stating context and that the reaction of listeners should be
considered.71 In making its decision, the Court wanted to ensure “that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
60.
See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
61.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708
(1969) (per curiam); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
62.
Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
63.
See id. at 706.
64.
See id. at 705–06.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. at 706.
67.
Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 708.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
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may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.”72 The Court was trying to
ensure that this restriction placed on free speech was not overly broad and
did not include all harsh or crude political discourse.73
Watts would become the seminal case for determining what kind of
speech was considered to be a true threat.74 The decision has been criticized
by scholars for not giving any guidance to the lower courts on how to handle
true threat cases and for providing barely any information on what is
considered to be a true threat.75 The Court chose to deliver a per curiam
decision and therefore failed to provide the guidance lower courts needed to
properly decide their own true threat cases.76 The only thing the Court
guaranteed was that political hyperboles, like the one spoken by Watts, are a
form of protected speech.77 In place of a test, the Court did give some
factors that can be used to determine if the speech is a true threat, such as:
(1) the words in full context; (2) reaction of the listeners; and (3) if the threat
is expressly conditioned upon future events happening.78 Although the Court
did mention the possibility of analyzing the subjective intent of the listener in
Watts, ultimately, the Court appeared to favor the use of an objective
analysis when deciding future true threat cases.79 However, the Court never
explicitly stated whether a subjective or objective test should be used when
analyzing true threats.80 For the next thirty years, the federal and state courts
would apply the objective factors when analyzing First Amendment
protections and true threats.81 It would not be until 2003 when the Supreme
Court of the United States would again be faced with the opportunity to
review true threats and provide further insight and analysis into the
exception.82
With its decision in Virginia v. Black,83 the Supreme Court of the
United States provided a definition of true threats and more relevant
information about what a true threat is.84 In Black, the Supreme Court of the
United States agreed to hear the case of two men who were found guilty of
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
See id.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 7; see also Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 7–8.
Id. at 8; see also Watts, 394 U.S. at 705, 708.
See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
Id.
See id. at 707–08.
See id.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 8; see also U.S. CONST. amend I.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–60 (2003).
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
Id. at 359–60.
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violating a Virginia statute that outlawed burning crosses.85 The statute
made it illegal for anyone to burn a cross “with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons.”86 The Court accepted certiorari to determine if
burning crosses fell under the true threat exception.87 In her opinion, Justice
O’Connor described true threats as speech that “encompass those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”88 The Court further held the speaker “need not actually intend
to carry out the threat [and] a prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s]
individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear
engenders,’ in addition to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.’”89 The Court seemed to agree that true
threats should be identified through the use of objective factors alone,
disregarding the subjective intent of the speaker.90 However, confusion
emerges in reading Justice O’Connor’s true threat definition which appears
to indicate a focus on subjective intent.91 The opinion qualifies that the
speaker must intend to communicate a threat or intend to threaten the listener
when the threat is spoken.92 In Black, the Court could have provided a
concrete analysis for true threats, but instead further fueled the ambiguous
and inconsistent application of the doctrine by lower courts left to their own
interpretations.93
The Black decision did little to help the already muddied and
confusing precedent surrounding the true threat doctrine.94 The Court
focused on Virginia’s statute as it related to the facts of the case and
forewent the opportunity to make a larger decision based on the First
Amendment protections to freedom of expression.95 Due to the lack of a
direct answer regarding true threats, some circuits have chosen to adopt a
subjective analysis, some have maintained an objective analysis, and others
have created a hybrid objective and subjective analysis to determine the
85.
Id. at 347–48.
86.
Id. at 348; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423, declared unconstitutional by Elliot
v. Commonwealth, 593 S.E.2d 263, 236, 270 (Va. 2004).
87.
See Black, 538 U.S. at 347–48.
88.
Id. at 359.
89.
Id. at 359–60; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
90.
Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
See id. at 367; Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1896–97.
94.
See Black, 538 U.S. at 367; Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1896–97.
95.
Black, 538 U.S. at 347–48; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-423, declared unconstitutional by Elliot v. Commonwealth, 593 S.E.2d 263, 270
(Va. 2004).
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nature of the speech in question.96 The difference between a subjective and
objective analysis completely alters the charged offense from either being
reviewed as a specific intent crime or a general intent crime.97 A general
intent requirement punishes the speaker for uttering words that a reasonable
person would think are a threat, and a specific intent requirement would seek
an analysis into what the defendant actually meant.98 In 2015, the Court
again failed to set a uniform standard for true threats, but this time the crime
involved true threats over social media.99
In response to his wife leaving him, Anthony Douglas Elonis
adopted the pseudonym of Tone Dougie and took to Facebook to vent his
anger in the form of violent, graphic lyrics.100 Elonis would provide a
disclaimer with the lyrics stating they were fictitious and a form of therapy to
help him cope with the pain of his separation.101 After posting a photograph
of himself threatening a coworker with a knife at a Halloween party with the
caption I wish, Elonis was fired from his job.102
Following his
unemployment, Elonis’ lyrics became more aggressive and violent.103
Elonis, posing as Tone Dougie, posted lyrics online such as “I have sinister
plans for all my friends and must have taken home a couple. Y’all think it’s
too dark and foggy to secure your facility from a man as mad as me? . . .
Whoever thought the Halloween Haunt could be so f***in’ scary?”104 Elonis
continued to post threatening messages about his wife, eventually driving her
to seek a protective order from a court because she feared her life was in
danger.105 Elonis caught the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) after posting “I’m checking out and making a name for myself.
96.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 9–10; see also United States v. Heineman,
767 F.3d 970, 975 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th
Cir. 2011).
97.
David Barney, Note, Elonis v. United States: Why the Supreme Court
Punted on Free Speech, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016).
98.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 9.
99.
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2005, 2013 (2015).
100.
Id. at 2005–06.
101.
Id. at 2005.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005.
105.
Id. at 2006. The post that led to the wife seeking a protective order
involved Elonis quoting a comedy sketch about how it is illegal for him to say that he wants to
kill his wife. Id. at 2005–06. The post escalated to Elonis stating it is incredibly illegal for
him to say that she should be killed by a mortar launcher through the roof because it is the best
line of sight. Id. at 2005. Elonis then posted an illustrated diagram of his wife’s house. Id. at
2006. After the protective order was issued, he made another post stating the order will not
stop a bullet and that he will use explosives to kill the police department and sheriffs. Elonis,
135 S. Ct. at 2006.
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Enough [sic] elementary schools in a ten mile radius to initiate the most
heinous school shooting ever imagined.”106 After being interviewed by FBI
agents, Elonis then posted on Facebook lyrics titled Little Agent Lady, which
depicted Elonis slitting an agent’s throat then blowing himself up when law
enforcement attempted to arrest him.107 Elonis was arrested shortly after
making these comments and indicted by a grand jury on five counts of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).108
At trial, Elonis sought to have the charges dismissed by applying the
Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Black.109 Counsel argued
that the Government needed to establish that Elonis had the subjective intent
to intimidate the victims under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).110 If Elonis lacked the
intent to intimidate or threaten the victims at the time he made the threats,
then his messages could not be considered true threats and the First
Amendment would protect his speech as artistic expression that took the
form of violent hip-hop lyrics.111 The trial court denied the motion and the
State presented evidence that established an objective reasonable person
would understand Elonis’ statements as threats.112 The jury found Elonis
guilty on all counts and his convictions were upheld on appeal.113 In June of
2014, Elonis was given one last chance to be heard when his writ of
certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States.114
The main issue before the Court was whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
required a level of mens rea for the threat to be prosecutable.115 Pursuant to
the plain language of the statute, the Court decided Congress intended to not
identify a particular mental state required to convict a defendant under the
statute.116 The Court reasoned that the transmission of threatening
communication is only wrongful when the speaker intends to be

106.
Id.
107.
Id. at 2006–07.
108.
Id. at 2007; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2018). 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) states:
“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any
threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
109.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016; Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003);
Chester, supra note 38, at 411.
110.
Black, 538 U.S. at 347–348; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); Elonis, 135 S.
Ct. at 2017; Chester, supra note 38, at 411.
111.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016; Chester, supra note 38, at 411; see also U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
112.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007; Chester, supra note 38, at 411.
113.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007; Chester, supra note 38, at 411–12.
114.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2001.
115.
See id. at 2004; 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
116.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
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threatening.117 The perspective of the recipient is not in-and-of-itself enough
to qualify as a true threat.118 Therefore, any mental state requirement would
have to apply to whether the speaker knew the communication contained a
threat.119 Justice Roberts pointed out that Elonis was convicted on an
objective reasonable person standard and such standard essentially reduces
the culpability of the crime to negligence.120 Negligence is proven from an
objective analysis, but the Court found this standard to be insufficient.121
Essentially, in Elonis, the Court acknowledged the validity of a hybrid test,
weighing both objective and subjective factors to determine a true threat.122
However, the Court again refused to tackle this matter head-on, and did not
discuss the ongoing First Amendment concerns effecting lower court rulings
and subsequent inconsistent precedents surrounding the true threats
doctrine.123 Ultimately, the Court overturned Elonis’ conviction holding that
criminal liability for a federal crime should not entirely rest on the results of
the defendant’s actions without taking a look at the mental state of the
defendant.124 The Court chose not to discuss the First Amendment issues
related to Elonis’ threats, nor whether a recklessness standard would have
been satisfactory to convict Elonis.125
Leading up to the announcement of the Court’s decision in Elonis,
there was much hope that the Court would finally clarify much of the
confusion regarding true threats amongst the circuits.126 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court of the United States failed to shed any kind of additional light
on the true threat exceptions beyond 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).127 The majority
opinion is mostly scrutinized for its failure to address any of Elonis’ First
Amendment arguments.128 Both the concurring opinion, written by Justice
Alito, and the dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas agree the Court could
have addressed these issues.129 Justice Alito opens his concurring opinion
stating the Elonis decision will only cause confusion and serious
117.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009.
118.
See id. at 2011.
119.
See id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 2011–12.
122.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011.
123.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Barney, supra note 97, at 2.
124.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
125.
See id. at 2013; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
126.
Barney, supra note 97, at 2; Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1898; see
also Elonis, 135 S. Ct at 2013.
127.
Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1898; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
(2018).
128.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004; Barney, supra note 97,
at 11.
129.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013.
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problems.130 According to Alito, the Court only gave a partial answer to the
mens rea question and left the lower courts still in a state of ambiguity.131
The Court declined to state whether the jury needed to find the intent to
convey a true threat or if a higher standard than negligence—such as
recklessness—would satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), thus leaving federal and
state courts in the same place they were post Black.132 In his dissent, Justice
Thomas begins by stating the Court accepted certiorari on Elonis to help
clear up the confusion among the circuit courts about whether true threat
crimes require specific or general intent, and the majority failed to clarify
anything.133 Justice Thomas chose to address Elonis’ First Amendment
arguments in his opinion and argued the threats were not protected speech
and that the Court’s precedent does not indicate a subjective intent is
required for a true threat to rise to the level of criminal.134 Even though
Elonis failed to reach these expectations, it still strengthened First
Amendment rights and reaffirmed the idea that even the most violent or
distasteful speech can still be protected under the First Amendment.135
B.

The Lower Court’s Struggle with Uniformity

Since the 1969 Watts decision, the Supreme Court of the United
States has rejected every opportunity to define or instruct the lower courts on
how to analyze a true threat.136 As a result, lower district courts have had to
interpret true threat cases themselves, applying analysis and tests as they saw
fit without uniform instruction or guidance from above.137 Nine out of the
eleven federal circuits have chosen to follow the objective test alluded to in
Watts; however, not all of those circuits apply a uniform objective test.138
Some courts instead choose to follow a subjective standard and create even
more of a divide amongst the lower courts.139 With Black as the basis for
their decision, the subjective intent circuits believe a true threat has to be a

130.
Id.
131.
Id. at 2014.
132.
See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003).
133.
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018.
134.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135.
Barney, supra note 97, at 14; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Elonis, 135
S. Ct. at 2017.
136.
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam);
Barney, supra note 97, at 4.
137.
Barney, supra note 97, at 2; Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 9–10.
138.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 10; see also Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
139.
United States v. Doggart, No. 1:15-cr-39, 2017 WL 2416920, at *8 (E.D.
Tenn. June 2, 2017).
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specific intent crime in order to protect the sanctity of the First
Amendment.140
1.

The Subjective Intent Analysis

The Ninth and Tenth Circuits are considered the pioneers in adopting
the true threat subjective intent analysis.141 In 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided in United States v. Cassel,142 that an analysis of the
subjective intent of the speaker was required in order to convict the
defendant and find his or her speech not protected by the First
Amendment.143 Cassel revolved around the defendant’s threat to a potential
purchaser of government owned land.144 When someone attempted to
purchase a neighboring lot to his house, Cassel told the purchasers that if
they tried to build anything on that land, it would definitely burn and if they
left anything on the land it would be stolen or vandalized.145 The potential
purchasers instead bought a different lot because of Cassel’s threats and the
Government brought charges against Cassel for impeding with the sale of
federal land.146 Cassel was found guilty on all counts and he appealed the
decision on the grounds that his speech was unconstitutionally limited by
federal law.147 The Court referenced its true threat caselaw in order to
determine whether Cassel’s speech was protected or not.148 In its previous
decisions, the Court adhered to the objective standard, but it had not done a
true threat analysis since the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in
Black.149 When analyzing the Court’s opinion in Black, the Ninth Circuit
focused on the definition of true threat the Court provided.150 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit chose to adopt a subjective analysis because they read Black as
stating only intentional threats are punishable and that the definition itself
requires the speaker to intend to threaten the victim.151 When the subjective
test was applied to Cassel’s argument, the Court found the jury at trial was
140.
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367–68 (2003); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. I; Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 10.
141.
United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 634 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 975, 981–82 (10th Cir. 2014).
142.
408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005).
143.
Id. at 631; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
144.
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 625.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 625–26.
148.
See id. at 628.
149.
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 630–31; Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
150.
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 631; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
151.
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 631; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
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not given a proper instruction with regards to a required mens rea element of
18 U.S.C. § 1860 of the charged statute and his conviction had to be
overturned.152
The Ninth Circuit’s true threat caselaw would have an influence on
the Tenth Circuit’s true threat analysis in United States v. Heineman.153 The
defendant in Heineman violated 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) when he sent out three
emails containing white supremacist ideology.154 The emails did not actually
contain any threats, but the email recipients became fearful of potential harm,
and Heineman was subsequently arrested and charged with sending a threat
interstate.155 At trial, the defendant failed to convince the court that a
conviction under the disputed statute required the government to prove he
subjectively intended for the email to be considered a threat.156 Heineman
was found guilty by the trial court and he subsequently appealed the decision
believing the trial court erred when it stated a subjective intent analysis was
not necessary.157
Much like the court in Cassel, the Tenth Circuit turned to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Black to reach a decision.158 In its analysis, the
Tenth Circuit held that Black clearly proscribes a subjective analysis when
interpreting true threats because of the language used in the Court’s
definition of a true threat.159 According to the court, the words “mean to
communicate a serious expression of an intent,” indicates the speaker wants
the recipient of the threat to understand that the speaker intends to act
violently.160 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
decision finding that, pursuant to a subjective analysis, Heineman did not
have the requisite intent for his messages to be considered true threats.161
To make matters more confusing, courts within the same circuit vary
their objective and subjective analyses as applied to statutes identifying true
threats.162 For example, in United States v. Doggart,163 the defendant was
charged with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) which makes it
152.
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 638; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1860 (2018).
153.
767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014).
154.
Id. at 971–72; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2018).
155.
Heineman, 767 F.3d at 971–72.
156.
Id. at 972.
157.
Id. at 972–73.
158.
Id. at 975; see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
159.
Heineman, 767 F.3d at 978; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
160.
Heineman, 767 F.3d at 978; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
161.
Heineman, 767 F.3d at 982.
162.
See United States v. Houston, 683 F. App’x 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2017);
United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Doggart, No.
1:15-cr-39, 2017 WL 2416920, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. June 2, 2017).
163.
No. 1:15-cr-39, 2017 WL 2416920 (E.D. Tenn. June 2, 2017).
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illegal for anyone to make a threat in interstate commerce.164 The defendant
was found guilty at trial and appealed, believing the Government had failed
to establish the necessary elements of the statute.165 In its analysis, the
Eastern District of Tennessee defined a true threat as “‘a serious expression
of an intention to inflict bodily harm’ and is ‘conveyed for the purpose of
furthering some goal through the use of intimidation.’”166 This definition
differs from the Supreme Court of the United States’ definition in Black
because it adds an element of specific intent to further a goal through
intimidation.167 The court held that the defendant’s words did not constitute
a true threat because there was no evidence that established Doggart intended
for his words to intimidate anyone or that he intended to further a goal.168
During its opinion, the Eastern District of Tennessee drew parallels between
Doggart’s case and United States v. Houston,169 another true threat case from
the Sixth Circuit.170 These two cases demonstrate that the lower courts do
not know how to properly address the mens rea of true threat crimes because
similar statutes call for different types of analysis within the same district.171
2.

The Objective Intent Analysis

The majority of federal and state courts across the country apply an
objective standard when determining true threat cases.172 When courts
conduct an objective analysis of language that is alleged to be a true threat,
they either use the reasonable speaker or reasonable recipient test.173 When
analyzing true threat cases, these courts tend to use Black as their basis, but
focus on a different part of the opinion.174 Specifically, that “the speaker
164.
Id. at *8; 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (2018).
165.
Doggart, 2017 WL 2416920, at *4.
166.
Id. at *8 (quoting United States v. Houston, 683 F. App’x 434, 438 (6th
Cir. 2017)).
167.
Id.; see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
168.
Doggart, 2017 WL 2416920, at *9.
169.
683 F. App’x 434 (6th Cir. 2017).
170.
Id.; Doggart, 2017 WL 2416920, at *8. Here, the Eastern District of
Tennessee took note of the fact an objective analysis was upheld in Houston, and
distinguished Doggart from it. Doggart, 2017 WL 2416920, at *8.
171.
See Doggart, 2017 WL 2416920, at *9; Houston, 683 F. App’x at 439.
172.
Roark, supra note 49, at 197.
173.
Id. at 207–09. The reasonable recipient test holds that a communication is
considered a true threat when a reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the
message perceives it as a threat. Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 9–10. The reasonable speaker
test holds a statement is a true threat if the speaker could foresee the transmission being
interpreted as a threat of violence. Id. at 22.
174.
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343 (2003); Roark, supra note 49, at
206.
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need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”175 Courts here have deduced
the defendant need only intend to communicate the threat to establish a
conviction, and does not require the defendant intend the statement to be
actually threatening.176 According to these courts, Black gave no indication
that the true threat test should switch to a specific intent analysis; therefore,
the lower courts are still free to choose to use an objective general intent test
in true threat cases.177
In the case of United States v. Haddad,178 from the Northern District
of Illinois, the defendant appealed his conviction of sending threatening
communications.179 The defendant, using Black as the basis of his argument,
believed the statute he was charged under was overbroad and prohibited the
spread of constitutionally protected speech.180 The defendant specifically
argued that the statute needed a specific intent requirement.181 The goal of “a
prohibition on true threats [is to] ‘protect individuals from the fear of
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders.’”182 Referring to
Black, the court rejected the defendant’s argument and upheld an objective
general intent test because it was the best way for courts to regulate true
threats.183 According to the Northern District of Illinois, if true threats inflict
injury as soon as they are spoken, then the objective test ensures defendants
are punished for speaking such threats because the threats themselves are the
social harm.184
Not every circuit that has adopted an objective test standard for true
threats is entirely confident that objectivity is the answer for analyzing true
threats.185 For instance, although the Sixth Circuit has adopted an objective
analysis of true threats by applying a reasonable person standard, the court
could not help but admit “that subjective intent is part and parcel of the
meaning of a communicated threat to injure another.”186 Essentially, the
court is saying that subjective intent is as much of a factor as objective intent
when looking at true threats.187 Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit in United

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Roark, supra note 49, at 199.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 206–07, 209.
No. 09-CR-115, 2014 WL 1493152, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2014).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003)).
Haddad, 2014 WL 1493152, at *3.
See id.
See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 484.
See id. at 480.
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States v. Jeffries188 did not switch to a subjective standard due to a lack of
clear direction as to why the change was needed.189 The Seventh Circuit has
also questioned the use of an objective test in favor of a subjective one.190
Although the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Parr191 decided the case on
other grounds, the majority admitted “[i]t is more likely, however, that an
entirely objective definition is no longer tenable.”192 Even though these
circuits have not adopted a subjective analysis, admitting that the subjective
analysis is tenable or possible furthers the argument that a uniform test needs
to be established by the Supreme Court of the United States.193
The precedent surrounding the First Amendment exception of true
threats is not clear, and the Supreme Court of the United States has failed to
offer any sort of guidance into navigating this area of law.194 There needs to
be a uniform approach instructing the courts when to apply the true threat
exception to an individual’s inalienable right of free speech.195 If the Court
intends to deny a citizen of their First Amendment protections, the test to
justify this act must be widely utilized and strongly supported.196 As it
currently stands, an individual’s constitutional rights may be denied for
expressing him or herself in the wrong district.197
III.

HIP-HOP AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

What makes the confusion surrounding the true threat exception so
deplorable is that without a proper test to regulate its application, a defendant
can be convicted based on a jury’s taste, bias, and popular opinion.198 A jury
instructed to consider a reasonable person standard when determining
whether a Facebook post, message, or song qualifies as a true threat might be
swayed by bias to the art form, rather than objective interpretation of the
speech.199 Without a firm grasp on how to translate speech through the lens
of the true threat doctrine, music and lyrics, one of the oldest forms of
personal expression, stands to suffer the plight of an undirected legal
188.
692 F.3d 473, 473 (6th Cir. 2012).
189.
See id. at 480–81.
190.
United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2008).
191.
595 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2008).
192.
Id. at 500.
193.
See Chester, supra note 38, at 425–26.
194.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012
(2015); see also Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 9.
195.
Kass, supra note 37, at 121.
196.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
197.
See Kass, supra note 37 at 121.
198.
See Dennis, supra note 29, at 40.
199.
See Dunbar et al., supra note 33, at 289; Dennis, supra note 29, at 29.
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system.200 Specifically, rap and hip-hop have taken the brunt of the limelight
in recent decades, often associated with violent, threatening content, which
further stigmatizes its artists as violent and threatening people.201 Courts
have freely used song lyrics as evidence in criminal cases, alluding to intent
or serving as confessions.202 As a mainstream platform for airing frustrations
and venting about social and political struggles, such as the Black Lives
Matter Movement, hip-hop is notorious for violent themes, often
encapsulating anti-law enforcement and anti-establishment rhetoric.203
However, without a decision from the Supreme Court of the United States
drawing a clear line between artistic expression and prosecutable offensive
language, the true threat exception actually poses a bigger threat to hip-hop
artists simply exercising their right of expression.204
A.

A History of Hip-Hop

Hip-hop grew up in the 1970s on the streets of South Bronx, New
York City.205 At the time, South Bronx was in a state of extreme poverty.206
The landscape mirrored hopelessness and the neighborhood was defined by
abandoned buildings, drugs, and gang violence.207 It was from this
environment that hip-hop emerged as a means of communication between
rival gangs.208 Hip-hop crews formed and congregated, slowly developing a
culture that replaced rampant violence with rap battles and dance-offs.209
Hip-hop began to see mainstream success when the Sugarhill Gang
released Rapper’s Delight in 1979.210 According to journalist Kiah Fields,
Rapper’s Delight suddenly changed the public perception that hip-hop was
just an urban taboo and made hip-hop more accessible to the public,
something that could be enjoyed by everyone.211 At this point in its

200.
See Dennis, supra note 27, at 40.
201.
See Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 17; Dennis, supra note 29, at 30 n.180.
202.
Dennis, supra note 27, at 48.
203.
See Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 26; N.W.A., F*CK THA POLICE
(Ruthless Records 1988).
204.
See Dennis, supra note 27, at 40; Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 26.
205.
Tibbs & Chauncey, supra note 39, at 46.
206.
Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 7.
207.
Id.
208.
See id. at 7–8.
209.
Id. at 8.
210.
Tibbs & Chauncey, supra note 39, at 47; SUGARHILL GANG, RAPPER’S
DELIGHT (Sugarhill Records 1979).
211.
Kiah Fields, Today in History: Sugar Hill Gang Releases Rapper’s
Delight 37 Years Ago, SOURCE (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.thesource.com/2016/09/16/today-
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evolution, the hip-hop hitting the mainstream was described as party music,
intended to be something to dance to.212 However, the party music that
started as gang-generated rhymes about violence and struggle in the South
Bronx would see a reversion in the 1980s when hip-hop artists again started
to use their microphones as a platform to voice their views on social and
political issues, particularly as it related to being black in America.213 For
example, in 1982, Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five released The
Message which painted a graphic picture of living in a crime ridden, povertystricken neighborhood with “[b]roken glass everywhere, [p]eople pissing on
the stairs; you know they just don’t care.”214 Throughout the 1980s, many
rappers embraced the opportunity hip-hop provided to broadcast their
frustrations with society through music and lyrics.215 In 1989, the hip-hop
group N.W.A. broadcast the iconic three-word phrase that would start a
movement and become a battle cry for a generation of young, black
Americans turning to hip-hop to tell their story and vent their struggle.216
N.W.A.’s F*ck tha Police became the anthem for young African
Americans who lived in urban communities where overmilitarized police
departments were becoming increasingly more hostile with the citizens.217
N.W.A.’s 1988 album Straight Outta Compton, responded to this uptick in
police-related violence and in so doing, helped popularize a much more
harsh and aggressive form of hip-hop known as gangsta rap.218 This new
subgenre of hip-hop featured loud, aggressive instrumentals and brutally
graphic lyrics to describe the violent and vicious events happening in these
neighborhoods.219 As America waged its war on drugs, many impoverished
in-hip-hop-history-sugar-hill-gang-releases-rappers-delight-37-years-ago; SUGARHILL GANG,
supra note 210.
212.
Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 8.
213.
Id.
214.
See GRANDMASTER FLASH & THE FURIOUS FIVE, THE MESSAGE (Sugar Hill
Records 1982); Grandmaster Flash and the Furious Five Lyrics, AZLYRICS,
http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/grandmasterflashandthefuriousfive/themessage.html
(last
visited May 1, 2020).
215.
Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 8.
216.
See Tibbs & Chauncey, supra note 39, at 48; F*ck Tha Police Lyrics,
LYRICS DEPOT, http://www.lyricsdepot.com/n-w-a/fuck-tha-police.html (last visited May 1,
2020).
217.
Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 8–9; F*ck Tha Police, supra note 216.
218.
Id.; Tibbs & Chauncey, supra note 39, at 48; N.W.A., STRAIGHT OUTTA
COMPTON (Ruthless Records 1988).
219.
See Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 8, 17.
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communities were targeted by police departments and incarceration rates
reached record numbers.220 In Los Angeles specifically, many minorities
were victims of police brutality, harassed by law enforcement, and arrested
as a part of the city’s anti-drug and gang efforts.221 N.W.A.’s F*ck tha
Police depicts the struggles of many Americans with police officers.222 The
song unified its audience through their shared experiences and granted them
a sense of resolution by illustrating a role reversal that exacts revenge on an
abusive white police officer.223 The sentiment fueled a new era of anti-police
themed hip-hop, much to the displeasure of law enforcement.224 Soon, other
groups emerged on the scene spitting anti-cop rhetoric and addressing social
unrest by lyrically promoting police-violence.225 Rapper Ice-T released the
song Cop Killer in 1992, where he describes using a sawed-off shotgun to
dust some cops off.226
Thirty years ago, Straight Outta Compton brought hip-hop to a new
plane, using the medium to respond to growing police-violence and social
unrest with aggressive lyrics and violent messaging.227 In that time, hip-hop
and rap music have become a wide-reaching method of communicating
social and political discourse, particularly those issues promulgated by the
Black Lives Matter movement.228
The Black Lives Matter movement arose in the aftermath of George
Zimmerman’s not-guilty verdict for the murder of Trayvon Martin in
2013.229 In response, civil rights activist and future founder of the Black
Lives Matter organization, Alicia Garza, began posting various messages on
social media about her disappointment and frustration with the Zimmerman
verdict.230 Garza’s friend and fellow activist, Patrisse Cullors, replied to
Garza’s post using the hashtag #BLACKLIVESMATTER.231 This post would

220.
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223.
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Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 9–10; Tibbs & Chauncey, supra note 39, at 48.
228.
See Dennis, supra note 27, at 49; Garrett Chase, The Early History of the
Black Lives Matter Movement, and the Implications Thereof, 18 NEV. L.J. 1091, 1096 (2018).
229.
Chase, supra note 228, at 1096.
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Id. at 1095–96.
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Id. at 1096.
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become the first official use of the phrase Black Lives Matter and the start of
a nationwide movement for civil rights awareness.232
The Black Lives Matter Movement would again unite the following
summer in protest over the deaths of Eric Garner and Michael Brown Jr.233
Garner died in July 2014 as a result of a chokehold, and Brown Jr. was
fatally shot by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri the next month.234 Both
men were African American and unarmed, and both police officers were
white and would serve no jail time for the deaths.235 Supporters of the Black
Lives Matter Movement came together at rallies to protest the lack of justice
for the families of Garner and Brown Jr.236 As the Black Lives Matter
Movement grew in strength and numbers, so did its presence in the hip-hop
community.237 In 2014, Killer Mike and rapper El-P released the song Early,
which depicts many of the struggles African Americans face with local law
enforcement.238 In the song, Killer Mike is pulled over and wrongfully
searched, frisked, and arrested as a result of racial profiling from the
arresting officer.239 Killer Mike is not the only rapper to speak out against
the injustices of law enforcement and the criminal justice system.240 In the
song What’s Free, from his 2018 album Championships, rapper Meek Mill
discusses his issues with the criminal justice system stemming from his
wrongful imprisonment due to an alleged probation violation.241
Jamal Knox is not a famous rapper, but his songs echo the same
sentiment as Killer Mike, Meek Mill, and thousands of others.242 However,
even in a genre as popular as hip-hop, with themes and messaging prominent
throughout the artform as a whole, prosecutors were still able to circumvent
Jamal Knox’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression, and utilize
his lyrics as evidence against him.243
232.
Id.
233.
Id. at 1100.
234.
Chase, supra note 228, at 1099–1100.
235.
Id.
236.
Id. at 1100–01.
237.
See Dennis, supra note 27, at 49.
238.
See RUN THE JEWELS, EARLY (Mass Appeal Records 2014); Run the
Jewels Lyrics, AZLYRICS, http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/runthejewels/early.html (last visited
May 1, 2020).
239.
See RUN THE JEWELS, supra note 238; Run the Jewels Lyrics, supra note
238.
240.
See Dennis, supra note 27, at 50.
241.
MEEK MILL, WHAT’S FREE (Atlantic Records 2018); Meek Mill Lyrics,
AZLYRICS, http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/meekmill/whatsfree.html (last visited May 1,
2020).
242.
See Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa. 2018), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. 1547 (2019); Meek Mill, supra note 241; RUN THE JEWELS, supra note 238.
243.
See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1158; Dennis, supra note 29, at 2.
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The Inherent Prejudice of Lyrics as Evidence

The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to express
himself or herself, and the true threat doctrine determines when that right
should be excepted.244 The theory of the true threat doctrine is that some
speech actually poses dangerous consequences and is therefore a crime.245
However, the line distinguishing between mere words and actual threats is
more gray than clear, and as a result, there is no real protection.246 To prove
a true threat exists, the government can source a defendant’s creative artistic
expression and present it to the jury as evidence of a larger crime.247
Over the last three decades, the government has effectively used an
artist’s musical lyrics as evidence against him or her at trial.248 Since the
decision in United States v. Foster249 in 1991, prosecutors have argued to
admit lyrics penned by the defendant to prove various aspects of criminal
conduct.250 Courts have consistently permitted the use of lyrics in criminal
cases so long as they comply with jurisdictional regulations pertaining to the
rules of evidence.251 Lyrics have been used to establish knowledge of the
crime, premeditation, motive, and even to establish intent in murder cases.252
The defense often challenges the admittance of the lyrics as evidence,
objecting on a basis of relevance, improper character evidence, and
challenging the prejudicial nature of the lyrics.253 The lyrics emulate
statements made outside of the trial, and in the case of hip-hop and rap
songs, often convey an impression that colors the defendant without being
244.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003);
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
245.
Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
246.
See Lidsky & Norbut, supra note 7, at 1889–90.
247.
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2006–07 (2015); Knox, 190
A.3d at 1149.
248.
See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 456 (7th Cir. 1991). At trial,
the government presented lyrics describing drug dealing that were penned by the defendant.
Id. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admissibility of the lyrics claiming that the trial
court erred in allowing them to be presented at trial. Id. at 455. The court upheld the trial
court’s admission of the lyrics because the lyrics were not used to show that the defendant
intended to commit the crime, but were instead allowed under Federal Rules of Evidence
404(a) to show that the defendant was familiar with drug dealing and had knowledge of
narcotics trafficking. Id. at 456.
249.
939 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1991).
250.
Dennis, supra note 29, at 5–6.
251.
See State v. Skinner, 95 A.3d 236, 251 (N.J. 2014), cert. denied, 184 A.3d
101 (N.J. 2018) (holding that the trial court erred in admitting lyrics penned by the defendant
because they were prejudicial and held little probative value); Dennis, supra note 29, at 8.
252.
See Greene v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 76, 87 (Ky. 2006); Dennis,
supra note 27, at 48.
253.
Dennis, supra note 29, at 8–9.
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relevant to the charges he’s facing.254 As held by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in State v. Skinner,255 there needs to be a strong nexus between the
content of the lyrics and the facts of the crime charged.256 Without that
strong nexus, the lyrics lack any sort of relevancy and can end up being
prejudicial based off its content.257
Besides the literal content of these lyrics, rap and hip-hop songs
carry with them an intangible stigma that can bias a jury beyond the court’s
control.258 This genre is not for everybody and furthermore, people who are
not fans tend to inject negative preconceived notions on rap, hip-hop music,
and it’s artists.259 The general impression is that rap music is inherently
violent, threatening, vulgar, and immoral, and those artists who create it are
similarly characterized and a danger to society.260 The media and overall
marketing of this music perpetuates the brand of violence and grit, so much
so that many commonly regard rap fans as being more belligerent than fans
of heavy metal.261 From its inception, hip-hop has given a platform to artists
who rap about hate, fear, aggression, and struggle, and over the decades, a
persona has solidified around those who create that type of music.262 Now,
in a court of law, that persona is inherently prejudicial, applying heavy bias
to the facts of a criminal case.263
The University of California, Irvine conducted a study to examine
just how prominent the bias against rap music was amongst the general
population.264 Participants in the study were given a set of violent lyrics and
separated into two groups.265 One group was told the lyrics were from a rap
song, and the second group was told the lyrics were from a country song.266
The first round of testing found that “those who were told the lyrics were
from a rap song perceived them to be [much] more negative” and agreed the
song should be heavily regulated.267 The group that examined the country
song found it benign and safe for the airways.268 A second study with
254.
Id. at 12–13.
255.
95 A.3d 236 (N.J. 2014).
256.
Id. at 252.
257.
See id.
258.
Dunbar et al., supra note 33, at 288–89.
259.
Id. at 280.
260.
Id.
261.
Id.
262.
See Brief for Michael Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 23, at 8.
263.
See Dunbar et al., supra note 33, at 289.
264.
Id. at 281.
265.
Id.
266.
Id.
267.
Id. at 286.
268.
See Dunbar et al., supra note 33, at 285.
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different participants and song lyrics yielded the same result as the first
experiment.269 The researchers concluded that there was a clear inherent bias
against rap and hip-hop songs, which seems to suggest that a jury would
struggle with impartiality in determining whether a lyric signified a true
threat.270
The bias against the genre itself extends beyond the simple opinion
that rap and hip-hop are violent expressions created by violent people.271
According to Andrea Dennis, when the courts admit rap and hip-hop lyrics as
evidence, they tend to disregard them as art.272 In her article, Dennis
elaborates that hip-hop lyrics are a part of a complex form of expression that
needs a complex analysis to fully understand.273 Courts treat the analysis of
hip-hop lyrics as common knowledge, assuming the plain language used is
facially simplistic, and they thus refuse to examine these lyrics as the
intricate and poetic expressions they are.274 By plucking a few choice lines
from a rap or hip-hop song and parading them at face-value before an already
biased jury, the state can paint a true threat out of thin air and convict a
defendant from what should be protected expression.275
IV.

DETERMINING THE CORRECT TEST

One of the problems with the current true threat analysis is that there
is no test that can be applied to each of the criminal statutes that involve true
threats.276 For example, the Ninth Circuit chose to use a subjective analysis
when looking at 18 U.S.C. § 1860, but deferred to a combination of a
subjective and objective analysis when looking at a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
879(a)(3).277 The different tests applied to various statutes is most likely a
consequence of the fact that the statutes lack consistent terminology.278 For
example, the Elonis court stated a negligence standard would not be enough
to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), but 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) plainly states

269.
Id. at 285–86.
270.
Id. at 289.
271.
See id. at 280–81, 289.
272.
Dennis, supra note 29, at 13.
273.
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274.
Id.
275.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 12–13.
276.
See United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 979 (10th Cir.
2014); United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 634 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Doggart, No. 1:15-cr-39, 2017 WL 2416920, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. June 2, 2017).
277.
United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011);
Cassel, 408 F.3d at 634; see also 18 U.S.C. § 879(a) (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 1860 (2018).
278.
See Kass, supra note 37, at 130.
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that the required mens rea is knowingly and willfully.279 Therefore, it would
appear that a proper test for true threats would need to be able to cover a
standard that is above negligence.280
As mentioned before, the objective intent test revolves around
analyzing how a reasonable person would interpret the words that were
communicated.281 When an objective test is used, the speaker’s freedom of
speech is limited by the possibility the statement can be misinterpreted as a
threat.282 Punishing a criminal without a look into whether the defendant had
a guilty mind at the time of committing a crime, appears to go against the
purpose of the criminal justice system.283 As the Supreme Court of the
United States stated in Morissette v. United States,284 the requirement of a
mens rea separates those who are morally innocent and those who are
morally guilty in mind.285 Therefore, the goal of requiring a mens rea for
crimes is to ensure that those who intend and choose to commit morally
blameworthy acts are punished for doing so, instead of innocent people.286
The objective analysis used by many circuits treats the morally
blameworthy act as just communicating the threat instead of considering if
the communication was meant as a threat.287 An issue can arise when this
test is compared with the retributive and utilitarian philosophies of
punishment.288 The retributive philosophy revolves around punishing those
who chose to commit an evil act.289 With that in mind, it would appear that a
retributivist would have trouble punishing a rapper who is on trial for
threatening police officers with his lyrics when he did not intend for the
lyrics to be threatening.290 Punishing the defendant would not satisfy a
retributivist because the defendant did not know he committed an evil act.291
The same can be said when this is analyzed under the utilitarian
philosophy.292 People who subscribe to the utilitarian school of thought
believe that punishment should teach a lesson to the offender or others in the
279.
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2018); Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011
(2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2018).
280.
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015.
281.
Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 9.
282.
Roark, supra note 49, at 210.
283.
See Stephen F. Smith, Innocence and the Guilty Mind, 69 HASTINGS L.J.
1609, 1617 (2018).
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342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952).
286.
See id. at 251–52, 256.
287.
See Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 9.
288.
See Smith, supra note 283, at 1618.
289.
See id. at 1633.
290.
See id.
291.
See id.
292.
See id.
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community.293 These lessons are taught through the ideas of general and
specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.294 Punishing someone
for releasing what are considered to be threatening lyrics can comply with
general deterrence because the goal of general deterrence is to dissuade the
public at large from committing a certain crime.295 Therefore, witnessing
someone go to federal prison for threatening lyrics should stop others from
releasing threatening lyrics.296 The issue arises with specific deterrence
because how can the convicted rapper be deterred from committing a future
crime when he or she does not believe their lyrics were threatening enough to
be a crime.297 Therefore, a purely objective test can create issues regarding
the goals of punishment, but that does not mean objectivity is without its
benefits.298
A benefit of allowing some objectivity in a true threat analysis
examines if a reasonable listener, recipient, speaker, or person would
understand the speech as a threat.299 Clay Calvert points out that the
objective standard forces juries to understand the context the statement was
made under in order to determine if a reasonable person would understand
the statements as a threat.300 Calvert then presents the hypothetical that a
police officer who is on a gang task force and has familiarity of the slang and
terminology of hip-hop lyrics should be held to a higher standard than an
ordinary person.301 For the sake of providing greater protections to free
speech and the First Amendment, the hypothetical police officer’s
knowledge should be considered because it can help determine how
reasonable the officer’s reaction was to the threatening words.302 In an
objective jurisdiction, courts should still offer background evidence to those
who are not familiar with hip-hop to help them have a better understanding
of the genre and set aside any negative biases they might have.303 If courts
are going to allow lyrics as evidence, then there should be some kind of
instruction that explains hip-hop is a complex literary genre which contains
literary devices such as hyperboles, metaphors, and fantastical tales that do
293.
Smith, supra note 283, at 1618.
294.
Id.
295.
See id.
296.
See Mirko Bagaric, From Arbitrariness to Coherency in Sentencing:
Reducing the Rate of Imprisonment and Crime While Saving Billions of Taxpayer Dollars, 19
MICH. J. RACE & L. 349, 375 (2014).
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See id. at 377.
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303.
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not necessarily reflect on the author’s views, actions, or intentions.304 Any
kind of background information or instruction regarding hip-hop can help a
jury determine whether or not the language used in the lyrics can be
reasonably interpreted as a threat.305
Besides using the lyrics themselves as a basis for analysis in an
objective test, courts should consider the source of where the threats were
made, and any other context that can be used.306 Context is important to the
true threat analysis because it has been a part of precedent since Watts.307 In
Watts, the Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that the defendant’s
speech was not a threat because the statement was made at a youth rally and
the comment was met with laughter after it was spoken.308 Therefore, the
Court has always intended for the context of the comment and the reaction of
the audience to play a role in the true threat analysis.309 In the last five years,
two prominent true threat cases arose from the defendants posting violent
song lyrics on social media platforms.310 With the continuing popularity of
social media, it is becoming more and more apparent that the Supreme Court
of the United States needs to address threats that are communicated over
social media.311 Through social media, communication has become much
easier and more informal.312 As one author stated, “town criers are no longer
constrained by the volume of their voice.”313 This informal and often
anonymous speech has allowed many people to spread hateful and
threatening messages across the globe.314 When analyzing social media
posts, Megan Chester has suggested courts should take note of the context
where the post was made.315 For example, a post that is able to be seen by
everyone in the public, such as a status post, should be treated the same way
as someone yelling into a large crowd with a microphone.316 A message that
is more private, such as a direct message to one person, should be analyzed
as if a reasonable person who received the message would feasibly perceive
304.
Dennis, supra note 29, at 22, 26–27.
305.
Id.
306.
See Chester, supra note 38, at 414.
307.
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the communication as a threat.317 Ultimately, there needs to be an objective
part of a true threat analysis because it would allow the jury to consider
prudent contextual background information about the possible threatening
speech.318
Courts and supporters of the subjective test strongly believe that a
subjective intent test will restore the broad protections of the First
Amendment and may undo the damage an objective analysis has done to free
speech.319 The benefit of the subjective intent approach is that greater
protections to free speech would be given because the Government would
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the speaker intended the
message or communication to be a threat.320 A subjective intent analysis is
not a hard burden to meet.321 Courts that use a subjective analysis, and
therefore require specific intent, do not actually try to analyze the thoughts of
the defendant.322 Instead, courts will look to the words of the threat
themselves and determine if those words indicate the specific intent of
communicating a threat.323 This issue has arisen because the Supreme Court
of the United States has simply chosen not to address a required mens rea for
true threats.324 A subjective intent requirement would prevent any kind of
miscommunication that could arise between the speaker and the recipient or
anyone who overhears the threat because the defendant’s true intention
behind the message would need to be analyzed.325 Under the subjective
analysis, the speaker’s conviction and future would no longer be left up to
how the recipient interprets what could be considered constitutionally
protected speech.326
An inclusion or adoption of a subjective analysis will create
consistency with how the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted
other forms of unprotected speech, such as incitement.327 In the same year as
the Supreme Court of the United States decided Watts v. United States, the
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Court also decided another First Amendment case, Brandenburg v. Ohio.328
In Brandenburg, the defendant violated an Ohio statute that criminalized
advocating “crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.”329 The defendant, a
member of the Ku Klux Klan, spoke at a Klan rally where he stated that the
Klan needed to take revenge on the Government for suppressing the white
man by marching towards Congress.330 The Supreme Court of the United
States accepted certiorari to determine if the speech by the defendant was
protected speech.331 In its analysis, the Court held the defendant’s conviction
could not be upheld because the indictment did not properly define what
incitement was.332 The Court also held that the speech must be “directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and [be] likely to incite or
produce such action.”333 This ruling by the Court indicates that for
incitement to not be considered protected speech, there must be a subjective
element of intent present.334 The main similarity between the Court’s
analysis in both cases is the discussion of a subjective intent for true threats
and incitement.335 However, the Court in Brandenburg focused more on
subjective intent, holding that speech alone is not enough for incitement, and
that there must be an intent for the speech to cause lawless action.336
Therefore, an application of Brandenburg’s stronger subjective intent
analysis would allow for greater protection to First Amendment rights of
those suspected of communicating true threats because they cannot be
punished for sharing their thoughts or expressions without a criminally
wrongful intent behind them.337 The adoption of a subjective intent allows
for the defendant to present his or her side of the story and fight for his or her
right to free speech.338
To ensure the rapper’s or artist’s right of expression remains intact
and that the target of the purported threats is protected from any kind of
harm, a mixed objective and subjective analysis should be adopted to analyze
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true threats.339 The benefit of the objective standard is that it would allow for
juries to take in context a threat in its entirety, and view the totality of the
circumstances when looking at the threat.340 Then, the subjective analysis is
used after the objective evidence has been considered, and factfinders will
look at the lyrics and determine if the lyrics themselves satisfies the objective
analysis, or if they go outside of the scope of the contextual information
provided.341 The subjective intent prong provides an additional layer of
protection to the speaker because the message itself must also be intended to
be a threat.342 Specific intent under a subjective analysis will fit with the
schools of punishment because it ensures that a guilty mind is being
punished for communicating a threat.343 The goal with a two-prong test is to
protect both the freedom of artistic expression and the victims of true
threats.344 Hip-hop may appear on its face to be violent, vulgar, and lacking
in social value; however, the content is not so far from Edgar Allan Poe
describing a dead body beneath his floorboards, or Bob Marley shooting a
sheriff.345 By creating a two-prong test, a defendant is afforded the ability to
speak his or her mind and be free from worry of someone misinterpreting his
or her art as a threat of harm.346
A proposal for a mixed test is not a novel idea as the Ninth Circuit
has adopted the use of a hybrid test consisting of an objective prong and
subjective prong for true threats.347 In United States v. Bagdasarian,348 the
defendant posted racially charged threatening messages about killing then
Presidential nominee Barack Obama.349 Specifically, the defendant called
Barack Obama a racial slur and said the Presidential nominee was going to
have a fifty caliber bullet through his head soon.350 Similar to this
Comment’s proposed test, the court in Bagdasarian stated the objective test
to look at the totality of the circumstances and that the factfinder must
“look[] at the entire factual context of [the] statements including: [T]he
surrounding events, the listeners’ reaction, and whether the words are

339.
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conditional.”351 When looking at all the evidence presented, such as the
defendant’s username, the fact the message was made anonymously, the
place where the comment was posted, and the fact the defendant owned a
fifty caliber rifle, the court ultimately held a reasonable person would not
have taken the defendant’s comments as a threat.352 Because Bagdasarian’s
comments did not reflect any kind of immediate action and did not fall under
the definition of a threat, there was no indication that the Defendant
subjectively intended to kill former President Obama.353 Based on the
court’s opinion, it appears the subjective analysis does not actually inquire
into the defendant’s actual thoughts, but instead looks to the words
themselves to see if they reflect a subjective intent to communicate a
threat.354
A test that utilizes both schools of thought with regard to true threats
will help create uniformity across true threat statutes because the specific
intent requirement covers the knowingly and willfully mens rea of some true
threat statutes.355 According to the Model Penal Code, the mens rea of
knowingly is satisfied when the defendant “is aware that his conduct is of that
nature” or to cause such a result and if “he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such result.”356 Therefore, specific intent
goes beyond the requirement of knowing because it shows the defendant was
more than practically certain the lyrics or communication would cause the
victim to be threatened and indicates a specific desire for the victim to feel
threatened.357 Using both subjective and objective standards also parallels
the Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis because the conviction was not solely
based on a reasonable person standard, but instead is based on meeting an
objective reasonable person standard and showing there was an intent for the
lyrics to be threatening in nature.358
In Knox, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made a step towards
protecting First Amendment rights with true threats in that the court did
apply a subjective and objective test to determine if Knox’s lyrics were
protected speech.359 The court decided its pure objective test was no longer
feasible for prosecuting true threats and adopted a test that looks at the intent
351.
Id. at 1119 (quoting United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th
Cir. 1992)).
352.
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353.
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2020]

WHAT YOU RHYME COULD BE USED AGAINST YOU

257

of the speaker and the context surrounding the speech.360 However, when
examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding Knox’s song, the
court failed to properly analyze the lyrics within the scope of the genre of
hip-hop.361 As indicated before, hip-hop is an artistic genre that makes use
of literary devices such as similes, metaphors, hyperboles, and rhyme
schemes.362 When analyzing Knox’s lyrics, the court took the words at their
face value and failed to look at anything but the lyrics and the listeners’
reactions to them.363 This type of analysis does not adequately represent the
totality of the circumstances test.364 The court’s analysis ended up
unbalanced, with the objective analysis playing a substantial role and the
subjective analysis being almost an afterthought.365 The court’s closing
statement is indicative of not understanding the use of a totality of the
circumstances test.366 The court closes by stating “we would in effect be
interpreting the Constitution to provide blanket protection for threats,
however severe, so long as they are expressed within that musical style.”367
A test that uses the totality of the circumstances would require an individual
to look into the unique facts of each case before making a decision;
therefore, a decision in favor of Knox would not be granting immunity to the
whole genre of hip-hop, but instead, only apply to these specific facts.368
Knox was not asking for immunity to a whole genre when he stated his lyrics
were protected under the First Amendment, he just wanted rap to be treated
as art and not a confession or as evidence of a crime.369
However, under the proposed test in this Comment, Knox’s speech
would still be considered a true threat because the personal content goes
beyond the scope of literary devices used in hip-hop and indicates a
subjective intent to cause harm to the threatened victims.370 Even though
Knox may have been venting frustrations through his lyrics, the lyrics
360.
Id.
361.
Recent Case, First Amendment — True Threat Doctrine — Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Finds Rap Song a True Threat. — Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146
(Pa. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 1558, 1562 (2019).
362.
See Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 4–5.
363.
Recent Case, First Amendment — True Threat Doctrine — Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Finds Rap Song a True Threat. — Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146
(Pa. 2018), supra note 361, at 1562.
364.
See id.
365.
See id. at 1565; Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160.
366.
See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1161.
367.
Id.
368.
See id. at 1165–66.
369.
Recent Case, First Amendment — True Threat Doctrine — Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Finds Rap Song a True Threat. — Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146
(Pa. 2018), supra note 361, at 1565.
370.
See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160.
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crossed a line when they specifically named police officers and threatened
them personally.371 N.W.A. and Ice-T, in their anti-cop songs, did not state
their desire to harm specific members of the LAPD; they instead chose to
generalize their frustrations with law enforcement.372 In his song, Knox does
make use of hyperboles and similes, like when he says “I got artillery to
shake the mother [f*ckin] streets” and “I keep a forty on my waist, that’ll wet
you like a mop.”373 The problem arises when those lyrics name the specific
names of police officers and list the way Knox allegedly planned on killing
them.374 Hip-hop lyrics should be protected under the First Amendment, but
there is a line that was crossed here when Knox named specific people, the
time when they leave work, and stated how he would attack them.375 Even
though personalization of lyrics is not a deciding factor of whether a message
or song contains a threat, it deserves to be addressed in an analysis of a true
threat.376
Therefore, the best way to ensure the rights of the speaker and the
rights of the recipient are equally upheld is to create a two-prong test that
requires an analysis into the specific intent of the speaker and an examination
of any relevant factors related to the threat and its context.377
V.

CONCLUSION

As indicated in this Comment, there has been little to no guidance
for courts to follow when determining what is a true threat.378 This has led to
a clash and divide amongst the circuits when analyzing true threats.379 The
requirement for a uniform test goes beyond the application to the genre of
hip-hop.380 In a time when people have access to a plethora of outlets where
they can voice their opinion and post it on a global scale for anyone to see, a
test is needed to measure threatening speech.381 Without the guidance of a
uniform test or rule, there is a high possibility that many people who are
371.
Id.
372.
N.W.A., supra note 203; BODY COUNT, supra note 226.
373.
Knox, 190 A.3d at 1149–50.
374.
Id. at 1149.
375.
See id. at 1160; U.S. CONST. amend I.
376.
See id. at 1150–61; Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015);
Recent Case, First Amendment — True Threat Doctrine — Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Finds Rap Song a True Threat. — Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa. 2018), supra
note 361, at 1564.
377.
See Best, supra note 41, at 1157–58.
378.
See Barney, supra note 97, at 2; Calvert et al., supra note 6, at 13.
379.
Barney, supra note 97, at 2.
380.
See Chester, supra note 38, at 413.
381.
See id.
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acting within their First Amendment rights are going to be prosecuted for
speech that was intended as therapeutic or artistic.382 Punishing a defendant
who did not have a guilty mind when making the supposed threat does not
advance any theory or goal of the criminal justice system and merely
punishes innocent people for voicing their opinion.383

382.
383.

See Roark, supra note 49, at 220; U.S. CONST. amend I.
See Smith, supra note 283, at 1618.
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INTRODUCTION

“It had to happen sooner or later—someone has died riding an
electric scooter on a busy Fort Lauderdale road,” so began a recent article in
the Sun-Sentinel.1 This exact sentiment has been echoed across the country
as thousands of dock-less electronic scooters (“e-scooters”) have been
introduced into more than one hundred cities worldwide.2 A rough count of
reports from the Associated Press indicate at least eleven electronic scooter
riders have died in the United States since 2018.3 Further, an investigation
by Consumer Reports found “at least 1,500 [e-scooter] riders [have] been
injured since e-scooters were introduced in late 2017” by the company Bird
(the most popular ride-sharing electronic scooter company).4 Despite safety
concerns, e-scooters have become immensely popular with consumers.5
According to a study by the National Association of City Transportation
Officials (“NACTO”), riders took 38.5 million trips on shared scooters in
2018.6
Proponents of ride-sharing e-scooters argue that they are cheap,
clean, and efficient alternative methods of transportation.7 Many cities in the
United States have inadequate public transportation systems and roadways
clogged with cars.8 E-scooters offer a viable alternative means of
transportation for short trips (the average e-scooter trip is shorter than 1.5
miles according to the NACTO) and some argue this makes them ideal
first/last mile solutions.9 Of course, many riders also simply use e-scooters
because they are fun.10
1.
Linda Trischitta, Scooter Rider Dies in Crash with Car on Busy Road,
SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 2019, at A1.
2.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, SHARED MICROMOBILITY IN THE
U.S.: 2018 5 (2019).
3.
Cathy Bussewitz & Amanda Morris, Boom in Electric Scooters Leads to
More
Injuries,
Fatalities,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(June
6,
2019),
http://www.apnews.com/33f376b91e5945efbcbb2c460b1d0dcc.
4.
Ryan Felton, 8 Deaths Now Tied to E-Scooters, CONSUMER REP. (June 3,
2019), http://www.consumerreports.org/product-safety/deaths-tied-to-e-scooters/; The Scooter
Scourge, WEEK (Feb. 24, 2019), http://www.theweek.com/articles/824992/scooter-scourge.
5.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, supra note 2, at 4; see also
Felton, supra note 4.
6.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, supra note 2, at 4.
7.
Levi Tillemann & Lassor Feasley, Let’s Count the Ways E-Scooters Could
Save the City, WIRED: TRANSP. (Dec. 7, 2018, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/story/escooter-micromobility-infographics-cost-emissions/.
8.
See id.
9.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, supra note 2, at 11; E-Scooters
Could Be a Last-Mile Solution for Everyone, INST. FOR TRANSP. & DEV. POL’Y (Dec. 14,
2018), http://www.itdp.org/2018/12/14/e-scooters-last-mile-solution/.
10.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, supra note 2, at 9.
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Opponents of ride-sharing e-scooters contend that they are
dangerous to both riders and pedestrians, arguing that e-scooter companies
do not properly train and monitor riders.11 People frequently ride without
helmets—a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) study
found that less than one percent of injured riders wore them.12 Also, the
minimum age requirement is easily circumvented by underage riders using
their parent’s information.13 Additionally, cities have been frustrated by the
“act first, ask for forgiveness later” approach e-scooters companies have
taken to introducing their services to cities.14 Cities like Denver and
Minneapolis had e-scooters pop up in their cities essentially overnight before
potential regulations could be discussed and implemented.15
This Comment will examine the history of the sharing economy and
what led to the current e-scooter revolution.16 Particular focus will be placed
on car-sharing, ride-sharing, and early forms of micromobility.17 It will
examine the development of each of these sectors, discuss policy issues that
were faced, and how e-scooter companies and local governments can learn
from the past.18 The primary focus of this Comment, after providing

11.
See AUSTIN PUB. HEALTH, DOCKLESS ELECTRIC SCOOTER-RELATED
INJURIES STUDY 11 (2019); John Benson, Don’t Go There, Seattle: Electric Scooters Tied to
Injuries, Fatalities, SEATTLE TIMES: OPINION (June 28, 2019, 12:52 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/dont-go-there-seattle-electric-scooters-tied-to-injuriesfatalities/. While seventy percent of injured scooter riders reported they had received training
on scooter use, sixty percent of injured riders were only trained via the scooter companies’
mobile app. AUSTIN PUB. HEALTH, supra. The report concluded that more substantial training
may be necessary. Id. at 11.
12.
Id. at 6.
13.
Will Kubzansky, The Secret Life of Teen Scooter Outlaws, VERGE:
FEATURES (Sept. 23, 2018, 12:00 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2018/9/23/17882996/teenselectric-scooter-age-requirement-bird-lime.
14.
Paul DeMaio, Bike-Sharing: History, Impacts, Models of Provision, and
Future, J. PUB. TRANSP., Dec. 2009, at 41, 47; Chaney Skilling, Electric-Scooter Sharing
Company Bird Lands in Denver but City Puts up Stop Sign, DENVER POST: BUS. (June 1, 2018,
6:44 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2018/06/01/denver-electric-scooters-bird-lime/.
15.
DeMaio, supra note 14, at 47.
16.
See Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing
Economy Can Win over Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://www.hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators/;
discussion infra Part II.
17.
See Sarah Seright, Sharing Economy Pioneers: 15 Companies Disrupting
Industries Left and Right, NEIGHBOR (Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.neighbor.com/storageblogsharing-economy-pioneers; discussion infra Section II.C.
18.
See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local
Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
901, 903 (2015); discussion infra Sections II.B.1–3.
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background information, will be dockless electric scooters.19 First, there will
be analysis weighing the positive and negative effects e-scooters have on
society.20 Then, a discussion on how cities should regulate e-scooter
companies, not to control them, but instead use them as a tool to achieve the
city’s transportation goals.21
II.

HOW THE SHARING ECONOMY LED TO THE E-SCOOTER
REVOLUTION

In the last decade or so, the sharing economy has given birth to new
firms and businesses with massive valuations and impact.22 Ridesourcing
firms founded in the last decade (Uber and Lyft) are now multi-national
corporations worth billions of dollars.23 Car-sharing firms like Zipcar and
car2go have seen their memberships balloon from 52,347 in 2004, to over a
million in 2015.24 Generally speaking, sharing firms exist in one of two
primary forms: They either own capital or services that are rented out to
consumers on a short-term basis (“asset hubs”) or they create peer-to-peer
networks that connect providers and users for exchanges of goods and
services on a short-term basis (“peer-to-peer networks”).25
A.

Background on the Sharing Economy

The modern sharing economy emerged from the collision of several
consumer trends and widespread technological changes.26 The consumer
trends include a growing sense of environmental consciousness among
consumers who see borrowing or reusing goods as more sustainable than

19.
See DeMaio, supra note 14, at 42; Adeyemi Ajao, Electric Scooters and
Micro-Mobility: Here’s Everything You Need to Know, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2019, 9:16 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adeyemiajao/2019/02/01/everything-you-want-to-know-aboutscooters-and-micro-mobility/; discussion infra Parts II–V.
20.
See DeMaio, supra note 14, at 42, 49–50; Ajao, supra note 19; discussion
infra Part III.
21.
See RASHEQ ZARIF ET AL., SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: MAKING MICROMOBILITY
WORK FOR CITIZENS, CITIES, AND SERVICE PROVIDERS, 9–10 (2019); discussion infra Part IV.
22.
See Cannon & Summers, supra note 16. Noting the ten billion-dollar
valuations of sharing firms like Airbnb and Uber. Id.
23.
See From Zero to Seventy (Billion); Uber, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2016, at
17, 17–18.
24.
Joseph P. Schwieterman & Mollie Pelon, First Zipcar, Now Uber: Legal
and Policy Issues Facing the Expanding Shared Mobility Sector in U.S. Cities, 4 BELMONT L.
REV. 109, 109–10 (2017).
25.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 903.
26.
Id. at 910.
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buying new ones.27 As people move to cities and urbanization increases,
consumers gain greater access to sharing and renting opportunities.28
Additionally, the Great Recession created a thrifty consumer and a new
interest in renting over owning goods.29 Further, the recession led to
unemployment and underemployment, creating a workforce ready and
willing to take on side gigs like driving for Uber.30
Beyond just the change in consumer habits, the most important
development in creating the modern sharing economy has been the
development and implementation of new technology.31 Smartphones have
become ubiquitous in American society and are now used by a majority of
Americans.32 The omnipresence of smartphones allows users to access web
or application-based sharing services anywhere.33 Further, widespread GPS
tracking of both consumers and goods leads to an enhanced customer
experience—Lyft drivers know where to pick you up—and greater security
for sharing firms—protects their capital from being lost or stolen by
consumers.34 And digital rating systems have allowed consumers and
providers alike to create a form of trust that lends credibility to
transactions.35
In the aggregate, these changes have led to the modern sharing
economy.36 New sharing firms have grown in size dramatically, and many
27.
Id.
28.
Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-Based Consumption: The
Case of Car Sharing, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 881, 884 (2012).
29.
See David Brooks, The Evolution of Trust, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2014,
at 9, (discussing the cultural effect of the Great Recession on consumer behavior); Rauch &
Schleicher, supra note 18, at 910.
30.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 910.
31.
Id.
32.
See Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership 2013, PEW RES. CTR.: INTERNET
& TECH. (June 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/06/05/smartphone-ownership2013/.
33.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 910.
34.
Id. at 910–11; see also Sue Carlton, Can’t We at Least Do Scooters,
People?,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES:
OPINION
(June
1,
2019),
http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/cant-we-at-least-do-scooters-people-20190601/
(discussing a failed attempt to bring bike-sharing to Tampa before GPS, “twenty years ago,
Tampa tried an early form of bike-sharing by placing bicycles recovered by police and spraypainted bright orange around town so anyone could grab one . . . and then leave them for the
next guy . . . [w]ithin weeks, more than [fifty] bikes vanished”); Tina Rosenberg, It’s Not Just
Nice to Share, It’s the Future, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (June 5, 2013, 9:00 AM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/its-not-just-nice-to-share-its-the-future/.
35.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 911. As an example of these rating
systems building trust, “if a Lyft driver has 800 five star reviews, a rider may be willing [to]
board her car even if she lacks classic indicia of trustworthiness, like a business license.” Id.
36.
Id.
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now rival their more traditional competitors in size.37 Projections of Uber’s
valuation suggest that the ride-sharing company’s market cap could double
the likes of traditional car companies like General Motors or Ford.38 And the
sharing economy shows no indication of slowing down with startups in every
industry imaginable.39 The wide breadth of sharing firms has a common idea
at its core, “a stark reduction in transaction costs that allows for radically
disaggregated consumption. The sharing economy allows users to buy, sell,
or donate ever-smaller units of goods, services, or experiences.”40
B.

The Primary Systems of the Sharing Economy

While the types of businesses within the sharing economy
encompass all varieties of industries, two primary business models have
emerged: Peer-to-peer networks and asset hubs (or the business to consumer
model).41
1.

Peer-to-Peer Networks

The peer-to-peer network business model uses an internet-based
platform to connect would-be providers with would-be consumers within a
membership community.42 This model was pioneered by eBay, which
provided a platform for buyers and sellers to interact and incorporated a
rating system (connected to each user) that lent credibility to the
transactions.43 The businesses that operate these platforms do not themselves
possess any capital assets but, instead, connect people with assets or
services.44 Among the networks concerned with assets, Turo allows people
to rent their vehicles to those seeking short vehicle rentals.45 Airbnb
37.
See id.
38.
Kate Rooney, Uber’s Eye-Popping $120 Billion Valuation Would Make It
Worth More than Nvidia, 3M and PayPal, CNBC (Mar. 15, 2019, 3:12 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/15/ubers-eye-popping-valuation-worth-more-than-nvidia-andpaypal.html (stating that Uber could be worth as much as $120 billion while General Motors
is worth $53.8 billion and Ford is worth $33.4 billion).
39.
See DOGVACAY, http://www.dogvacay.com (last visited May 1, 2020).
The Airbnb of dog kennels. Id. CAVIAR, http://www.trycaviar.com/about-us (last visited May
1, 2020). The Uber of caviar delivery. Id. SQUARETRADE, http://www.squaretrade.com/go/
(last visited May 1, 2020). The Uber of smartphone screen repairs. Id.
40.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 912.
41.
Id. at 913; Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 111–12.
42.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 111.
43.
Id. at 111–12.
44.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 915.
45.
See TURO, http://www.turo.com (last visited May 1, 2020). Allows
vehicle owners to maximize their vehicles utility by renting them out when they would
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connects the owners of vacant homes or rooms with those looking for short
term rentals.46 The peer-to-peer networks that offer services are among the
biggest names in the sharing economy.47 The two largest, Uber and Lyft,
connect drivers and potential passengers, circumventing the traditional taxi
service.48 And in the very literal sense of service-oriented peer-to-peer
networks, TaskRabbit connects people offering services (like installing
shelving or picking up groceries) with potential employers.49 Sharing firms
using the peer-to-peer model avoid the expense of buying and maintaining
capital (Uber does not have to buy or maintain their own vehicles) which
makes expansion easier.50
2.

Asset Hubs

The other primary structure for the sharing economy is the asset hub,
where a single company provides both the communication platform and the
physical assets that consumers seek.51 Firms like car2go and Zipcar own a
fleet of vehicles and allow drivers to rent them on an hourly or daily basis.52
The newest major player among asset hub firms provide dockless scooter
rentals.53 There are also asset hubs that are not-for-profit.54 These primarily
consist of bike-sharing programs like London’s Santander Cycle or
Washington D.C.’s Capital Bikeshare.55 In these cases public-private
partnerships (or governments directly) own fleets of bicycles that are rented
otherwise remain stagnant. Id. Also provides consumers an alternative to purchasing a
vehicle of their own. Id.
46.
See What Is Airbnb and How Does It Work?, AIRBNB,
http://www.airbnb.com/help/article/2503/what-is-airbnb-and-how-does-it-work (last visited
May 1, 2020).
47.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 915.
48.
See LYFT, http://www.lyft.com (last visited May 1, 2020); Sign Up to
Ride, LYFT: RIDER, http://www.lyft.com/rider (last visited May 1, 2020); UBER,
http://www.uber.com (last visited May 1, 2020); What We Offer, UBER,
http://www.uber.com/us/en/about/uber-offerings/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
49.
About Us, TASKRABBIT, http://www.taskrabbit.com/about (last visited
May 1, 2020).
50.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 112.
51.
Id.; Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 913.
52.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 913.
53.
See BIRD, http://www.bird.co (last visited May 1, 2020); LIME,
http://www.li.me/en-US/home (last visited May 1, 2020); Introducing JUMP Scooters, UBER,
http://www.uber.com/ride/scooters (last visited May 1, 2020). Announcing Uber’s entry into
the world of dockless scooters. Id.
54.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 913.
55.
Id.; see also Santander Cycles, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON,
http://www.tfl.gov.uk/modes/cycling/santander-cycles (last visited May 1, 2020); CAPITAL
BIKESHARE, http://www.capitalbikeshare.com (last visited May 1, 2020).
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out by the hour.56 It could be argued that asset hub sharing firms are not all
that different from their more-traditional counterparts and that would not be
entirely wrong but what sets them apart is the levels of disaggregation now
possible.57 Before constant GPS tracking, remote locking, and instant appbased online reservations and payment, it was not possible to rent cars or
bikes from unmanned automated terminals, much less would it have been
possible to rent free-roaming dockless scooters.58
C.

Transportation-Based Sharing Services

While the sharing economy has evolved to encompass all manner of
goods and services, many of the largest sharing firms have aimed at
disrupting our traditional notions of transportation.59 This Section will focus
on three types of services offered by sharing firms within the transportation
sector.60 First, car-sharing, firms that rent out fleets of vehicles or provide a
platform for people to rent out their private vehicles.61
Second,
transportation networks, companies that provide a platform to connect
drivers with potential passengers.62 Finally, micromobility services, firms
that provide users with smaller vehicles primarily used for short trips (i.e.,
bike-shares and dockless e-scooters).63
1.

Car-Sharing

Car-sharing can be viewed as the sharing economy’s take on the car
rental; however, car-sharing firms often allow people to rent vehicles for
periods as short as minutes or hours, instead of entire days.64 While
generally similar to conventional car renting, car-sharing firms differ in
several aspects.65 Many car-sharing companies employ a membership-based

56.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 913.
57.
Id. at 913–14.
58.
Id.; see also How to Bird, BIRD: RIDE, http://www.bird.co/how/ (last
visited May 1, 2020).
59.
Seright, supra note 17 (discussing sharing firms in various industries
including Rover, a pet care-share community; JustPark, a parking space-sharing company;
Lending Club, a peer-to-peer lending firm; Postmates, a peer-to-peer food delivery company;
and CrowdMed, a healthcare sourcing app); see also Rooney, supra note 38.
60.
Seright, supra note 17; see discussion infra Sections II.C.1–3.
61.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 112.
62.
Id. at 120.
63.
Id. at 128.
64.
Id. at 112.
65.
Id.
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model, that includes an annual fee and insurance coverage.66 Rentals are
only available to members, renters do not enter into a new contract at each
use, fuel costs are included in the rates, car-sharing is not limited by office
hours, and renters can access vehicles without human assistance.67 Carsharing firms employ both asset hub and peer-to-peer network business
models.68
a.

Asset Hub Car-Sharing

While less formalized, car-sharing has existed in some form for
about a half-century.69 The roots of the modern car-sharing firms, however,
can be traced to Portland, Oregon in the 1990s with Car-Sharing Portland in
1998.70 This early American car-sharing firm mimicked the car-sharing
firms of Europe and Canada.71 It employed a neighborhood model with pods
of cars in densely populated areas and Portland’s urban downtown area.72
The success of Portland’s car-sharing system inspired other local
governments to promote car-sharing, leading to pod locations at government
buildings, airports, and universities.73 These early car-sharing ventures
heavily emphasized their value to the community and were rewarded with
grants and friendly negotiating positions with local governments.74
Today, the car-sharing sector is dominated by a few major players.75
In particular, the success of car-sharing firms utilizing asset hub business
models has led to traditional companies moving into the sector.76 The largest
firm of this type, Zipcar, was acquired by Avis Budget Group in 2013.77 The
66.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 112; see also CAR2GO,
http://www.car2go.com/US/en/ (last visited May 1, 2020); Pricing, ZIPCAR: PRICING,
http://www.zipcar.com/pricing (last visited May 1, 2020).
67.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 112; How Does Carsharing
Work?, ZIPCAR: HOW IT WORKS, http://www.zipcar.com/how-it-works (last visited May 1,
2020). Demonstrates how members book Zipcar’s vehicles directly through their mobile app
or website, and how reserved vehicles are unlocked via membership card or mobile app. Id.
68.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 913–16.
69.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 113.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
ALICE BIESCZAT & JOSEPH SCHWIETERMAN, ARE TAXES ON CARSHARING
TOO HIGH?: A REVIEW OF PUBLIC BENEFITS AND TAX BURDEN OF AN EXPANDING
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR 4 (2011).
73.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 113.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
See id. at 113–15.
77.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 113–14; Press Release, Avis
Budget Grp., Avis Budget Group Completes Acquisition of Zipcar (Mar. 14, 2013) (on file
with author).
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rental car giant Enterprise now has the second largest car-sharing network in
Enterprise CarShare.78 “[T]he largest car-sharing company in the world,”
and third largest in the United States, is car2go.79 Car2go is a subsidiary of
Daimler AG, the parent company of Mercedes.80 The expansion of
Daimler’s car2go, and the potential of autonomous cars in the future, has
caused many other major car brands to jump into the car-sharing market.81
Car-sharing firms have been linked to environmental, economic, and
social benefits, particularly to the reduction of the social costs of private
vehicle operation (air pollution, car accidents, and congestion).82 Naysayers
have argued that providing cheap, easy access to private vehicles will further
encourage America’s vehicle dependent culture, however, research indicates
car-sharing leads to active lifestyles with more walking and biking.83 Users
of car-sharing programs have also been shown to use public transit at similar
or higher rates than those who do not.84 Additionally, some research points
to car-sharing’s potential to create more open space in urban areas and
improve public safety by decreasing the amount of land used for parking.85
Asset hub-based car-sharing firms have not been met without
controversy.86
Among the most common complaints concern cities
allocating parking spaces or public space for car-sharing firms.87 Some
78.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 114; Our Story: How It Began,
ENTERPRISE CARSHARE, http://www.enterprisecarshare.com/us/en/our-story.html (last visited
May 1, 2020). This discusses Enterprise CarShare’s growth and aggressive expansion via the
acquisition of local competing car-share companies like Philadelphia’s PhillyCarShare,
Chicago’s IGO CarSharing, Denver’s Occasional Car, Toronto’s AutoShare, and the United
Kingdom’s City Car Club. Id.
79.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 115.
80.
Id.; see also Get in and Drive Off. Free-Floating Carsharing with
Car2go, DAIMLER, http://www.daimler.com/products/services/mobility-services/car2go (last
visited May 1, 2020); Ronan Glon, So, Who Made My Car?: A Comprehensive Guide to
Today’s Car Conglomerates, DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 8, 2019, 3:32 AM),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/car-breakdown-car-conglomerates/.
81.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 115 (noting that Audi, BMW,
Ford, and General Motors have all followed Daimler’s lead and have invested in American
car-sharing brands, and also noting BMW’s experimentations with complex par per minute
pricing that factors in time spent driving or parked).
82.
Id. at 116–17; see also ADAM MILLARD-BALL ET AL., TRANSIT COOP.
RESEARCH PROGRAM, CAR-SHARING: WHERE AND HOW IT SUCCEEDS 3–4 (2005).
83.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 117.
84.
Id. (expanding on this phenomenon, “those sharing cars . . . make
decisions differently than those who have large sunk investments in a private vehicle. Since
they pay for every trip, they use buses and trains more regularly than vehicle owners . . .”).
85.
Id.
86.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 914.
87.
Karen Klinger, City Plan to Allow Residential Zipcar Parking Sparks
Controversy,
CAMBRIDGE
COMMUNITY
TELEVISION
(May
21,
2009),
http://www.cctvcambridge.org/node/18076; SFMTA Board Expands Locations for Car Share

2020]

E-SCOOTER REGULATION

271

existing businesses have also claimed to be undermined by asset hub firms
and the public subsidies they receive.88 Car-sharing firms have made an
effort to avoid the ire of regulators and provide insurance coverage for
drivers, baked into membership and rental rates.89 However, the industry has
drawn some criticism that the policy limits of these insurance plans may be
insufficient in catastrophic accidents.90
b.

Peer-to-Peer Network Car-Sharing

The initial wave of car-sharing came in the form of asset hubs that
followed the same general principles of conventional car rental: Acquire a
fleet of vehicles, rent them out to customers, and repeat.91 In the past few
years, a new form of car-sharing has grown rapidly: Peer-to-peer carsharing.92 The two largest firms in this field, Turo and Getaround, provide a
network that connects private vehicle owners to customers looking to rent
vehicles.93 Turo tends to target tourists and local weekend drivers, while
Getaround aims to provide an alternative to vehicle ownership for urban
users.94 To date, Turo has raised over $470 million and boasts ten million

Vehicles,
S.F.
EXAMINER
(June
26,
2014,
12:00
AM),
http://archives.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/sfmta-board-expands-locations-for-car-sharevehicles/Content?oid=2832120.
88.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 914.
89.
Frequently Asked Questions, CAR2GO, http://www.car2go.com/US/en/faq/
(last
visited
May
1,
2020);
see
also
Insurance
Coverage,
ZIPCAR,
http://support.zipcar.com/hc/en-us/articles/220433387-Insurance-Coverage- (last visited May
1, 2020).
90.
Ron Lieber, Consider Worst Case with Zipcar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011,
at B1 [hereinafter Lieber, Consider Worst Case with Zipcar]; Ron Lieber, Zipcar’s Liability
Insurance:
Is It Adequate?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011, 4:11 PM),
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/zipcars-liability-insurance-is-it-adequate/
[hereinafter Lieber, Zipcar’s Liability Insurance: Is it Adequate?]; Felix Salmon, How
Comprehensive
Is
Zipcar’s
Insurance?,
REUTERS
(June
15,
2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/06/15/how-comprehensive-is-zipcars-insurance/.
91.
See Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 112–14.
92.
Id. at 116.
93.
See How Getaround Works, GETAROUND, http://www.getaround.com/tour
(last visited May 1, 2020); How Turo Works, TURO, http://www.turo.com/en-us/how-turoworks (last visited May 1, 2020).
94.
Tomio Geron, Getaround, Turo Take Different Car-Rental Routes, WALL
STREET J. (July 8, 2019, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/getaround-turo-takedifferent-car-rental-routes-11562578205 (discussing not only the difference in target audience
between Turo and Getaround, “[i]t’s like comparing Hertz and Zipcar,” but also the varied
expansion strategies of the two companies).
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members on its platform.95 Getaround is no small fish itself, having raised
$410 million and counts Toyota Motor Corporation among its investors.96
The average price of a new car is over $37,000 and transportation
costs are the second-highest expenditure for the average American.97 Yet,
the average car is only used for one hour a day, sitting idle for the other
twenty-three.98 Car-sharing peer-to-peer networks provide a platform for
people to rent out cars that would otherwise sit idle, thereby maximizing
their utility.99 And on the flip side, rather than owning a vehicle and leaving
it unused for most of the day, consumers can instead rent one when they need
to.100 “In sum, . . . goods and people can be employed more intensively than
before, making already existing products and service providers more
valuable.”101
Car-sharing firms, in general, maintain that they are essentially just
car rental companies and not a service.102 This strategy has enabled carsharing firms to sidestep some of the most pressing issues facing the ridesharing market.103 However, peer-to-peer car-sharing is not free from
pressing legal questions.104 Among them are unresolved insurance issues
stemming from the legal liability of driving another person’s private
vehicle.105 This problem has even caused some firms to leave the New York
market.106 There is also research indicating that car-sharing platforms face
95.
Annie Palmer, IAC Invests $250 Million in Car-Sharing Company Turo,
CNBC: TECH (July 17, 2019, 8:31 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/17/iac-invests-250million-in-car-sharing-company-turo.html.
96.
Geron, supra note 94 (discussing Getaround’s plans to expand into the
European market).
97.
John M. Vincent, How Much Should You Spend on a Car?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Mar. 6, 2019), http://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/how-much-should-you-spendon-a-car (stating the average price of a used car is over $20,000). In 2018, the average vehicle
costs $9,761 a year to own and operate, putting transportation between housing, $20,091, and
food $7,923 as second largest way Americans spend their money. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES — 2018 5 (2019); see also Lisa Smith, The True Cost
of
Owning
a
Car,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan.
31,
2020),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/08/cost-car-ownership.asp.
98.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 917.
99.
See id.
100.
See id.
101.
Id.
102.
See Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 118.
103.
Id.; see also discussion supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the battle of Uber
and Lyft drivers to be recognized not as independent contractors, but instead employees,
entitled to the protections and benefits enjoyed by traditional employees).
104.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 118.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.; see also Colleen Taylor, Car-Sharing Startup RelayRides Hit with
$200K Fine from New York State for Insurance Violations, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 10, 2014, 4:14

2020]

E-SCOOTER REGULATION

273

higher tax rates than the rest of the sharing economy, and growth of the carsharing sector has stalled as a result.107
2.

Ride-Sharing

The major ride-sharing firms primarily employ peer-to-peer
models.108 Ride-sharing companies, or transportation network companies,
operate digital networks that connect potential drivers with potential
passengers.109 The largest firms in this space, Uber and Lyft, dominate the
market.110 In a sense, ride-sharing companies resemble high-tech app-based
taxicab systems.111
The general idea of ride-sharing is not a new concept; ride-sharing
has existed in various forms for years.112 Jitneys, or share taxis, have
provided semi-fixed route service that can change based on customer
requests, since at least 1914.113 Airport and hotel shuttles are similarly likely
to alter their routes based on customer request.114 And of course, many
would claim that ride-sharing apps like Uber and Lyft are no different from
traditional cabs.115
Today’s ride-sharing sector began in earnest in 2010, when Uber
arrived in many United States markets.116 Uber has expanded dramatically
and is now valued at over $70 billion.117 The company now offers a variety
PM),
http://www.techcrunch.com/2014/03/10/car-sharing-startup-relayrides-hit-with-200kfine-from-new-york-state-for-insurance-violations/.
107.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 118–20.
108.
See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 915.
109.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 120.
110.
Kathryn Gessner, Uber Vs. Lyft: Who’s Tops in the Battle of U.S.
Rideshare
Companies,
SECOND
MEASURE
(Aug.
21,
2019),
http://blog.secondmeasure.com/datapoints/rideshare-industry-overview/. Uber takes in 71.1%
of all ride-share spending in the United States, meanwhile Lyft is responsible for 27.2%. Id.
Only 1.7% of ride-share spending goes to other ride-sharing companies, like Sidecar. Id.
111.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 121.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.; Matthew Mitchell & Michael Farren, Op-Ed: If You Like Uber, You
Would’ve Loved the Yesteryear’s Jitney, L.A. TIMES: OPINION (July 12, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mitchell-jitneys-uber-ride-share-20140713story.html.
114.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 121.
115.
Brian Fung, E.U. Court Adviser Delivers Opinion Against Uber, WASH.
POST, May 12, 2017, at A13.
116.
The
History
of
Uber,
UBER:
NEWSROOM,
http://www.uber.com/newsroom/history/ (last visited May 1, 2020). The Uber app was
initially launched in 2009, but the first Uber ride was taken July 5th, 2010. Id.
117.
Evie Liu, Uber, Lyft, and Beyond Meat Stocks Will Join the Russell 1000
Next Week. Don’t Expect Prices to Move Much, BARRON’S (June 28, 2019, 11:36 AM),
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of ride-sharing services to accommodate all manner of clientele.118 Lyft has
followed a similar path.119 Like Uber, Lyft started in San Francisco and has
expanded rapidly, both domestically and abroad.120 Lyft also offers a variety
of services, from the economical Lyft Share to their luxury black car service,
Lyft Lux Black.121 Both firms have also experimented with versions of their
service tailored for commuters or carpooling.122
Research indicates that consumers who use shared-use modes of
transportation, like ride-sharing, are more likely to use public transportation
than their non-sharing counterparts.123 Frequent ride-share users tend to own
fewer cars and rely on a variety of different modes of transportation,
adapting as needed.124 People who regularly use several shared transit modes
“own half as many household cars as [those] who use public transit alone.”125
In comparison to taxi customers, ride-sharers are younger, own fewer cars,
and are more likely to travel with other people.126
Just like car-sharing has allowed for more intensive use of otherwise
unused vehicles, ride-sharing apps also allow more intensive use of human
capital.127 Peer-to-peer ride-sharing firms, “serve [a] two-sided market[]:
[T]heir users include both market-buyers and market-sellers.”128 Two-sided
sharing platforms can create a producer and consumer surplus because they
allow “existing assets to be traded in new ways.”129 Many people own

http://www.barrons.com/articles/uber-lyft-beyond-meat-stocks-will-join-the-russell-1000next-week-51561736049.
118.
See What We Offer, UBER, http://www.uber.com/us/en/about/uberofferings/ (last visited May 1, 2020). Uber’s ride-sharing options include: Pool, UberX,
UberXL, Lux, and Lux SUV. Ride, UBER: OUR PRODUCTS, http://www.uber.com/us/en/ride/
(last visited May 1, 2020).
119.
See Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 122.
120.
Id.
121.
Sign up to Ride, LYFT: RIDER, http://www.lyft.com/rider#options (last
visited May 1, 2020); see also Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 122.
122.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 123.
123.
See SHARED-USE MOBILITY CTR., SHARED MOBILITY AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC TRANSIT, 6 (2016). The research was conducted in partnership
with the American Public Transit Association, with survey information from over 4,500
shared mobility users from across the United States. Id.
124.
Id. at 3–4.
125.
Id.
126.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 125.
127.
See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 917.
128.
Id. In Uber’s case, riders are the market-buyers and drivers are the
market-sellers. Id.; see also David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial
Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 154
(2007).
129.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 918.
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vehicles but previously were unable to capitalize on them.130 Now those
vehicle owners can sell their driving services and offset the costs of
ownership.131 Firms utilizing two-sided platforms can also engage in
seemingly anti-competitive actions, that may be beneficial to society.132
Ride-sharing firms’ dependence on gig workers is pitched as a positive but
has led to many of the legal questions facing this sector.133
The rise of the non-professional, or gig, workers for peer-to-peer carsharing firms has caused tension with existing professional employees in the
industry, and tension between the ride-sharing firms and their own drivers.134
The taxi industry has been vocal in their malcontent for ride-sharing firms.135
They argue that they have an unfair competitive advantage due to the relative
lack of regulation imposed on ride-sharing.136 As the industry has matured,
new regulations have been imposed on ride-sharing firms in attempts to
resolve disputes over unfair competition.137 Some municipalities have struck
deals with sharing companies, allowing them to continue or resume
operations in return for new tax payments.138 In Colorado and Washington
D.C., Uber has been required to conduct more extensive background checks
on their drivers, and buy additional insurance coverage.139 New York City
has enacted regulations that create a pay standard for drivers and have

130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
See id. As an example, ride-sharing firms can manipulate prices for one
side of the market to attract people towards the other. Id. It is common among ride-sharing
firms to charge cut rate fares when first entering a market to attract new customers. Rauch &
Schleicher, supra note 18, at 918. Likewise, ride-sharing firms will also hike fares during
times of heightened demand in hopes of attracting extra drivers. Id. at 908.
133.
See Become a Driver, LYFT: DRIVER, http://www.lyft.com/driver (last
visited May 1, 2020); Drive, UBER: OUR PRODUCTS, http://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/ (last
visited May 1, 2020). Lyft sells potential drivers on being their own boss, getting reliable
earnings, and maintaining a flexible schedule. Become a Driver, supra. Uber’s pitch to
drivers set your own hours, get paid fast, and earn on your terms. Id.; Sara Ashley O’Brien,
Why Uber and Lyft Drivers Are Striking, CNN: BUS. (May 8, 2019),
http://www.cnn.com/2019/05/07/tech/uber-driver-strike-ipo/index.html; Lauren Feiner, Uber
Drivers Will go on Strike over Pay and Benefits Ahead of the Company’s $90 Billion IPO,
CNBC: TECH (May 8, 2019, 12:36 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/07/uber-lyft-driversto-go-on-strike-over-low-wages-and-benefits.html.
134.
See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 922; Feiner, supra note 133.
135.
Andrea Peterson, What It Looks Like When Taxi Drivers Protest Uber and
Lyft in D.C., WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/10/28/what-it-looks-like-when-taxi-drivers-protest-uber-and-lyft-in-d-c/.
136.
Id.
137.
See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 922–23.
138.
Id. at 923.
139.
Id.
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capped the number of ride-sharing vehicles allowed in the city.140 Some
cities have taken a sterner approach, temporarily or permanently banning
certain ride-sharing services.141
Ride-sharing firms have also been heavily criticized for how they
treat their employees.142 The service providers on apps like Uber and Lyft
“are not full-time [salaried] employees and lack benefits” traditional to fulltime employment—health insurance, paid sick leave, and retirement plans.143
The question of how ride-sharing drivers should be classified has been a
long-running discussion that has been subject to both contentious litigation
and political debate.144 Wages for drivers can also be lower than what some
marketing materials might suggest.145 Ride-sharing firms dispute these
claims and argue that their workers make more than similar employees at
more traditional firms.146 Further, they provide an opportunity for their
workers to earn a “supplementary income that would otherwise be
unavailable” to them.147
3.

Micromobility

The history of shared micromobility began in 1965 when the first
bike-share program was introduced in Amsterdam.148 In this program,
140.
James Parrott & Michael Reich, How City Regulations Are Making Uber
and
Lyft
Better,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(July
23,
2019,
8:00
AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-how-city-regulations-are-making-uber-andlyft-better-20190723-lquix3t4b5gbdh3vlqlwhtj4nm-story.html.
141.
Uber Launches in Hamburg, Now Live in Six German Cities, REUTERS
(July 16, 2019, 6:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-germany/uber-launches-inhamburg-now-live-in-six-german-cities-idUSKCN1UB2SD (discussing Uber being forced out
of, and now reentering German markets with new regulations); Natasha Lomas, Uber Driven
Out
of
Barcelona
Again,
TECHCRUNCH
(Jan.
31,
2019,
5:37
AM),
http://www.techcrunch.com/2019/01/31/uber-driven-out-of-barcelona-again/; see also Uber
Drivers in Denmark Must Pay Fine for Every Ride, Supreme Court Rules, REUTERS (Sept. 13,
2018, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-denmark/uber-drivers-in-denmarkmust-pay-fine-for-every-ride-supreme-court-rules-idUSKCN1LT1M7.
142.
See Feiner, supra note 133.
143.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 925.
144.
See Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Settles Driver Classification Lawsuit for
$20
Million,
VERGE
(Mar.
12,
2019,
11:59
AM),
http://www.theverge.com/2019/3/12/18261755/uber-driver-classification-lawsuit-settlement20-million.
145.
See Michael Sainato, ‘I Made $3.75 an Hour’: Lyft and Uber Drivers
Push to Unionize for Better Pay, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2019, 2:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/22/uber-lyft-ipo-drivers-unionize-low-payexpenses.
146.
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 925.
147.
Id.
148.
DeMaio, supra note 14, at 42.
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unwanted bikes were painted white, and simply left out for public use.149
The program fell apart quickly as bikes were stolen, damaged, and thrown
into canals.150 The next major attempt at bike-sharing was in Copenhagen in
1995.151 Bikes were dispensed from a station, and while free, required a coin
deposit that was returned when the bike was returned.152 The Copenhagen
system still suffered from theft and bike damage because of the anonymity of
the users.153 In the late 1990s and early 2000s new bike-share programs in
England and France that tracked who checked out bikes were
implemented.154 Paris’ bike-share, Vélib’, has been particularly successful
with fifty million trips in its first two years.155 Today it has a fleet of over
fourteen-thousand bikes.156 Now with GPS tracking, remote locking, online
payment, and the ubiquity of smartphones, bike-shares can be dockless.157 In
2018, e-scooters and dockless bikes usage overtook station based bike-share
usage.158
III.

PROS AND CONS OF E-SCOOTERS

Micromobility may trace its roots to bike-share programs in the
twentieth century, but the sector has exploded since 2018 with the emergence
of shared dockless e-scooters and bikes.159 The sharing firms that pioneered
the e-scooter, Bird and Lime, have reached billion-dollar valuations faster
than any other United States’ companies.160 Thousands of e-scooters
belonging to these two companies can be found in over one hundred cities
worldwide.161 With the massive rise in micromobility and huge valuations of
e-scooter companies, it begs the question: What exactly are we talking

149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
DeMaio, supra note 14, at 42.
154.
Id. at 42–43.
155.
Id. at 45.
156.
Feargus O’Sullivan, The Great Parisian Bikeshare Meltdown, CITYLAB
(May 8, 2018), http://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/05/the-paris-bikeshare-is-nowfree-but-thats-because-its-broken/559913/.
157.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, supra note 2, at 4.
158.
Id. at 5.
159.
Ajao, supra note 19.
160.
Id.
161.
Joshua Brustein et al., Why E-Scooters Are on the Rise, Along with
Injuries,
BLOOMBERG
(July
20,
2019,
12:00
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-20/why-e-scooters-are-on-the-rise-alongwith-injuries-quicktake.
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about?162 The best “way to think about what micromobility is and can be is
in relation to existing infrastructure: Micromobility constitutes forms of
transport that can occupy space alongside bicycles.”163 E-scooters in
particular, are electric-powered scooters that are rented for short one-way
trips.164 Users begin rental by unlocking them through the companies’
smartphone app.165 To end a trip, users simply park the scooter on the
sidewalk, preferably out of the way of pedestrian traffic.166 On average, escooters have a maximum speed of fifteen miles per hour.167
A.

Benefits of E-Scooters and Micromobility

Since 2018, e-scooters have popped up quickly, sometimes
overnight, in cities across the country.168 The young industry still has plenty
of issues that need to be addressed, but e-scooters also have the potential to
positively affect cities.169 Early studies indicate that e-scooters could reduce
traffic congestion and act as a first/last mile solution, reduce air pollution,
and provide a transportation alternative for underserved low-income areas.170
1.

E-Scooters as a First/Last Mile Solution

As cities and urban areas continue to experience rapid population
growth, the strain placed on existing transportation networks will continue to
grow.171 Over half the world population lives in urbanized areas, and current
trends could see two-thirds of the world’s population living in cities by
2050.172 Some projections show that the demand for urban passenger-miles

(2018).

162.
163.
164.

See Ajao, supra note 19.
ZARIF ET AL., supra note 21, at 2.
PORTLAND BUREAU OF TRANSP., 2018 E-SCOOTER FINDINGS REPORT 8

165.
Id.; Electric Scooter Sharing, LIME, http://www.li.me/electric-scooter (last
visited May 1, 2020).
166.
PORTLAND BUREAU OF TRANSP., supra note 164, at 8.
167.
Ethan May, Here’s Everything You Need to Know About Bird and Lime
Electric
Scooters,
INDIANAPOLIS
STAR
(Apr.
11,
2019,
11:21
AM)
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/06/21/bird-electric-scooters-rental-costs-hourscharging-locations/720893002/.
168.
Skilling, supra note 14.
169.
See Ajao, supra note 19.
170.
PORTLAND BUREAU OF TRANSP., supra note 164, at 11; ZARIF ET AL., supra
note 21, at 3.
171.
ZARIF ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.
172.
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could just about double between 2015 and 2050.173 Moving forward, mass
transit (trains, buses, etc.) will continue to be the most efficient method to
transport great numbers of people over large distances, but getting people to
and from public transit remains a challenge in many cities.174 Travelers left
without convenient and affordable ways to reach public transit are more
likely to use inefficient private vehicles, the source of much congestion and
air pollution in urban areas.175
Areas where demand for transit is high but access is low have been
dubbed transit deserts.176 People who depend on public transit, yet live in
transit deserts, may be forced to forgo certain job opportunities, preventative
medical care, and access to healthy food.177 E-scooters, and micromobility in
general, offer a potential solution to address the first/last mile problem and
effectively shrink transit deserts.178 A Chinese dockless bike-sharing
program, Mobike, claims to have doubled access to health care, jobs, and
education by targeting areas presently underserved by public transit.179
About half of the trips using bike-share programs in China are part of
multimodal journeys that include public transit.180 This resembles the
behavior of American travelers that make use of sharing services.181 Users
without the sunk cost investments of private vehicles are more flexible and
willing to use a range of transportation services that fit their needs.182
Micromobility and e-scooters may have even greater potential as a
partial replacement for other transit options.183 Each year more than half of
the car trips taken in the United States are less than five miles long.184 These
short-distance car trips are ripe to be replaced with alternative modes of
transportation, like e-scooters and dockless bikes.185 The average trip made
173.
ZARIF ET AL., supra note 21, at 3.
174.
Id.
175.
Id. at 3, 8.
176.
Junfeng Jiao & Nicole McGrath, In the US, Transit Deserts Are Making It
Hard for People to Find Jobs and Stay Healthy, CITYMETRIC (Sept. 4, 2017),
http://www.citymetric.com/transport/us-transit-deserts-are-making-it-hard-people-find-jobsand-stay-healthy-3291.
177.
Id.
178.
ZARIF ET AL., supra note 21, at 3–4.
179.
Id. at 4.
180.
See Xiaomei Tan & Yin Dafei, Bike-Sharing Data and Cities: Lessons
from
China’s
Experience,
GLOBAL
ENV’T
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(Jan.
17,
2018),
http://www.thegef.org/blog/bike-sharing-data-and-cities-lessons-china-experience.
181.
Schwieterman & Pelon, supra note 24, at 117.
182.
Id.
183.
ZARIF ET AL., supra note 21, at 8.
184.
Id. at 4; see also Frequently Used National Statistics: Vehicle Trips,
NAT’L HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURV. (2017), https://nhts.ornl.gov/verhicle-trips.
185.
ZARIF ET AL., supra note 21, at 2.
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on e-scooters and bike-share is between 1.2 and 2.5 miles.186 Portland’s
study of their e-scooter pilot program found that thirty-four percent of
residents and forty-eight percent of visitors would have used a car if a
scooter had not been available.187 Additionally, six percent of Portlanders
reported getting rid of their personal vehicle because of e-scooters and
another sixteen percent considered it.188 Other areas where short trips
abound, like university campuses and military bases, are also ripe for
micromobility solutions.189
2.

E-Scooters as Transportation for Underserved Areas

As private and shared mobility services have expanded quickly,
many cities are concerned that traditionally underserved, low-income areas
are not given equal access to new transportation modes.190 Station-based
bike-sharing systems have been criticized for disproportionately
concentrating stations in wealthier communities, limiting accessibility in
low-income and minority neighborhoods.191 Survey data suggests that public
support for micromobility and e-scooters is highest among lower-income
groups.192 Because there is minimal infrastructure required for e-scooters,
cities may look to micromobility as a means to improve access to
transportation for all.193 In Portland, the city required that e-scooter
companies provide a set minimum number of scooters to lower-income areas
(East Portland) that had been historically underserved by the transportation
system.194 Portland also required a lower price be charged for e-scooter
usage in East Portland.195 The city found that the scooters were used
regularly and riders in East Portland took sixty percent longer trips than
riders in central Portland.196 Similar to other polling data, Portland found
that its lower-income residents were strongly in favor of e-scooters.197
186.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFICIALS, supra note 2, at 11.
187.
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188.
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189.
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190.
POPULUS, THE MICRO-MOBILITY REVOLUTION: THE INTRODUCTION AND
ADOPTION OF ELECTRIC SCOOTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2018).
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
PORTLAND BUREAU OF TRANSP., supra note 164, at 26. The study did note
that despite the requirement to deploy at least 100 scooters in East Portland each day, only one
of three companies complied. Id. at 7. On average, 243 scooters were deployed to East
Portland. Id. at 26.
195.
See id. at 7.
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See id. at 26.
197.
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Issues Facing E-Scooters

While e-scooters may have tremendous potential to affect positive
change in the world, they have also caused their share of controversy.198 Escooter companies have barged into cities and employed tried and true tactics
common among tech startups but grating on local governments.199 E-scooter
riders have been injured, and hospitals have reported spikes in scooterrelated injuries.200 Both pedestrians and vehicles have had their space
intruded by e-scooters.201
1.

E-Scooters Employ the Playbook

Around the country, cities were caught flat-footed by the sudden
deployment of scooter fleets within their limits.202 Seemingly overnight, an
entirely new form of transportation arrived in their towns and governments
were forced to react quickly.203 Some local governments responded by
simply banning scooters instead of grappling with ubiquitous ride-hailing
and the ensuing congestion and competition with public transit.204
Scooter companies are currently executing a familiar playbook that
has been employed by sharing firms in many industries.205 The goal of the
playbook is to bend or manipulate local politics to their advantage.206 The
playbook is emblematic of Silicon Valley and Mark Zuckerberg’s motto,
“[m]ove fast and break things.”207 Step one is to quickly enter markets and
develop customer bases before waiting around for regulatory approval.208
Next, if and when regulators begin to crack down on them, sharing firms
argue that they are not actually doing anything, but they are instead simply a
network that connects third parties.209 This can force cities to enforce
regulations against their own individual citizens, a politically dangerous
gambit.210 Finally, sharing firms weaponize their large, loyal customer
198.
See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 914–16.
199.
See id. at 927–28.
200.
See PORTLAND BUREAU OF TRANSP., supra note 164, at 22.
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See id. at 24–25; ZARIF ET AL., supra note 21, at 7.
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Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 927.
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Hemant Taneja, The Era of “Move Fast and Break Things” Is Over,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 22, 2019), http://www.hbr.org/2019/01/the-era-of-move-fast-andbreak-things-is-over.
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Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 18, at 927.
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bases, bombarding politicians via social media and other protests.211 What
sharing firms lack in history and hardened organization they make up for in
technological and media savvy.212 When the playbook is used effectively,
sharing firms, like e-scooters, become too big to ban before regulators can
act.213
2.

Safety Concerns

The safety of both e-scooter riders and others has been of paramount
concern in many cities, it is also the issue that garners the most media
attention.214 Hospitals have reported dramatic spikes in scooter-related
injuries and Portland found that scooter-related injury emergency room visits
accounted for about five percent of total crash injury visits.215 Further, in
sixteen percent of reported injuries, there was evidence of alcohol use.216
Data also suggests that despite warnings from e-scooter companies, riders are
not wearing helmets.217 Portland found that ninety percent of riders did not
wear helmets and Austin found that less than one percent of injured riders
wore helmets.218 The study conducted by the City of Austin and the CDC
concluded that there should be an increase in educational messaging
emphasizing safety and helmet use.219 The report also found that most
riders’ only training on e-scooter usage was provided by the app.220 More
substantial training was recommended going forward.221
E-scooter
companies are addressing some of the safety concerns and will be
introducing new scooter models with sturdier chassis and larger wheels
capable of handling uneven pavement.222
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Id.
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that a spike in scooter related injuries should be expected to a certain degree, simply because
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Impact on Pedestrians and Vehicles

Many of the complaints about e-scooters from both cities and their
citizens stem from scooters’ usage of public spaces.223 In particular, there is
concern among pedestrians about e-scooter usage on sidewalks.224 It varies
from city to city as to whether or not it is legal to ride on sidewalks, but
unprotected pedestrians sharing space with vehicles that can travel fifteen
miles per hour is naturally concerning.225 Interestingly, pedestrians are not
the only ones that dislike e-scooters presence on sidewalks.226 Scooter riders
themselves strongly prefer riding in bike lanes over sidewalks, and generally
avoid sidewalks unless the alternative is a major roadway without a bike
lane.227
In a way, e-scooters are exposing an infrastructure limitation that has
existed in the United States for decades.228 Many United States cities have
prioritized automobiles over any other mode of transportation, which has left
micromobility users with a dearth of options.229 Expecting unprotected
scooter riders to use streets without bike lanes and cohabit the same space as
cars seems more likely to cause serious injury than sidewalk riding.230
However, the future of safe e-scooter use depends on infrastructure being
built with all forms of micromobility in mind.231
IV.

REGULATION OF E-SCOOTERS

Going forward, if e-scooters are to be used safely and effectively,
cities must implement regulations, and e-scooter companies must abide by
them.232 Regulators must avoid the temptation to simply try and control escooter companies and instead work collaboratively.233 Cities should require
that e-scooter companies share data and then use that data to properly tailor
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regulations.234 Finally, cities should take time to experiment with their
regulations and use outcome-based regulations when possible.235
A.

Cities Must Be Collaborative

Few would dispute that e-scooter companies may have acted too
boldly when they stormed into cities without warning in 2018.236 It would
also not be surprising if politicians and regulators were decidedly miffed at
these brash new startups and saw regulations as a means to control the
scourge of e-scooters.237 However, city officials should resist the urge to
unilaterally regulate scooters to death and instead recognize the potential of
e-scooters.238
If deployed properly, e-scooters could reduce urban
congestion, lower emissions, and cure uneven access to public transit.239
The influx of e-scooters and dockless bikes represents an opportunity
to build a policy framework that can accommodate new mobility devices that
are introduced in the future.240 Cities could begin to integrate future policy
decisions with information generated by digital mobility platforms that can
improve transportation systems.241
By developing a collaborative
relationship with sharing firms today, cities will be able to more readily
handle future mobility options like autonomous vehicles.242
Both
governments and service providers must remain open to collaboration and
cognizant of the struggles faced by their counterparts.243 One area ripe for
cooperation is data sharing between e-scooter companies and cities.244
B.

Data Sharing

One of the primary concerns city lawmakers have about e-scooters is
how, when, and where e-scooters are deployed.245 A mutually beneficial
234.
See id.; ZARIF ET AL., supra note 21, at 8–10.
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237.
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solution to this problem could be the standardization and sharing of data
between scooter companies and cities.246 If e-scooters are to be fully woven
into cities’ transportation networks, it will be crucial for city leaders to have
accurate up-to-date information about how scooters are being deployed and
utilized.247 To that end, the city of Los Angeles has developed and published
an application programming interface (“API”) that enables cities to take in
and analyze e-scooter data in real time.248 The cities of Portland, Austin, and
Santa Monica have implemented this powerful tool to gain a more complete
understanding of how e-scooters are being used.249 E-scooter companies
have also shown a willingness to share data with cities.250 Going forward,
cities should make data sharing a precondition for micromobility firms to
enter their market.251
C.

Potential Methods of Regulation

Many cities have already enacted regulations that cap scooter fleet
sizes and limit where scooters can travel.252 However, there are other forms
of regulation that might better serve their citizens that politicians should
consider.253
1.

Portland Regulatory Sandbox

Instead of jumping headlong into permanent regulation, cities should
be prepared to be adaptive.254 The cities of Portland and Tampa’s first forays
into scooter regulation have been through pilot programs.255 These programs
allow cities the opportunity to test multiple regulatory solutions at different
times in different areas.256 Cities can work directly with e-scooter companies
246.
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See id.
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to implement things like variable rental fees (by area), rules for e-scooter
parking, and incentive structures.257 Portland’s 2018 pilot program only
lasted for four months, allowing city officials to test their initial regulatory
ideas and properly recalibrate their efforts when implementing more long
term plans.258 Los Angeles has engaged in a similar plan, putting their
current regulations in place for a year, with the express intent of giving
“transportation officials time to tinker with the policies before lawmakers
approve a permanent plan.”259
2.

Outcome-Based Regulations

When crafting regulations, politicians should work with the mindset
of how can we use e-scooters to help our city, instead of how can we take
control over e-scooter use in our city?260 Cities should implement outcomebased regulation, with performance-based criteria for e-scooter companies.261
First, cities must establish goals they want to accomplish with their
transportation system.262 Then articulate those goals to service providers and
design regulations to help reach those goals.263 For example, in Portland’s
pilot program, each scooter company was capped at a fleet of 683 scooters.264
Portland also attempted to implement a requirement that 100 scooters were
deployed in East Portland (a low-income area, lacking in public transit) each
day.265 Only one of the three scooter companies complied with the East
Portland fleet requirement.266 A possible solution would be for Portland to
offer higher fleet caps to firms that demonstrate they are willing and able to
meet the East Portland fleet requirement and lower fleet caps for those that
cannot.267
257.
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CONCLUSION

A decade ago, the sharing economy essentially did not exist.268
Today, it is a significant part of our world, comprised of multiple billion
dollar companies and hundreds of fledgling startups bent on disrupting new
industries.269 There have been a series of mobility-oriented sharing firms
that have entered our cities.270 Car-sharing, ride-sharing, and micromobility
have all shown great potential to positively affect society.271 However, none
of these technologies are without controversy.272 Well thought-out policy
and regulation will be critical as shared mobility becomes interwoven with
modern urban transportation networks.273
Now, there is a new player in the world of shared mobility, dockless
e-scooters and bikes.274 Thousands of e-scooters can be found in over 100
cities worldwide.275 This young industry could be used as a real tool for
cities, as e-scooters have the potential to positively affect cities.276 Escooters could be used to reduce traffic congestion and act as a first/last mile
solution, reduce air pollution, and provide transportation alternative for
underserved low-income areas.277
While e-scooters may have tremendous potential to effect positive
change in the world, they have all caused their share of controversy.278 Escooter companies have barged into cities and employed tried and true tactics
common among tech startups but grating on local governments.279 E-scooter
users have been injured, while hospitals have reported spikes in scooterrelated injuries.280 Both pedestrians and vehicles have had their space
intruded by e-scooters.281
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If e-scooters are to be used safely and effectively, cities must
implement regulations, and e-scooter companies must abide by them.282
Regulators must avoid the temptation to simply try and control e-scooter
companies and instead work collaboratively.283 Cities should require that escooter companies share data and then use that data to properly tailor
regulations.284 Finally, cities should take time to experiment with their
regulations and use outcome-based regulations when possible.285
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